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Throughout much of the world corruption, one of humanity’s oldest problems, is
increasingly seen as a major obstacle to the development of open societies. In particular,
political corruption—the abuse of political process and power for private gain—discred-
its elections, poisons governments, undermines transparency and accountability, and
frustrates the consolidation of the rule of law. 
Combating corruption is one of five principal thematic aims of the Justice
Initiative’s current work. We promote rights-based law reform in partnership with local
institutions through a variety of tools, including litigation, advocacy, research and mon-
itoring, and technical assistance. Underlying each activity is an effort to enhance the
capacity of civil society groups to promote more open societies through legal means. 
In the field of corruption, our efforts to date have focused on the monitoring 
of campaign and political party finance—the means by which resources are raised and
spent in political campaigns. Problems range from the excessive influence of private
donors to the misuse of state resources in favoring particular candidates or parties.
Adequate disclosure and regulation of campaign finance are necessary prerequisites to
controlling political corruption. In many countries legal regimes governing campaign
finance are riddled with loopholes and poorly enforced. 
Civil society can often play a major role in highlighting flaws in the regulatory
process, identifying gaps in implementation, and proposing workable remedies and
solutions. Monitoring is a fundamental technique for achieving government transparen-
cy and accountability. It exposes corrupt practices, which almost always take place in
secret, to the cleansing force of public scrutiny. This handbook aims to provide practical
tools to members of civil society committed to fighting corruption. In doing so, it draws
on the rich experience of citizens challenging corrupt practices in more than a dozen
countries—from Argentina to Latvia, Poland to Zimbabwe.
The worldwide movement of civil society activists working to combat corruption
is an emerging reality of our time. In investigating facts, exposing wrongdoing, and
advocating for change, anticorruption activists can learn from others already using these
Foreword
techniques, including the international human rights movement that has come 
to prominence in the past quarter century. The Justice Initiative looks forward to collab-
orating with its partners in fortifying and deepening the anticorruption cause, and 
we offer this handbook as a modest contribution to that objective.
James A. Goldston
Executive Director
Open Society Justice Initiative
xii :  Open Society Justice Initiative
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Monitoring Election Campaign Finance: A Handbook for NGOs responds to a need that has
become increasingly felt among anticorruption activists in many countries. Corrupt
electoral campaign financing—whether by private donors or government incumbents
commandeering state resources—is damaging not only to the electoral process, but to
democracy itself. Political finance regulations, intended to create a level playing field for
electoral competition, often appear inadequate in the face of corruption.
In Western Europe, as elsewhere in the world, serious party financing scandals
in the past decade have shaken the political establishments of Belgium, France,
Germany, and Spain, and have contributed to a severe distrust of politicians and the per-
ception of rampant corruption. In 1997, the Czech government collapsed as a result of
a party funding scandal. According to the 2003 Transparency International Global
Corruption Barometer Survey,
1
in three countries out of four, political parties appeared
at the top of the list of institutions from which citizens said they would most like to elim-
inate corruption. 
International organizations are increasingly recognizing the threat. A May
2000 recommendation of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly states: 
The financial resources deployed in election campaigns can be as influential as party
programs or candidates in determining voting behavior (and thus election out-
comes).
2
In a 2001 recommendation, the Assembly adds:
Citizens are showing growing concern with regard to corruption linked to political
parties’ gradual loss of independence and the occurrence of improper influence on
political decisions through financial means.
3
Introduction
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The Council of Europe is not alone in expressing these concerns. A recent statement by
the Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas agrees: 
Largely because of many improper practices in financing campaigns and cor-
ruption scandals, politics unfortunately has become a discredited activity to
many people.
4
Correspondingly, NGOs across the world have begun to monitor campaign
finance and advocate reforms in order to reduce the opportunities for corruption, with
some promising results. Guidance on how to monitor election campaign finance
remains scarce, however. 
This handbook is the first systematic effort to date to consolidate the experiences
and knowledge of a wide variety of campaign finance monitoring efforts. It is intended to
provide a collection of existing good practices and lessons, organized in the form of both
practical guidelines and discussions of key concepts, to assist NGOs in designing and car-
rying out effective campaign finance monitoring and reform programs in their own coun-
tries. 
The handbook does not present a single “one size fits all” method applicable in
all contexts. Instead, it offers a set of tools appropriate for monitoring different aspects
of campaign finance. The exact combination of tools must be relevant to the local con-
text, and will vary from country to country. Any recommendations for reform should
likewise be tailored to local needs and circumstances.
The chapters that follow are designed to help NGOs reduce corruption by shap-
ing a campaign finance environment that is less susceptible to corrupt influence.
Monitoring can contribute in three ways: by revealing corruption or possible corruption,
promoting transparency, and/or assessing the performance of the current regulatory
framework. 
This handbook seeks to provide a methodology for monitoring campaign
finance that will help NGOs
• formulate clear and specific objectives to inform the design of a monitoring
project;
• identify the aspects of campaign finance to monitor, considering the unique
national institutional and legal environment;
• monitor different types of campaign expenditure;
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• monitor contributions to political parties and candidates;
• monitor the misuse of state or public resources for election campaign purposes;
• use monitoring results effectively;
• evaluate the success of a monitoring exercise.
While the handbook provides guidance specifically on monitoring election cam-
paign finances, the methods described here might also be used to monitor political
finance in general, that is, the totality of political parties’ or candidates’ income and
spending.
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance: A Handbook for NGOs is structured as follows:
Chapter One provides an overview of political finance and its relationship to corrup-
tion. The chapter defines the main terms used in this handbook and explains how
political finance may be vulnerable to corruption and how it can be monitored,
using the Justice Initiative approach. 
Chapter Two guides NGOs through the process of preparing and designing a mon-
itoring project. A preliminary “Scoping Study” is recommended to collect relevant
information on political financing and provide a basis for designing a well-targeted
monitoring project.
Chapter Three tackles the issue of campaign expenditure, provides a categorization 
of campaign spending, and explains how to monitor the different categories. 
Chapter Four focuses on monitoring political income, specifically political contri-
butions. 
Chapter Five introduces and explains a phenomenon that has so far received little
attention: the misuse of state administrative resources for campaign purposes. The
chapter explains why the misuse of administrative resources should be treated as a
form of campaign finance and provides a categorization of types of misuse of
administrative resources. 
Chapter Six provides information and examples for monitoring and preventing the
misuse of administrative resources.
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Chapters Seven and Eight offer guidance on using the results of monitoring and
evaluating the success of the monitoring exercise.
The Appendices provide a range of tools and information that can be used in for-
mulating and conducting monitoring activities. 
A Glossary at the back of the book also helps readers by providing definitions to key
terms used in the handbook.
We hope that the information offered here proves useful to NGOs in designing
and implementing their own monitoring projects. This handbook is not the final word
on the subject, however, and we invite NGOs to contact the Open Society Justice
Initiative with lessons and insights from new projects.
Notes
1. Transparency Interational Global Corruption Barometer Survey, 2003. See http://www.transparency.org/sur-
veys/ barometer/dnld/barometer2003_release.en.pdf.
2. Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, Resolution 105 (2000) on the
financial transparency of political parties and their democratic functioning at regional level, approved at
Seventh Session, Strasbourg, May 23-25, 2000.
3. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1516 (2001) on financing of political parties.
4. Statement of the Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers of the Americas, “Financing Democracy:
Political Parties, Campaigns, and Elections”, The Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia, March 19, 2003, p. 1.
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/nondatabase/Final%20Statement%20Financing%20Democracy.pdf.
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This handbook systematizes the key practical experiences and expertise on campaign
finance monitoring from the sources summarized below.
• Case Studies of campaign finance monitoring projects in Latvia, Romania,
Slovakia, and Ukraine
• Experiences from past monitoring efforts in the United States, Brazil, and
Zimbabwe
• Academic research on campaign finance in Poland, Costa Rica, and Uruguay
• Discussions, held between April and September 2003, in Kiev, Seoul, Yerevan,
and Istanbul, with NGOs involved in monitoring campaign finance, including
Asociatia Pro Democratia (Romania), the Center for Regional Development/
Transparency International Armenia, Delna (Transparency International Latvia),
the Fair Play Alliance (Slovak Republic), the Freedom of Choice Coalition
(Ukraine), Poder Ciudadano (Argentina), and Transparencia Brasil
• Review and expert input from Shari Bryan, Arista M. Cirtautas, Vera Devine,
Christian Gruenberg, Jonathan Hartlyn, Richard Holloway, John Makumbe,
Elena Panfilova, Mark Philp, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Rotimi Sankore, and
Marcin Walecki
The Case Studies
Full text versions of the Case Studies are available on the Open Society Justice Initiative
website, www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ac/cfm. 
Latvia: 2002 Parliamentary Elections
Delna (Transparency International Latvia), together with the Soros Foundation–Latvia,
monitored political parties’ income and expenditure in the run-up to the October 2002
Sources
¸ ¸
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parliamentary elections. The exercise followed a pilot effort that monitored the March
2001 municipal elections and contributed to the introduction of legal disclosure require-
ments on parties’ income and expenditure. The 2002 project monitored political and 
hidden advertising to compare the amount spent on publicity with parties’ declared
expenditure. Virtually all media were monitored (TV, radio, national and local press). 
The project further analyzed income declarations to assess whether declared donors were 
genuine. Parties spent almost double the amount they officially declared on advertising.
Significant evidence emerged that many donors were incorrectly or falsely declared by
parties and candidates. A decrease in the incidence of hidden advertising was noted
between 2001 and 2002, attributed in part to the 2001 monitoring exercise. Both projects
successfully increased the visibility of campaign financing in the public arena. Finally, 
legislative reforms advocated by Delna and the Soros Foundation–Latvia, including
stricter disclosure requirements, were adopted in 2002.
Romania: Election Year 2000
In 2000, Asociatia Pro Democratia (APD) monitored political party financing during 
the local and national parliamentary elections. The objective of the project was to
increase transparency in party financing, specifically by focusing attention on the issue,
monitoring compliance with financing regulations, and drafting and advocating 
a new law on political party financing. For the local elections, political advertising
through newspapers, posters, billboards, and banners was monitored in four major
towns. In the national elections, monitoring focused on advertising (TV, radio, press,
and outdoor ads—billboards, banners, and posters). Estimates of expenditure on adver-
tising were then compared with parties’ official income declarations: findings indicated
that spending exceeded declared income tenfold across party lines. The project succeed-
ed in placing the issue of party finance high on the public agenda, and produced bench-
mark figures on the costs of campaign activities, which can be used in future monitor-
ing. APD drafted and proposed a new law on party finance, which served as input into
later legislative amendments adopted by the government in 2003.
Slovakia: 2002 Parliamentary Elections
In 2002, the political campaigns for the Slovakian parliamentary elections were moni-
tored by the Alliance for Promotion of Fair Play (renamed the Fair Play Alliance in
2003). The NGO was founded specifically for this purpose with the support of a num-
¸ ¸
ber of international and national NGOs, and serves as a permanent party finance watch-
dog. Monitoring sought to estimate the market value of parties’ election campaign activ-
ities, to assess compliance with party finance regulation, and to evaluate the financial 
situation and history of political parties. The project monitored press and outdoor adver-
tising (political advertising on TV and radio is banned in Slovakia), marketing activities,
rallies, promotional materials, administrative and operational costs, and other campaign
activities. The final estimate of costs did not include rallies and other events, but the
project nevertheless demonstrated the significance of these categories, and concluded
that a more thorough estimate would have considerably exceeded official declarations.
The project also found that existing spending restrictions were too vague to be properly
enforced. The project team compiled a large amount of systematic quantitative and qual-
itative data on campaign practices and the legal framework, together with recommenda-
tions for reform, not yet adopted. The Alliance has followed up with a new project to
track political donations and benefits to donors in the form of public contracts or other
favorable political decisions.
Ukraine: 2002 Parliamentary Elections
In 2002, the Freedom of Choice Coalition, an alliance of Ukrainian NGOs, monitored
the financing of the 2002 parliamentary campaign. The exercise, designed broadly to
reduce corruption and increase transparency in election campaign finance, monitored
spending on advertising by parties and electoral coalitions. The focus was on political
advertising, both direct and hidden, in select national and regional TV, radio, and print
media outlets. Monitored spending on advertising exceeded official party advertising
expenditure declarations by 40 percent and party declarations for total spending by 20
percent. The project yielded a number of recommendations for reform of party finance
regulations, such as the abolition of limits on party electoral funds, and the inclusion of
legislation to regulate the use of state administrative resources for electoral purposes. 
The project was conceived as the first in a series of “Three Steps Toward Transparent
Financing of Electoral Campaigns in Ukraine.” Subsequent stages will advocate legisla-
tive reforms and monitor the 2004 presidential elections.
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance :  7
8 :  Open Society Justice Initiative
Other Monitoring and Research
The Poder Ciudadano “Transparent Elections” Model
In 1997, Poder Ciudadano, the Argentinean chapter of Transparency International, 
carried out a pilot project to monitor political parties’ spending on advertising during the
parliamentary election campaign. Based on this pilot, a new methodology was developed
using Transparency Agreements—voluntary contracts signed by the major parties prom-
ising to disclose campaign expenditure—to monitor the campaigns for the presidential
and parliamentary elections of 1999. The project found that parties spent substantially
more than they officially declared or revealed in their Transparency Agreements. As a
result, Poder Ciudadano’s main recommendations were incorporated into a new party
finance law, adopted in 2002, that includes a requirement for parties to submit a report
on the sources and spending of campaign finances ten days before elections.
Source: The Transparent Election Manual, Poder Ciudadano and Tinker Foundation, 2000. 
Armenia: 2003 Parliamentary Elections
From March to June 2003, the Center for Regional Development/Transparency
International Armenia (CRD-TIA) carried out a project entitled “Monitoring of Parties’
Campaign Finances during the 2003 Parliamentary Elections.” The objective was to 
“create a demand for transparency and accountability of political parties, promote pub-
lic debates, and generate civil society pressure to ensure equal and fair elections and
induce changes in the politicians’ behavior.” The strategy focused on monitoring a range
of expenditures—TV, radio, press, and outdoor advertising, other election publications,
events and rallies—and comparing the results with income declarations submitted by
the parties themselves and by the Central Election Commission.
According to the findings, three out of eleven parties or electoral blocs exceed-
ed the legal electoral fund limit. In most cases, significantly more was spent than was
indicated by the parties or the Central Election Commission. In addition, 75 percent of
voters said they had been offered bribes to vote for a particular party. The project drew
special attention to the problem of a developed “gray economy,” which underpins much
illegal party funding and spending, and facilitates poor disclosure. CRD-TIA also suc-
ceeded in generating significant pressure for reform: one party contested the election
results with the Constitutional Court, citing project findings as evidence. In October
2003, a roundtable was organized where political parties discussed the recommended
reforms.
Source: www.transparency.am/website/ws/id71.htm.
Brazil: Monitoring Donations to Election Candidates
Transparencia Brasil, the Brazilian chapter of Transparency International, monitored
donations to political parties prior to the 2002 parliamentary elections. Using the candi-
dates’ official declarations of income (disclosure requirements in Brazil are strict), the
project tracked in detail the volume and origin of all declared donations, analyzed the
distribution of donations among candidates and parties as well as among donors, and
provided a detailed survey of one of the largest political contributor’s donations. The
results demonstrated a clear correlation between the amounts received in donations by
particular candidates and their success in the elections. 
Source: Transparencia Brasil, Political Financing in Brazil: A Preliminary Analysis of
the Accounts of All Candidates to the 2002 Brazilian Electoral Campaign, available at:
www.transparencia.org.br/docs/asclaras-eng.ppt.
The United States: Tracking Donors and Political Decisions
A number of NGOs in the United States have tracked donations and other sources 
of income for election candidates (usually incumbent politicians), and monitored candi-
dates’ subsequent political decisions. In this handbook, their experiences represent one of
the primary sources of information on monitoring the income side of campaign finance.
The main organizations are:
Campaign Finance Information Center (www.campaignfinance.org) 
Center for Responsive Politics (www.crp.org)
Common Cause (www.commoncause.org)
Center for Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org) 
National Institute on Money in State Politics (www.followthemoney.org) 
Public Campaign (www.publicampaign.org) 
Political Money Line (www.tray.com/fecinfo) 
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance :  9
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Poland: Doctoral Research on Party Finance
Marcin Walecki’s research on party financing in Poland from the late 1990s to 2001
focused primarily on the sources of party income. Walecki analyzed parties’ official
financial declarations and conducted research, based on more than 200 press reports
and articles, interviews with investigative journalists, and approximately 50 interviews
with former and current political party officials, election candidates and fundraisers.
Walecki found a massive misuse of state resources by political parties: an estimated 45
percent of party income in 2001 was derived directly from state and public resources,
while a further 16 percent came from subsidies for parliamentary activities.
Source: Marcin Walecki, Money and Politics in Poland: A New Democracy in Comparative
Perspective, Ph.D. thesis, University of Oxford, 2003.
Uruguay and Costa Rica: Doctoral Research on Political Finance
and State Funding
Kevin Casas-Zamora’s research on political finance in Costa Rica and Uruguay over the
past two decades provided a comparative assessment of direct state funding of parties
and its effects on political financing practices. The research challenged the generally
held belief that campaign costs have been increasing rapidly, and that television adver-
tising accounts for the dominant share of campaign spending. Neither of these was
shown to be the case. Direct state funding has lessened the dominance of party funding
by business elites, but corruption in political finance remains a significant factor in elec-
tion campaigns. 
Source: Kevin Casas-Zamora, Paying for Democracy in Latin America: Political Finance
and State Funding for Parties in Costa Rica and Uruguay, thesis submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University 
of Oxford, Michaelmas Term 2002.
Zimbabwe: Monitoring Parliamentary Election Campaigns
In 1995, a broad coalition of NGOs in Zimbabwe, coordinated by John Makumbe, car-
ried out detailed monitoring of the parliamentary election campaign. The project pooled
data from the independent press and from teams of monitors who observed campaign
activities. The project registered substantial reports of vote buying, particularly in the
primary elections. State resources and funding were systematically diverted for cam-
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paign purposes to the exclusive benefit of the incumbent ZANU (PF) party, which was
seeking to preserve its hold on power.
Source: John Makumbe and Daniel Compagnon, Behind the Smokescreen: The Politics
of Zimbabwe’s 1995 General Elections, University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare,
2000. 
Russia: Monitoring the Misuse of Administrative Resources
The Center for Anti-corruption Research and Initiative, Transparency International–R
(the Russian chapter of Transparency International) and the Open Society Justice
Initiative jointly monitored the use of state resources in the December 2003 Russian
parliamentary election campaign. The project focused on parties’ misuse of “institution-
al resources” (e.g., state employees performing campaign tasks), “financial resources”
(e.g., extraordinary public budget outlays for campaign purposes), and “media
resources” (e.g., hidden advertising on behalf of incumbent candidates). Monitors
tracked state-controlled TV stations with national coverage, and a wide range of newspa-
pers, magazines, and Internet portals. A number of case studies were used to assess
legal or procedural violations or loopholes that enabled the misuse of administrative
resources, and to estimate the “minimum cost” of the misappropriated resources. 
This experience was drawn on extensively in Chapters Five and Six on the misuse of
administrative resources.
Source: www.justiceinitiative.org/activities/ac/cfm

I: Monitoring 
Campaign 
Finance—
An Overview
At a Glance
This chapter defines key concepts relating to corruption in campaign finance and intro-
duces three types of corruption typically associated with elections: quid pro quo donations,
the misuse of administrative resources for campaign purposes, and the direct corruption
of voters and election officials, or vote buying. It examines the objectives of monitoring
and the factors affecting the choice of monitoring target, based on the local context. The
chapter ends with an overview of the Justice Initiative approach to monitoring.
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Defining Campaign 
Finance and Corruption
What Is Election Campaign Finance?
This handbook defines election campaign finance as the resources acquired and spent
by electoral candidates and political parties in election campaigns. The approach put for-
ward here marks an advance on previous discussions of campaign finance. These often
focused only on income—the means by which candidates and parties obtain
resources—with a view to establishing corrupt links between donor contributions and
political favors. However, the handbook recognizes that campaign finance also encom-
passes campaign expenditures—the way in which candidates and parties spend their
resources—and that corruption occurs through spending transactions as well.
Furthermore, a significant area of campaign resources is covered systematically here for
the first time—the use or abuse of public resources by governing parties in their elec-
toral campaigns. This handbook, therefore, offers guidance on monitoring three aspects
of campaign financing: income, expenditure, and the misuse of administrative
resources.
What Is Corruption in Election Campaign Finance?
Corruption in the financing of election campaigns takes three forms: 
1. Quid pro quo donations, where parties or candidates receive campaign
resources in return for favorable treatment 
2. Candidates’ or parties’ misuse of state and public administrative resources 
for electoral purposes
3. Bribery of voters and election officials
All three harm the public interest directly or indirectly, by influencing election outcomes
undemocratically, or by leading to political decisions that primarily suit sectoral or 
private interests.
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Campaign vs. 
“routine” finance
A handbook on monitoring cam-
paign finance might be expected
to ignore “routine” party income
and expenditure. Electoral cam-
paigns are, after all, one-off
events, subject to different finan-
cial pressures and cycles than
the everyday costs of running a
party. However, many “routine”
activities—such as polling and
market research—might as easily
be classified as “campaign”
activities. Attempts by lawmakers
to deal with this, by cordoning
off periods of time prior to elec-
tions as “official” campaign peri-
ods, inevitably lead parties and
candidates to spend as much 
as possible before that period
begins. Aware of these ambigui-
ties, this handbook treats the 
distinction between “campaign”
and “routine” finance with cau-
tion. The monitoring methods
presented here can be applied 
to either, as long as similar cate-
gories of expenditure are used.
Quid pro Quo Donations 
The most commonly recognized form of corruption in campaign finance involves the
provision of financial or other resources by private interests to parties or candidates in
return for favorable treatment by elected representatives. This type of corruption often
results in financing scandals, such as those that have shaken many countries in recent
years. The World Bank coined the term “state capture” to refer to the influence of private
interests over laws and politics, as originally identified in postcommunist countries in
transition. 
Campaign finance is an obvious channel through which private interests influ-
ence political decisions, yet it may be difficult to establish a direct link between funding
and favors. Policies that benefit party donors can be implemented for a variety of reasons.
Donors and politicians may share the same goals. An apparent case of quid pro quo might
turn out to be a policy put forward in the public interest that only incidentally benefits a
donor. In postcommunist countries, for example, investors often support reform-orient-
ed parties, as they clearly stand to benefit from liberal economic policies, but so do other
sectors of society. The role of monitoring, therefore, is to identify areas of potential corrup-
tion, as well as measures to combat it, such as regulations on transparency or disclosure.
The Misuse of Administrative Resources 
The “misuse of administrative resources” refers to the use of state (or public) financial,
infrastructural, and human resources for campaign purposes. Typical examples include
the deployment of state officials to organize campaign events, as has happened in
Russia, the expenditure of covertly allocated public funds by the ruling party, as in
Zimbabwe, or the use of state enterprises to provide the incumbent party’s main source
of income, as in Poland. 
This form of corruption is less widely recognized than quid pro quo donations,
but it is equally deserving of attention as a dominant feature of election campaigns in
some countries, and a serious threat to democracy. Not only can incumbent parties and
politicians exploit a tremendous advantage over other candidates (which may extend
even to political violence, such as the arbitrary detention of competitors’ campaign staff),
but the abuse of administrative resources may even help to establish and preserve a per-
manent monopoly of power.
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What is quid pro quo
corruption?
According to Mark Philp, a leading
authority in the field, quid pro 
quo corruption involves four key 
components: 
1. A public official (A), who, 
acting for personal gain,
2. violates the norms of public
office, and 
3. harms the interests of the 
public (B)
4. to benefit a third party (C) 
who rewards A for access 
to goods or services that C
would not otherwise obtain.
Source: M. Philp, “Conceptualising
Political Corruption,” in A.J.
Heidenheimer and M. Johnstone 
(editors), Political Corruption:
Concepts and Contexts, Third 
Edition, Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick and London, 
2002, p. 42.
Bribery of Voters and Election Officials
A third category of corruption linked to campaign finance is vote buying, i.e., providing
money or other benefits to voters to support a particular party or candidate, or to officials
as an incentive to manipulate election results. The latter is difficult to monitor, as both
sides in the transaction usually go to great lengths to conceal it. The present handbook
offers some suggestions for monitoring vote buying, a potentially sizable category of
campaign expenditure. It does not deal with bribery of election officials, an issue beyond
the capacity of most NGOs to monitor, and better left to law enforcement agencies.
Monitoring Objectives
Monitoring refers to the systematic and objective observation and documentation of 
a particular process over time. It is primarily a diagnostic tool that captures how systems
operate in practice, as opposed to how they are designed to function through a given 
regulatory framework. Monitoring has been used over the past two decades most notably
by human rights and environmental activists to track violations of international stan-
dards and national laws. Anticorruption activists are increasingly finding this tool useful
in their own work, as this handbook will demonstrate.  
In the context of election campaign finance, the overall aim of monitoring is to
contribute to an environment in which corruption is less prevalent or less likely to occur
by promoting well-targeted reforms of law and practice. This breaks down into three
broad objectives for monitors: 
1. Identifying shortcomings in the regulatory framework governing cam-
paign finance and monitoring the enforcement of existing regulations 
2. Seeking evidence of corruption 
3. Promoting transparency 
Ideally, a monitoring effort will pursue all three. However, if this is not possible,
it is useful to prioritize in order to focus on one or two attainable objectives. In the fol-
lowing sections, we examine the general objectives in more detail.
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Defining the objectives
The importance of defining clear
objectives for a monitoring project
and of designing an adequate 
monitoring strategy to pursue these
objectives cannot be emphasized 
too strongly. If an NGO finds it 
difficult to explain exactly what its
monitoring objectives are and how
the monitoring strategy supports
those objectives, then the project
objectives and/or the strategy 
should be revisited before moving 
to implementation of the project.
Assessing the Regulatory 
Framework and Its Enforcement
Some form of party funding and election campaign regulation is in place in many, if not
yet all, democracies. Monitoring enables an NGO to assess how well the existing legal and
institutional framework for campaign finance functions, and to advocate relevant
reforms. In practice, as the Case Studies outlined at the beginning of this book show, any
monitoring exercise requires, among other things, an evaluation of existing rules, even
where this is not an explicit objective. In countries making the transition from authoritar-
ian or otherwise undemocratic regimes to democracy, assessing the current campaign
finance system in order to underpin reforms is likely to be particularly important. 
Assessment of the legal framework is not complete, however, without an evalu-
ation of the observation and enforcement of existing provisions. Seemingly sound legal
provisions may be dysfunctional in practice, or be poorly observed or enforced. It is
important to identify the root of the problem and to determine whether the existing 
provisions are
• too vague to allow for effective enforcement;
• too complicated to allow for effective enforcement;
• too restrictive to be observed in practice;
• adequate but lacking an effective enforcement framework;
• adequate but enforced in a discriminatory fashion.
Where the legal and institutional framework has shortcomings, monitoring
should provide evidence of this. Where it is more-or-less sound, monitoring should
assess the extent to which relevant provisions are effective in practice and highlight any
problems with their implementation. In both cases, the findings should then be used to
advocate targeted reforms. 
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Regulation reform: 
how far to go?
A monitoring objective of all four
Case Studies was to generate reforms
of campaign finance regulations. 
The Romanian project was the most
ambitious, effectively drafting a com-
prehensive proposal for a new law 
on party financing. The Latvian proj-
ect had a major impact on the draft-
ing of amendments to party finance
regulations that were adopted in
2002, in particular requiring stricter
disclosure of donations and spending.
In Slovakia, the breadth of monitoring
yielded valuable new information
about the nature of campaigns, 
and enabled an informed discussion
about possible regulatory solutions. 
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Unexpected findings 
in Romania
On occasion, monitoring may 
uncover unanticipated instances 
of corruption. An important outcome
of the Romanian monitoring exercise,
for example, was to draw public 
attention to the problem of donations
made in exchange for a place on 
a party’s candidate list, which only
came to light after one potential 
candidate came forward, unsolicited,
with the information.
Searching for Evidence of Corruption
Corruption, or the possibility for corruption, can be revealed by
• examining records of donations for evidence of fictitious donors;
• seeking evidence of third-party spending, i.e., hidden contributions 
made by unrecorded donors to a party or a candidate’s campaign;
• monitoring donations along with candidate and party voting and policy records
for evidence of political decisions made in favor of specific donor interests;
• monitoring the use of state resources for campaign purposes.
Promoting Transparency 
in the Campaign Finance System
The more transparent a political finance system, the less vulnerable it is to corruption.
Promoting transparency has thus been a key objective of many monitoring exercises.
Monitoring can point to significant discrepancies between monitored and declared
income or expenditure, which can then be used to generate support for greater trans-
parency, as well as for more effective enforcement of existing rules.
Deciding What to Monitor
Once general objectives appropriate to the local context are established, a monitoring
exercise needs to define its specific objectives of what to monitor and why. The Scoping
Study presented in Chapter Two provides guidance in analyzing relevant information on
the legal and institutional framework and campaign finance practices in order to define
the specific objectives. 
Income and Expenditure
One of the basic questions facing NGOs intending to monitor election campaign finance
is whether to focus primarily on a candidate or party’s income or on their expenditure of
campaign finances. 
Monitoring Income
Disclosure requirements are a prerequisite for monitoring campaign income. Strict 
disclosure requirements, such as those in the United States, for example, facilitate
detailed monitoring, but wherever any requirements for candidates or parties to disclose
donations exist, some kind of monitoring is possible. Many countries are, therefore, like-
ly to have sufficient disclosure requirements to justify monitoring income.
This handbook presents two main approaches to monitoring income. One is to
check the veracity of income declarations by examining the records of individual donors
in order to reveal the extent to which parties and candidates behave transparently. Where
parties or candidates are required to disclose the identities of individual donors, a moni-
toring organization can check whether listed donors are, in fact, actual or likely contribu-
tors. The second approach is to monitor elected parties’ or candidates’ political decisions
for evidence that they benefit donors. This assumes not only requirements to disclose
individual donors but also access to information on relevant subsequent decisions that
could have benefited those donors (e.g., a database of awarded public contracts).
Investigative tools such as interviews are often useful in obtaining information on income
and donors that is not readily available in the public domain to supplement the main
monitoring approaches. 
Monitoring Expenditure
Monitoring campaign expenditure can help to uncover and reduce corruption in three
ways. First, where parties and candidates are required to disclose total income but not
individual donations, the main categories of campaign spending can be monitored to
assess the accuracy of parties’ income declarations. If monitoring shows that spending
significantly exceeds declared income, this is a clear indication that parties are conceal-
ing income or failing to report it accurately.
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Second, monitoring expenditure can uncover direct evidence of corruption or
identify practices that indicate potential corruption. For example, monitoring expendi-
ture may reveal third party spending on campaign services, which parties may use to 
circumvent income or spending limits. Such spending does not appear in party financial
records and is, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. This practice may or may not
violate existing regulations, but the value of the services received should be declared as
a campaign donation, in line with international good practice. 
Third, monitoring expenditure may yield information of use to regulators 
in establishing a legal framework and creating a level political playing field. A lack 
of restrictions on spending can result in spiraling campaign costs, which, in turn,
encourages parties and candidates to engage in corrupt financing to meet ever-increas-
ing financial demands. On the other hand, unreasonably low caps on spending will moti-
vate parties and candidates to circumvent regulations entirely. Estimates of actual cam-
paign expenditure can, therefore, serve as a sound basis for sensible regulation. 
Income = Expenditure 
As any spending on an election campaign must be matched by income (expended
resources must have been acquired somewhere), certain campaign activities may 
be interpreted as either income or expenditure, and tracked as either, depending on 
the monitoring strategy of a specific project. In Romania, for example, there are indi-
cations that in the 2000 elections, tobacco companies purchased airtime on television 
in order to run ads for certain candidates. Spending on behalf of a party or candidate 
by third parties, as in this example, is both a form of campaign expenditure and a
source of income, and can be used in analysis and reporting accordingly. Likewise,
when candidates or parties use administrative resources for campaign purposes, they
are incurring campaign expenditure, which amounts to receiving campaign income
from the public purse. 
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The Justice Initiative Approach
This handbook does not advocate an “income only” or “expenditure only” approach 
to monitoring. It deliberately avoids stipulating which elements of campaign finance 
an NGO should monitor, as the relevant components vary from country to country.
Monitoring should, therefore, be designed on the basis of existing evidence concerning
how parties actually raise and spend their resources, rather than by applying “off-the-
shelf” methodologies. Different tools are needed to conduct different kinds of monitor-
ing exercises relevant to different national contexts. 
The Justice Initiative sets forth a systematic approach to monitoring campaign
finance that will enable NGOs to identify what they should monitor, based on the 
specific circumstances of their country, and how they should conduct monitoring, given
the resources and information sources available. 
1. The Scoping Study1
The first step toward a well-designed campaign finance monitoring project is a prelimi-
nary Scoping Study. The Scoping Study involves brief research to collect all the available
information on campaign finance in the country to be monitored. The information 
is then used to define the specific objectives of monitoring. The objectives in turn 
determine the appropriate monitoring strategy: identifying what is to be monitored and
why. The Scoping Study is discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
2. The Monitoring Methodology
The monitoring methodology is the core component of a monitoring project. It defines
• the components of campaign finance to be monitored;
• how each component will be monitored (e.g., by direct observation, 
by a hired agency, using a case study approach, or a combination of these);
• the sources of information available.
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Knowing the neighborhood
In deciding what to monitor, local 
circumstances will play an important
role. What qualifies as potentially 
corrupt behavior in one context may
be perfectly acceptable in another. 
For example, one method of eliminat-
ing corruption by private donors is to
ban private funding of political parties
altogether—roughly the situation in
Sweden, where political parties are
financed entirely by the state. While
this may be effective, the same meas-
ure might be viewed as a violation of
basic rights. In the United States, for
example, the right to donate money 
to parties or candidates is viewed as 
a fundamental aspect of political par-
ticipation and freedom of expression.
Assessing such factors before decid-
ing what to monitor or which reforms
to recommend is a key component of
a successful monitoring project.
The process of selecting a monitoring methodology is covered in Chapter Two,
while Chapters Three to Six outline applicable methodologies for monitoring three
broad categories of campaign finance: income, expenditure, and the misuse of adminis-
trative resources.
3. Project Implementation
Once a methodology has been developed, the monitoring exercise can be implemented,
a process described in Chapters Three to Six. However, several important questions
need to be answered before a project can be implemented:
• What resources, in terms of staff and funding, are necessary to implement 
the project as planned?
• What relationships have been established with stakeholders such as 
official enforcement bodies or political parties?
• What is the timeframe for monitoring?
• How flexible is the methodology, i.e., can the project adapt successfully 
to unforeseen circumstances?
4. Using the Monitoring Results
Monitoring campaign finance is not an end in itself. Rather, the data produced by mon-
itoring can then be used to achieve a project’s wider objectives. The different ways in
which the results of monitoring can be used are discussed in detail in Chapter Seven.
Briefly, results can be used
• to raise public awareness of certain issues;
• to initiate litigation where monitoring produces direct evidence of corruption 
or other regulatory violations;
• to support advocacy and lobbying efforts for reform; 
• as input for further monitoring efforts.
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5. Evaluating Success
Evaluation of a monitoring project, once it is completed, will not only reveal whether 
the stated objectives were met, but may point to other results, not specifically pursued
or considered at the outset. In Chapter Eight, we outline how an NGO might evaluate
the success of a monitoring project based on three different criteria:
• Benefits to the local community, such as improved disclosure requirements 
or an improved regulatory framework
• Benefits to the monitoring organization itself, such as improving the NGO’s
capacity to conduct monitoring (e.g., number of monitors trained, data collect-
ed, or monitoring tools developed) 
• Benefits to the wider monitoring community, such as the development of new
methodologies that can be applied elsewhere by other organizations
Taking a monitoring project through all of the five stages outlined above will not
only ensure a well-conceived exercise but also allow maximum information and benefits
to be drawn from the experience.
Notes
1. We are indebted to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky for pointing out the importance of the Scoping Study and for a
critical evaluation of the “Poder Ciudadano” monitoring model in his April 2003 draft paper “Monitoring of
Political Financing by Civil Society Organizations,” available on the Justice Initiative website at www.justiceinitia-
tive.org/activities/ac/cfm
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The stages of a campaign finance monitoring project
2. The Monitoring Methodology
Methodology: how to monitor / Sources of information for monitoring
Overall Aim 
To promote an environment less vulnerable to corruption in election campaign finance by
• assessing the legal framework and practice,
• exposing corruption or practices vulnerable to corruption, and
• promoting greater transparency.
1. The Scoping Study
Gather existing knowledge on campaign finance  / Define specific objectives: 
what to monitor and why
3. Project Implementation
Logistics (resources, staff, timeframe) / Relationships with other stakeholders
4. Using the Monitoring Results
Dissemination of monitoring data and results / Advocacy and reform proposals / 
Input for further monitoring
5. Measuring Success
Improvement in campaign finance regulation or practices / Success for monitoring 
organization / Success for wider community/other stakeholders
2: Planning a 
Monitoring Project—
The Scoping Study 
and Project Design
At a Glance
This chapter is devoted to planning a monitoring project. The first half explains in detail
how to perform a preliminary Scoping Study, including which sources of information to
consult and how to assemble the relevant information on campaign finance that will
directly inform the project design. The remainder of the chapter discusses the key issues
involved in planning a project, from strategy, through implementation, to using the
results. 
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The Scoping Study
The first step toward a well-designed campaign finance monitoring project is a thorough
preliminary Scoping Study. The purpose of the Scoping Study is to collect existing infor-
mation on political finance in the country in order to define clearly appropriate objectives
for a monitoring effort. The areas of campaign finance to be monitored depend on 
a number of factors, including, but not limited to: the political context and type of elec-
tions; the legal and institutional environment regulating campaign finance; and the way
in which parties or candidates are believed or known to raise and spend campaign
resources.
When an NGO has compiled a significant amount of this information, monitor-
ing objectives may be set. However, given the importance of setting specific objectives
appropriate to the local context, any predetermined objectives should be reviewed in the
course of the Scoping Study, as initial assumptions may prove incorrect after further
analysis.
Sources of Information 
Five basic sources of information should be consulted when conducting the Scoping
Study:
1. Existing Laws and Related Legal Documents
Laws and relevant regulations, jurisprudence and official explanations of the laws, and
other related documents are critical to understanding the legal and institutional environ-
ment. These might include laws regulating, and/or government decrees concerning the
following:
• The organization of elections
• Political party finance 
• The financing of election campaigns 
• Relevant enforcement institutions
• Freedom of information
• The media
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Filling in the context
The Scoping Study is not intended 
as a time-consuming research 
project in itself. A month should 
be ample time for gathering and 
analyzing the necessary information.
The idea is to assemble and synthe-
size readily available information, 
i.e., the kind of data that most 
NGOs either already have at hand,
or have easy access to. The time
spent on the Scoping Study is likely 
to be insignificant compared to 
the time and resources saved 
in the long run by ensuring that 
the project has been planned on 
the basis of accurate and relevant
information.
2. Official Reports and Declarations
A number of other legally relevant documents can help to assess the regulatory frame-
work. These include the following:
• Reports by institutions with a supervisory or enforcement role 
in campaign finance regulation
• Official financial declarations submitted by political parties or candidates 
themselves
3. Existing Literature and Studies
In many countries, studies, articles, or other specialist literature on political finance may
have been published or prepared by other NGOs, political research institutes, universi-
ties, or international organizations. These studies may provide valuable information on
political finance, its regulation, and the specific issues that require attention.
4. The Media
The press and electronic media represent an invaluable source of information on elec-
tion campaigns. A survey of relevant articles can be a fast, inexpensive, and efficient way
to gather information on all aspects of campaign finance, ranging from explanations of
laws to investigative pieces on how campaign finance works in practice. In many coun-
tries, there are agencies that archive media articles in electronic and searchable form.
5. Personal Interviews
Targeted interviews with 10–20 people with knowledge of campaign finance can also be
of value. These may include the following: 
• Experts from organizations with an interest in the subject 
• Academic observers
• Current and former campaign finance managers
• Officials from institutions responsible for supervising and 
enforcing campaign finance regulations
• Selected politicians
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Collecting the Facts
Information collected during the Scoping Study should cover each of the following:
• The fairness of elections
• The legal framework
• The media
• The state sector and public administration
The Fairness of Elections
A fundamental question that will shape the context of monitoring is the extent to which
elections are free and fair. Reports generated by national or international organizations
that monitor elections can be a good source of information:
• The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
www.osce.org/odihr/?page=elections&div=reports
• The International Republican Institute, www.iri.org
• The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), which has a
searchable database of reports, www.accessdemocracy.org/basic.asp
• The Carter Center, whose Democracy Program monitors elections in a number
of countries, www.cartercenter.org
• The European Union European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/projects/eidhr/elections_reports_en.htm
Where elections are falsified or manipulated directly, it may not make sense to
monitor campaign finance at all. In most cases, however, such tactics are combined with
illicit campaign finance practices—particularly the misuse of state resources for cam-
paign purposes—that may together comprise a ruling party’s strategy to maintain power. 
In such circumstances, monitoring campaign finance may prove to be a tool in counter-
ing electoral corruption. In Zimbabwe, for example, where elections are manipulated, evi-
dence that resulted from monitoring campaign finance helped to persuade the courts 
to review election petitions. In most of these cases, the election results contested in par-
ticular constituencies were nullified by the courts. 
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The Legal Framework
In order to assess the legal framework governing elections and campaign finance, 
a number of questions need to be answered, each of which will be further discussed 
in turn:
• What kind of electoral system is in place?
• What is the duration of the election campaign?
• What disclosure requirements, if any, are parties and candidates 
subject to?
• What restrictions on campaign income exist?
• Do parties and candidates receive financial resources from public budgets?
• What restrictions on campaign expenditure are in place?
• How is the legal framework enforced?
1. What kind of electoral system is in place?
Election systems vary dramatically. In some proportional representation systems, citi-
zens vote for parties whose candidates are then allocated seats according to the percent-
age of votes won. In others, each party submits a list of candidates ranked in order of the
party’s preference—there is little or no direct link between voters in specific locations
and the elected representatives. 
In many majoritarian systems, on the other hand, citizens vote for individual
candidates who compete directly against one another and need not be affiliated with any
political party. In these systems, elected candidates become the sole representatives of
their constituencies. Between these two extremes lie a number of variations. 
The electoral system in place affects the structure of election campaigns and
their financing. Proportional representation systems tend to encourage, or even require,
campaigns to be based on competition between political parties rather than individual
candidates, with the likely result that campaign finance is channeled predominantly
through a central party organization. A majoritarian system encourages competition
among individual candidates, which may result in campaign finance being more decen-
tralized, with candidates raising and spending funds directly. 
However, generalizations about the impact of different electoral systems do not
hold in every case. For example, in Poland’s proportional representation system more
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than half of campaign income appears to be raised by candidates directly. Despite the
UK’s purely majoritarian system, election campaigns are heavily based on national
party campaigns. For this reason, the Scoping Study needs to draw on materials or
sources that provide a detailed account of the specific electoral system and its impact
on local campaigning. 
With respect to monitoring, the more an electoral system encourages cam-
paigns to be organized centrally by political parties, the simpler the monitoring task 
is likely to be: income or spending can then be analyzed according to political parties
without focusing too much attention on individual candidates’ fundraising and expendi-
ture. It will generally be easier to estimate total spending in certain categories. Where the
electoral system encourages individual races, monitoring must focus on the campaign
finance activities of individual candidates. For example, in the United States, individual
candidates largely raise their own campaign funds, and NGOs, therefore, focus primari-
ly on monitoring the sources of individual candidates’ campaign funds. Where such a
system has no effective disclosure requirements, a more in-depth, case study approach
in select constituencies is more likely to provide meaningful information.
2. What is the duration of the election campaign?
The duration of the election campaign period will largely determine the timeframe of
monitoring. The Scoping Study should determine whether this period is defined by law,
as well as the duration of campaigns in practice. 
In many countries, the campaign period is defined as a specific number of days
prior to the election, or as the period commencing from the moment elections are
announced. In Latvia, for example, the campaign period is not regulated by law, and par-
ties may, in theory, campaign permanently. Some countries limit certain kinds of cam-
paign activities: in Russia, campaigning on television is permitted only in the final
month of the national election campaign. 
It is also common for parties or candidates to begin campaigning prior to 
the official campaign period, despite legal restrictions. When that period entails limits
on spending, parties and candidates may try to pay for campaign activities before the offi-
cial starting date, in order to declare the costs as routine, i.e., unregulated, expenditure.
In addition, where campaigns are very frequent, it may be impossible to distinguish
“campaign” periods from “ordinary” periods, in which case it may be necessary to mon-
itor from the beginning of one election cycle to the beginning of the next.
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Deciding on the 
monitoring period
Countries vary considerably in the
period that will require monitoring. 
In Latvia, expenditure was monitored
for approximately ten months
because, although there are no
restrictions on the duration of the
campaign, parties must submit 
disclosure forms on campaign
income and expenditure for the 
270 days prior to the election. In
Ukraine, only the 50-day legal cam-
paign period was monitored, with 
the goal of demonstrating that parties
spent more than they declared even
within the official campaign period
alone. In Romania, party spending
was monitored for the whole of 2000
because there were two elections 
in that period: the objective was to 
compare parties’ spending on elec-
tions with their annual income decla-
rations for that year. In Slovakia, the
law defines the election campaign 
as a period starting 30 days and 
ending 48 hours before the elections,
but it does not prohibit parties from 
campaigning before the official 
campaign period. The project 
monitored campaigning for about
nine months prior to the election,
based on expert assessments.
3. What disclosure requirements, if any, are parties and candidates subject to?
The nature and scope of information that political parties and candidates must disclose
by law are key issues affecting the design of a campaign finance monitoring strategy.
Disclosure requirements can apply to either income or expenditure or both. 
In any case, accounting requirements will determine the format in which candidates 
and parties maintain financial records and, thereby, the kind and quality of information
that will be disclosed. 
The following questions can help reveal the kind of information monitoring
groups are likely to find:
• Are candidates or parties required to keep detailed financial accounts?
• Do accounts have to distinguish between campaign and routine income and/or
expenditure?
• What level of itemization and detail is required? 
Income disclosure 
• Are candidates or parties required to disclose information about their income?
• If so, are they required to separate routine income from campaign income?
• Are they required to provide a detailed breakdown of routine and/or campaign
income? In how much detail?
• To whom are they required to disclose income? 
• Is the information available to the public?
• Are they required to disclose individual donations? If so, over what amount?
• Are they required to disclose the identity of individual donors? 
• Are candidates or parties prohibited from splitting donations from a single
source into several smaller donations in order to avoid disclosure requirements?
• Are candidates or parties obliged to declare in-kind income (e.g., services 
provided for free, media discounts, etc.)?
• Is there a time limit within which parties and candidates must disclose 
donations? Does the deadline occur before the end of the election campaign?
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Where income disclosure requirements are strict, a monitoring project can
compare declared income with monitored spending. Where there are strict require-
ments to identify individual donors, a project might choose to assess the authenticity 
of individual donors or to monitor donors together with political decisions made in 
their favor. Where disclosure hinges on the size of donations, a natural target for moni-
toring may be donations close to the threshold. In the Czech Republic, for example, 
all donations exceeding CZK 50,000 (approximately e1,500) must be received on the
basis of a standard contract that includes a notarized confirmation of the donor’s identi-
ty. According to media reports, this has resulted in the widespread practice of splitting
donations into CZK 50,000 blocks to avoid having to show proof of the donor’s identi-
ty. In such a situation, an NGO might wish to investigate whether, in fact, the same
donor is making multiple donations, thereby infringing the rules. 
Where income disclosure requirements are nonexistent or very weak, monitor-
ing should focus on campaign expenditure in order to demonstrate the scale of spend-
ing—and, by extension, income—and advocate reforms to increase transparency. 
Expenditure disclosure
• Are candidates or parties required to report on campaign expenditure?
• If so, how detailed a breakdown of expenditure are they required to provide 
(i.e., which categories)? 
• Do disclosure requirements allow candidates or parties to avoid declaring 
significant amounts of expenditure (e.g., by classifying them as “routine”)?
• Do candidates or parties have to declare campaign expenditure made on their
behalf by third parties (foundations, NGOs, companies, etc.)? If so, how is 
such spending defined?
• To whom are candidates and parties required to disclose expenditure? 
Is the information publicly available?
Where disclosure requirements for expenditure are strict, monitoring will
focus, among other things, on testing the accuracy of disclosure statements by compar-
ing declared spending to monitored spending. Where disclosure requirements include
a breakdown according to specific line items or categories, monitoring should reflect the
same breakdown. Where disclosure requirements are weak or nonexistent, monitoring
should aim to demonstrate the magnitude of campaign spending in order to underpin
advocacy efforts for better disclosure requirements.
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4. What restrictions on campaign income exist?
Restrictions on income can address the level, sources, and type of income, all of which
should be considered when designing a monitoring exercise. However, it is also impor-
tant to look at potential “loopholes” in the restrictions—common ways in which candi-
dates and parties avoid or circumvent the existing regulations.
• What are the permitted sources of income for candidates and parties?
• Are candidates or parties permitted to receive donations from private entities?
• Are there any limits on the total income a party may raise from donations?
• Are there any prohibitions or limits on donations from the following entities:
individuals, private-corporations, state-owned enterprises, foreign individuals
and entities, nonprofit or charitable organizations (such as trade unions, 
special interest groups, political foundations, or professional organizations)?
• Can organizations that are otherwise forbidden from making donations 
establish other organizations to pool donations for candidates or parties?
• Are individuals, corporations, and other entities required to declare donations 
to candidates or parties in their tax returns, annual reports, or other available 
documents?
Where restrictions on income are strict, a monitoring methodology designed to
assess whether they are being observed and/or enforced is recommended. The specific
objectives of the monitoring exercise should be determined according to local circum-
stances. For example, where restrictions are enforced equally for all candidates and par-
ties, monitoring may focus on assessing whether the income is declared accurately, by
comparing declared income with monitored spending. Where it is believed that restric-
tions are enforced on a discriminatory basis against opposition parties and candidates, 
monitoring may focus on gathering information to assess whether this is true. Where
there are limits on the size of donations from a single donor, monitoring may search 
for evidence of parties splitting donations in order to sidestep the restriction.
5. Do parties and candidates receive financial resources from public budgets?
State funding for election campaigns has been widely regarded as a way to reduce par-
ties’ dependence on potentially corrupting private interests. In some countries, such as
Sweden or Austria, this is the dominant source of party funding. In fact, over the 
last three decades, this practice has been introduced or expanded in many countries,
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such as in the postcommunist countries of Eastern Europe. In the Czech Republic, 
for example, state subsidies now appear to be the most important source of funds for
parties represented in parliament.
To assess the significance of state funding in campaign finance, the following
questions must be asked:
• Do candidates or parties receive funding from the state budget?
• If so, is funding allocated directly (by subsidy) or indirectly (through services
provided, such as free advertising time)?
• How are subsidies allocated: based on the number of mandates currently held
in parliament, the level of support at the previous election, the number of votes
received or seats won in the current election, or as a flat sum?
• Are the criteria for allocating state funding clear and unambiguous?
• Does the system of state funding favor incumbent candidates or parties over
challengers?
In general, the less state funding there is, the more important it becomes to
monitor the income side of campaign finance. Where state funding is insignificant, can-
didates and parties are likely to be more dependent on private donors. If, on the other
hand, state funding is generous, it may not be necessary to monitor donations at all.
Instead, monitoring may focus on the mechanisms of state funding in practice, i.e.,
whether state funding is distributed consistently, evenly, and transparently. 
6. What restrictions on campaign expenditure are in place?
The following questions can reveal the extent of restrictions on campaign expenditure as
well as income: 
• Is there a limit on total campaign spending by a candidate or party?
• Are there any restrictions or bans on specific kinds of campaign spending, 
such as advertising?
• Are there any restrictions on campaign spending by third parties on behalf 
of parties or candidates?
Where spending is curtailed by law, monitoring can target the degree to which
restrictions are observed or enforced. This is especially true where restrictions are unre-
34 :  Open Society Justice Initiative
State funding of 
election campaigns
The Case Studies provide contrasting
examples of the degree and nature of
state funding. At one extreme, in
Latvia, the state provided no funds to
political parties for the 2002 elec-
tions. In Slovakia, by contrast, accord-
ing to parties’ official financial decla-
rations, state funding accounted for
40-98 percent of parties’ income in
2002. In Ukraine, state funding takes
the form of free advertising time, but
the law specifies neither the precise
amount of time each party is entitled
to nor the criteria for entitlement. In
Romania, the level of state support
for individual parties was unclear, so
one of the targets of the monitoring
exercise was to clarify it. In
Zimbabwe, the funding system is
designed in such a way that only the
ruling party qualifies for state funds.
alistic or impossible to observe. In Ukraine, for example, total campaign spending is
limited to approximately U.S. $475,000, an unrealistic level, transgressed by all the main
parties. Likewise, in Romania, the limit on campaign spending was found to be suffi-
cient to fund only about three weeks of intensive campaigning.
Bans or limits on specific categories of expenditure also affect the design of a
monitoring exercise. For example, where advertising on television or other electronic
media is banned (a provision that exists in many countries, such as the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and the United Kingdom), the need to monitor spending in this category is
greatly reduced. However, where spending on advertising is not banned entirely but
merely restricted, as is the case in most countries, monitoring may focus on the obser-
vance and enforcement of the restrictions. Where there are few or no restrictions 
on advertising, an estimate of total campaign expenditure is likely to be an important
aim of monitoring, as this information can then be used to assess the need for better 
disclosure requirements or restrictions on spending (for example, to prevent spiraling
election costs, which tend to encourage corruption). 
7. How is the legal framework enforced?
Poor or discriminatory enforcement of campaign finance regulations is, in many coun-
tries, a more serious problem than the regulations themselves. In these cases, a moni-
toring project can generate specific recommendations to improve enforcement. The
results of the Scoping Study concerning enforcement represent vital input into any mon-
itoring project and will contribute to sharpening its focus.
• Is any particular body entrusted with the task of supervising adherence to cam-
paign finance regulations? If so, which type: electoral commission, supreme
audit institution, anticorruption bureau, parliament, or other?
• Does the body entrusted with regulation have the authority to audit candidates’
and parties’ financial reports? Who initiates such investigations?
• Does the body concerned have the power to impose or initiate sanctions for 
violations of campaign finance regulations?
• What resources and staff does the body possess for the purpose of supervising
campaign finance and enforcing adherence to campaign finance regulations?
• What degree of independence does the body enjoy from incumbent parties and
candidates?
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• What sanctions may be imposed for violations (fines, forfeiture or suspension
of public funding, loss of illegally obtained funds, loss of eligibility for public
office, loss of political party registration, imprisonment, other)?
• Has the regulator issued reports on observance of campaign finance regula-
tions? Have these reports had any impact on changing campaign practices?
• Has the regulator issued any sanctions against parties or candidates that violate
campaign regulations?
The Media 
The media play a crucial role in political campaigns. The Scoping Study should, there-
fore, assess the level of media penetration, the degree to which the media are free and
independent, and regulations that affect the way in which the media may cover election
campaigns. 
Level of Penetration
In the context of election campaigns, the key questions regarding media penetration
include the following:
• What percentage of households have televisions? 
• What percentage of households have radios? 
• What percentage of the population watches television, and what is the break-
down of viewing figures among channels and according to viewing periods?
• What percentage of the population listens to radio programming, and what is 
the breakdown of listening figures among stations and according to listening
periods?
• What is the circulation of major print media?
• What is the level of Internet penetration, and how often are websites containing
political advertising or election coverage visited?
The level of TV penetration determines how important a role TV advertising
plays in election campaigns (unless political advertising on TV is banned). In areas with
very high penetration, such as in Latin America, monitoring efforts have predictably
placed much weight on TV advertising. In countries with low TV penetration, monitor-
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ing has often focused on radio advertising instead. The relative importance of newspa-
pers and the Internet should also be examined in the Scoping Study to determine how
much attention each should receive in monitoring.
Degree of Independence
The extent to which the media—both print and electronic—remain independent 
from government also has an enormous effect on political parties’ election campaigns.
Here are the key questions:
• What proportion of broadcast media (TV and radio) and press is owned by 
the state? 
• Do these media outlets enjoy de facto independence or is the content controlled
or influenced by the government? For example, to what extent is a public service
broadcasting model in place that includes recognition of the importance that
such media be objective and balanced? 
• Are particular media affiliated with particular political parties? 
• In practice, do candidates and parties have equal access to the media? In partic-
ular, what if any legal or other provisions are in place to ensure that the media
provide equal access to various parties or candidates?
If government authorities control the broadcast media, they can restrict opposi-
tion parties’ and candidates’ access. In Ukraine, for example, during the 2002 parlia-
mentary elections, one opposition party was unable to spend even one third of its cam-
paign funds because it was simply denied access to the media. In such circumstances, a
monitoring project might monitor the abuse of state-controlled or public media for elec-
tion purposes, such as through hidden political advertising, i.e., election propaganda in
the guise of news or other nonadvertising formats. By contrast, where candidates and
parties have equal access to the media, monitoring is more likely to focus on standard
political advertising, with a view to estimating the costs.
Regulation of Election Coverage
In many countries, media regulations are designed to restrict bias in the broadcast
media, particularly television. The Scoping Study should address the following issues:
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Monitoring strategies 
in Latvia and Slovakia
The legal frameworks in Latvia 
and Slovakia affected project design 
in contrasting ways. In Latvia, 
where there are no restrictions on
advertising expenditure, but disclo-
sure requirements are detailed, 
the project was designed to monitor
media advertising for comparison
with declared spending. In Slovakia,
on the other hand, political advertis-
ing is banned on TV and radio, 
so the project focused on rallies 
and other local campaign events 
in addition to advertising in the 
print media.
• Are there any restrictions on political advertising in the media?
• If so, to which media do they apply? Print? Broadcast? Electronic? Outdoor?
• Are there regulations that forbid or restrict broadcasting or publishing of 
content that is biased toward a particular candidate or party?
• Are there regulations requiring balance in election coverage, i.e., 
prohibiting a quantitative bias in favor of a particular candidate or party?
• Who is responsible for enforcing media regulations?
• What sanctions apply in case of violation? Who initiates sanctions? 
Are they effectively enforced?
• Do any regulations govern the media specifically during election campaigns?
The State Sector and Public Administration 
In addition to the electoral system, the legal framework, and the media, the Scoping
Study should obtain information on the state sector and public administration.
State-controlled Enterprises and Agencies
Where there is a sizable state sector, and especially where management appointments to
state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are subject to party patronage and/or regula-
tory control of their finances is weak, parties may use state company resources for their
own purposes. In Poland, where seven of the country’s ten largest companies remained
state-owned in 2002, the main political parties appeared to obtain a larger proportion of
their funding from state enterprises than any other single source. If there are indications
that this is the case, a campaign finance monitoring project should target the activities
of state-controlled enterprises.
• How significant is the sector of state-owned or state-controlled enterprises?
• Are appointments to the statutory organs and management of these enterprises
characterized by professional criteria or by political or party patronage?
• Are these enterprises’ finances subject to effective control and audit?
• Are there quasi-autonomous institutions and agencies that administer public
functions, such as social security benefits? If so, are these agencies subject to
party patronage appointments and/or weak financial controls?
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The Legal Framework for Public Administration 
Another factor that should be assessed in the Scoping Study is the degree of independ-
ence from arbitrary political influence among public servants. The following questions
can help reveal whether and how politicians and political parties can use public servants
and other resources within public administration for their own electoral purposes,
which may shape the way a campaign is conducted. 
• How many senior appointments in public administration are political
rather than professional (i.e., tend to be replaced with each election)?
• Are the duties of public officials clearly defined in their job descriptions? 
What job security guarantees are there?
• Are there legal provisions that forbid public officials from engaging in 
political activities including election campaign activities?
• Is there any evidence that such officials participate in political campaign 
activities?
If public officials are political party appointees, or if they do not have clearly
defined duties and responsibilities, then it is more likely that incumbent parties and can-
didates will use them and other state resources for campaign purposes. 
How Election Campaigns Are Conducted 
Once the legal and regulatory environment has been assessed, the Scoping Study should
focus on the practice of election campaigns themselves, i.e., the style and nature of the
campaigns, how campaign finance works in practice, and specifically how candidates
and parties obtain and spend resources to conduct campaigns. 
The Nature of Campaigns
Even among countries with some degree of free elections and political competition,
there exists a broad range of campaign styles and activities, which all require different 
monitoring strategies. Traditional forms of campaigning, such as rallies, concerts, or
other local events, often provide the context for illicit practices, such as vote buying 
or state resource abuse. In many countries, experts see a general trend toward profes-
sional campaigns involving a greater reliance on the mass media in campaigning,
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including the outsourcing of entire campaigns to public relations agencies. This is the
case in North America and much of Europe. As the Slovakian Case Study notes:
A pre-election campaign is no longer a simple set of media advertisements.
Political parties increasingly use more sophisticated methods to reach voters.
These include permanent agreements with marketing agencies, branding, crisis
management, use of spin doctors and other PR and marketing techniques. These
elements are difficult to spot and even harder to monitor, as well as more expen-
sive than other campaign elements. 
The trend toward professionalism is not uniform, however. In Russia, for exam-
ple, where television has increasingly become subject to state influence for campaign
purposes, the 2003 Duma elections witnessed a rise in traditional door-to-door cam-
paigning by opposition candidates.
The Scoping Study should therefore address the following questions:
• What are the main methods of campaigning used by political parties 
and candidates in election campaigns? 
• How are these methods ranked in terms of their importance?
• What is the relative significance of national and regional versus local 
campaigning?
Campaign Finance
The way in which campaigns are financed affects the choice of monitoring strategy. 
The types of campaign income and expenditure observed in the course of the Scoping
Study will generally determine the categories to be monitored. Thus media monitoring
will dominate where campaigning is concentrated through the media; where rallies and
events dominate, monitoring will target these. The monitoring strategy will also be
affected by the way in which the organization of campaign finance acquisition and
expenditure is divided between (a) candidates and parties, and (b) candidates and par-
ties, on the one hand, and professional agencies, on the other. 
The questions to be addressed in the Scoping Study include the following:
• What is the best estimate of the total cost of election campaigns? Have costs
been rising?
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• What is the best estimate of the breakdown of campaign income for parties or
candidates?
• What proportion of campaign resources is raised by candidates individually
as opposed to political parties?
• What are the main sources of donations for each candidate or party?
• To what extent do party organizations raise campaign resources centrally 
as opposed to regionally or locally?
• To what extent are campaigns organized and carried out by parties directly 
and to what extent are these tasks outsourced to professional agencies?
• What is the best estimate of the breakdown, in terms of main costs, 
of campaign expenditure?
• What are the main problems or concerns about campaign finance raised 
by the information obtained through the Scoping Study?
Many of these questions may appear similar to those raised earlier, but cam-
paign methods should not be confused with campaign finance—information on cam-
paign finance alone cannot be relied on to determine what the most important methods
of campaigning are. For example, where campaign coverage on national television is sys-
tematically biased in favor of incumbents that control state television, those candidates’
campaign spending on the media may be low, but TV campaigning itself may neverthe-
less constitute a crucial component of the campaign. Such a conclusion emerging from
the Scoping Study would suggest a monitoring strategy focused on the misuse of the
state media during the election campaign. 
Designing the Monitoring Project
The Scoping Study will identify the areas of campaign finance to monitor. The next step
is to design the monitoring project. Experts advise planning all the stages of the proj-
ect—from the monitoring methodology through implementation, advocacy, and assess-
ment—as far in advance as possible. The remaining chapters of this handbook discuss
them in detail. Here the focus is on general issues relevant to every type of campaign
finance monitoring exercise.
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Project Strategy
The project strategy will depend on which aspects of election campaign finance deserve
the most attention. These will inevitably vary according to the local context and problems
identified in the Scoping Study. Typically, they include the following:
• Contributions from private donors
• Misuse of state resources for campaign purposes
• Problems with the legal framework:
• Insufficient disclosure requirements
• Insufficient restrictions on income or spending
• Excessive restrictions on income or spending
• Inadequate enforcement of existing provisions:
• Insufficient enforcement
• Discriminatory enforcement
• Inadequate sanctions for violations
These concerns affect the design of a monitoring strategy, as demonstrated by
the following examples:
• Where the Scoping Study suggests that legal restrictions on income or spending
are unrealistically low, an important objective of monitoring will be to assess
whether parties adhere to the limits.
• Where the Scoping Study indicates that a few powerful companies fund major
political parties in order to influence important policies, monitoring should
track donations and political decisions.
• Where the Scoping Study indicates that inadequate restrictions on spending
have led to spiraling campaign spending—a clear incentive for seeking contribu-
tions at any price, including corruption—the monitoring exercise may wish to
demonstrate simply that spending has been increasing dramatically.
• Where the Scoping Study suggests that state resources are the primary (or a
major) source of campaign income for incumbent candidates and parties, 
the monitoring project may opt for a case study approach to illustrate instances
of misuse of administrative resources.
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Ask the experts
Organize a roundtable, inviting
experts and officials interested 
in campaign finance as well as 
representatives of parties, candidates,
fundraisers, and campaign managers
to brainstorm a monitoring methodol-
ogy. In addition to providing valuable
input, such a meeting will also serve
to forestall possible attacks on the
methodology and build relationships
with key stakeholders.
The strategy will be shaped not only by the areas of campaign finance selected
for monitoring, but also by the types of information available. For example, even if cor-
ruption of candidates by private businesses is thought to be a serious problem, it will be
impossible to monitor these relationships if there are no disclosure requirements for
donations. The table on pages 44–45 outlines four hypothetical scenarios featuring var-
ious types of electoral systems, legal frameworks, and enforcement practices, as well as
other potentially relevant factors to show what kind of monitoring strategy is likely to be
most appropriate in each case.
Sources of Information for Monitoring
An effective monitoring strategy requires that the best sources of information be select-
ed for observation. In general, there are three types of sources: official, independent, and
primary. A number of these will be the same as those used in the Scoping Study, but
their role will change for the monitoring exercise itself. For example, while a brief press
survey might suffice for the Scoping Study, the monitoring exercise will likely involve
systematic, “real-time” monitoring of the press.
Official Sources 
Official sources of information include institutions involved in the regulation of cam-
paign finance or the enforcement of campaign finance regulations.
• The Electoral Commission—Supervision and control of party finances are 
often entrusted to an electoral commission.
• Supreme Audit Institution (SAI)—SAIs often audit party finance and may, 
in some instances, perform the role of an electoral commission.
• Parliament—In some countries, party finances are controlled by parliament,
often by a parliamentary committee.
• Tax authorities—Where tax authorities have the responsibility and authority 
to control political party finance, and parties’ tax declarations can be obtained,
such documents can be a valuable source of information on party finances. 
• Broadcasting regulator—The institution responsible for regulating the broadcast
media may be a source of information on hidden advertising and other aspects
of the media during election campaigns.
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Freedom of information
An important question to address 
in the Scoping Study is whether there
are legal provisions guaranteeing free-
dom of information (FOI). Where FOI
provisions are in place and enforce-
able, they may greatly enhance the
availability of information for monitor-
ing. The project in Slovakia, for exam-
ple, relied heavily on FOI legislation in
obtaining data for monitoring dona-
tions and the political decisions made
to the donors’ benefit. Chapter Four
offers more detail on invoking access
to freedom of information provisions.
Monitoring scenarios
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Electoral system Proportional  Proportional Half proportional Majoritarian
representation representation with representation,  
voting preferences half majoritarian
Campaign Party, centralized Predominantly  Dominant party Candidate-
organization central party, campaign,  centered
remainder but significant organization  
individual organization  
candidates by majoritarian 
candidates
Disclosure Strict Strict Weak Weak
requirements
Restrictions on None Strict on income,  Liberal on income, Strict
income/spending liberal on spending strict on spending
Enforcement of Effective Questionable Questionable Discriminatory
campaign finance
regulations
Media High TV High TV penetration, High TV penetration, Low TV 
penetration, free, free, pluralistic. strong political penetration
pluralistic influence on 
public television
State sector Negligible Important state Large state Large state
sector, patronage sector, professional sector, heavy
appointments management political 
influence
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Monitoring scenarios (continued)
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Public Independent/ Largely professional, Strongly politicized Mainly 
administration professionally limited patronage professional
appointed appointments
Main concerns in 
campaign finance
Spiraling campaign 
costs
Violation of income
disclosure require-
ments
Possible corruption  
by private donors
Violation of income 
restrictions
Possible corruption  
by private donors
Possible unlawful
financing of parties 
by state sector
Misuse of public
TV by incumbent 
parties and candidates 
for campaign
Violation of spending
restrictions
Use of public employees
for campaign purposes
Misuse of 
state sector to
finance and implement 
campaign. Use of 
spending/income 
restrictions to 
disadvantage opposition 
candidates
Main objectives of mon-
itoring strategy
Assess veracity 
of donors
Track donors and 
political decisions
Monitor media 
spending
Monitor spending and
compare with income
Monitor donations  and
donors
Monitor links between
state enterprises/agen-
cies and PR agencies
Search for evidence 
of quid pro quo 
decisions linked to
donations
Monitor hidden advertis-
ing and political use of
public TV
Monitor media spending
on a national basis
In selected constituen-
cies monitor total spend-
ing and use of public
employees for campaign
Monitor links between
state enterprises and 
PR agencies
Monitor activities of
state enterprises/agen-
cies duringcampaign
Monitor decisions 
of electoral institution
enforcing campaign 
regulations
Independent Sources
Independent sources of information include entities that are not directly involved in
raising and spending campaign resources or regulating campaign finance. The most
important of these include the following:
• The media—Both state-run and private media can be a key source of informa-
tion in most monitoring projects. Not only will they yield data on political 
advertising, including hidden ads, but professional and independent media 
may also provide other relevant information concerning campaigns, including, 
for example, on donors or promotional events and rallies.
• Professional monitoring agencies—Independent monitoring agencies can be
hired to monitor some categories of campaign expenditure. The method devel-
oped by Poder Ciudadano recommends hiring an independent media agency 
to monitor advertising, for example. Advertising or public relations (PR) agen-
cies may also be asked to assist in estimating the costs of certain categories 
of expenditure.
• Other NGOs—Other organizations monitoring party finances or related issues
may prove to be an important source of independent information. A monitoring
project carried out in Russia for the December 2003 parliamentary elections, 
for example, involved collaboration with other organizations that were already
monitoring different aspects of the election.
Primary sources
Primary sources of information include reports collected from direct observation of 
election campaign activities themselves, such as attendance at local campaign events, 
or observation of media items for evidence of bias. 
Persons who currently are or have been directly involved in the process of rais-
ing and spending campaign resources are also primary sources. These might include
political parties, party treasurers and officials, candidates and elected politicians. Such
sources are valuable, especially when trying to assess the extent to which political parties
use public officials for campaign purposes. Nevertheless, obtaining accurate informa-
tion from them may prove to be difficult.
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Talking to the veterans
When a situation demands a more
investigative and interview-based
approach, it is often useful to 
establish contact with, and perhaps
even hire, former senior politicians 
in order to facilitate communication
with current party leaders, elected 
officials, and donors with whom 
they may enjoy a unique relationship.
All of these individuals may be able 
to provide valuable information. 
Transparency Agreements 
Transparency Agreements—voluntary contracts with candidates and parties committing
them to providing information on all or certain aspects of their finances—are a tool 
several NGOs have used to obtain financial information from parties, particularly in 
settings where few disclosure requirements or freedom of information provisions are in
place. While the effectiveness of such agreements has proven limited, they can neverthe-
less yield some useful data, and noncompliance with them can be invoked to advocate
disclosure requirements and other reforms designed to improve transparency. A sample
Transparency Agreement from the Slovak Republic is included in Appendix Two. 
Sampling
Monitoring all election campaign activities comprehensively is virtually impossible.
Project organizers should, therefore, select a sample for monitoring. Sampling methods
are particularly important for selecting
• locations for monitoring campaign events (Chapter Three);
• voters for conducting surveys (Chapter Three);
• political donors for analysis of income declarations (Chapter Four).
A sample can be either representative or targeted. A representative sample is a
portion of the whole that is believed to accurately represent the characteristics of the total
“population” of persons, activities, or locations monitored. For example, if the project
calls for a telephone survey on the provision of cash and other benefits by political par-
ties, the selected sample should reflect the characteristics of the total voting population
in terms of age, sex, religion, place of residence, socioeconomic status, and so on. A sim-
ilar logic applies in choosing representative samples of locations to observe campaign
events. The validity of any general conclusions made on the basis of representative 
samples hinges on how well the sample was chosen. It is therefore a good idea to con-
sult with professional statisticians when doing so. 
To demonstrate specific phenomena, a targeted sample might be more appro-
priate. An NGO can illustrate the ruling party’s use of state enterprises for campaign
purposes with a small number of cases, or even a single incontestable or typical
instance. The existence of vote buying practices, for example, can be demonstrated by
targeted monitoring of one or a few constituencies.
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Go to the source
Proper sampling methods are 
crucial to the success of a project. 
An excellent introduction is Marek
Nowicki and Zuzana Fialova’s
Human Rights Monitoring, Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights,
Warsaw, 2001. For more detailed guid-
ance on sampling, a useful example-
based reference work is Gary T. Henry,
Practical Sampling (Applied Social
Research Methods), SAGE
Publications, 1990. 
Logistics
Resources and Staff
Once a project design has been outlined and approved, the first step in implementation
is to form a project team. The financial resources and staff or volunteers required to suc-
cessfully run a monitoring project require careful consideration in the planning stages.
The issue of personnel is particularly important when the project involves monitoring
local rallies and events, or other aspects of campaign finance that are labor-intensive. 
In general, project staff consists of monitors, analysts, and coordinators.
Monitors gather the raw data—for example, selecting media items for analysis,
or filling out questionnaires on campaign events.
Analysts classify and process the data to produce findings, for example,
by judging which media items constitute hidden advertising or by producing
estimates of the total cost of campaign events. 
Coordinators manage the project by providing overall direction, overseeing the
monitoring itself, and offering guidance and supervision to the monitors and
analysts. 
It is a good idea to train staff before monitoring begins, and this should be done
prior to testing the methodology (see the following section on Implementation).
Monitors and analysts with experience, i.e., those who have already participated in sim-
ilar projects, should be engaged in training the project team, whenever possible.
Timing
It is important to plan a monitoring exercise so that the monitoring method is ready for
implementation in advance of the campaign period itself. It is a good idea to begin mon-
itoring prior to the official monitoring period, in order to leave room for ironing out
potential problems.
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Staff requirements in 
Latvia, Slovakia, and Russia
The number of staff required will
depend on the type of monitoring 
that is to be conducted and the types
of tasks it involves. This is how the
staffing needs in Latvia, Slovakia, 
and Russia were defined:
• Latvia. The Latvian project to monitor
political advertising on television and
in the printed media was carried out
by a team of eight people, in 
conjunction with the monitoring 
conducted by professional agencies:
one project director, a representative
of Delna (Transparency International
Latvia) and six other monitors. The
monitoring of hidden advertising 
was conducted by eight students 
plus one supervisor.
• Slovakia. In Slovakia, the media as
well as local events, rallies, and cam-
paign activities were monitored in a
number of locations. This part of the
project employed twenty-four regional
monitors and eight central analysts.
• Russian Federal Duma. A project to
identify the misuse of administrative
resources in the Russian Federal
Duma election campaign of
December 2003 monitored two
national TV channels, a selection of
printed publications, and Internet
news portals. In addition, twelve
interviews and five case studies were
conducted. The project team consist-
ed of five media monitors, four ana-
lysts who carried out background
research and created a database of
laws and regulations, and five per-
sons working on the case studies,
four of whom also served as media
monitors or analysts.
Implementation
Monitoring proceeds through four stages:
1. Data Collection and Documentation 
Raw data, which will subsequently be used to generate findings, must first be collected
or documented firsthand. This stage is generally carried out by project staff monitors, or
it may be outsourced. Later chapters will discuss which aspects of monitoring might best
be outsourced. As the accuracy and integrity of data is paramount for a credible moni-
toring effort, in-house monitors need to be adequately trained to compile consistent and
comparable data sets for further analysis. 
2. Data Transfer and Storage
The collected data is then transferred to analysts. The project should establish clear
methods and procedures for standardizing, storing, and transferring data in a way that
facilitates further processing. This stage is carried out by both monitors and analysts.
The process needs to be timely, consistent, and dependable to prevent loss or damage of
collected data, thus compromising the validity of subsequent analysis. 
3. Data Processing
Analysts will then process the data to generate findings. The same information can be
processed in different ways. For example, data on campaign events can be used to gen-
erate findings on the number of events of a certain type having taken place, the number
of events organized by each party or candidate, or the cost of staging events. This stage
primarily involves analysts.
4. Reporting
The project should establish a clear procedure for analysts to report their findings inter-
nally. The procedure should specify when reporting will take place and in which form
the information will be provided. Ongoing (weekly) reporting for the duration of the
project is recommended, although it need not all be public. The frequency with which
an NGO publicizes its interim monitoring findings will depend on the existing level of
public interest in the project and on the predicted impact each public presentation is
likely to have at a given moment, particularly in view of the proximity of the elections. 
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Adapting to circumstances
No matter how well a monitoring
project is prepared, the methodology
is likely to undergo some changes
during implementation in response 
to unforeseen circumstances. The
Scoping Study should help to mini-
mize the extent of ad hoc modifica-
tions, but on-the-job reorientation
should nevertheless be expected and
accepted as a natural part of the
process. For example, monitoring
income was not part of the original
project design in Latvia, but it was
incorporated once the NGO received
information on “suspect donors” and
realized it was possible to monitor
them. The Slovakian monitoring proj-
ect, on the other hand, abandoned
the objective of assessing whether
parties observed campaign spending
limits when it realized that the spend-
ing limits were not clearly defined by
law.
Other Relevant Issues
Relationships with Relevant Institutions and Actors
In order to maximize the credibility of monitoring and secure the support of stakehold-
ers for the reforms that the project will ultimately recommend, it is vital to keep key
actors and other stakeholders in the campaign finance arena informed and maintain a
dialogue throughout the project. Such relationships not only increase the amount and
improve the quality of information available for monitoring, but also maximize the
impact of the monitoring results. Establishing these relationships early on is a key com-
ponent of an effective advocacy strategy. 
To maximize overall project effectiveness, three types of actors should be
approached: 
• Participants in elections (candidates and parties)
• Regulatory bodies
• Lawmaking bodies and institutions with a role in creating regulations
Election participants, i.e., parties and candidates, should be engaged both when
the project methodology is being developed and when the results are released. There are
various ways to encourage candidates and representatives of parties to feel they are part of
the project. These include Transparency Agreements, participation in roundtable discus-
sions, personal interviews, and opportunities to review information or project findings.
Nevertheless, NGOs should be prepared for some resistance, as not all election
participants will be willing to take part in or assist a project whose ultimate aim is to
advocate reforms that may restrict their options. Reform-oriented parties may be willing
to cooperate, but persuading those who do not have a clear interest in reform will be one
of the most challenging, but potentially most important, aspects of a monitoring project. 
A monitoring project should also pay special attention to building contacts and
alliances with the various institutions that oversee campaign finance and enforce rele-
vant regulations. For example, a formal cooperation agreement with the state institution
that controls political party finance can yield useful information and add legitimacy to a
project, as well as create an ally in advocating reforms. In Latvia, a formal agreement
with the Broadcasting Council provided a much-needed source of legitimacy to the con-
troversial monitoring of hidden advertising, while the Romanian monitors noted that
their failure to achieve sufficient cooperation with the Court of Auditors reduced the
effectiveness of monitoring. 
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Include stakeholders
Building relationships with stakehold-
ers may easily be neglected where an
NGO is concentrating on carrying out
the monitoring itself. However, this 
is a serious mistake. Unless such rela-
tionships are cultivated from an early
stage, the prospects of achieving
desired reforms will be poor, not least
because not all stakeholders stand to
gain from the recommended reforms.
Finally, if one of the objectives of monitoring is to advocate reforms in campaign
finance, the success of such advocacy efforts will depend largely on the support of the
institutions that prepare and approve legislation, i.e., government institutions and the
parliament. In Latvia, the project manager attended relevant parliamentary committee
meetings, which proved to be an important factor in ensuring the passage of recom-
mended reforms.
Maintaining Credibility
Monitoring exercises often place high demands on the nonpartisanship of an NGO, and
it is vital to avoid wittingly or unwittingly becoming an advocate for partisan political
forces. When monitoring a subject as politically sensitive as campaign finance, every-
thing possible should be done to support the credibility of the project. Building relation-
ships with other actors and institutions is one way of doing this. But there are other steps
that can be taken in order to avoid accusations of bias or inaccuracy.
An open communication policy embodying a completely transparent and high-
ly informative approach will not only lend credibility to the project, but also set a good
example of transparency. The monitoring methodology should be available to interested
parties and to the public in a comprehensible form, along with a full explanation of the
monitoring criteria. Special attention should be paid to areas of monitoring that might
be perceived as controversial or subjective, such as the monitoring of hidden advertis-
ing. It may be wise to designate one person in your organization to deal with the media,
ideally someone who is comfortable giving press interviews. 
The results will take different forms depending on the aspect of campaign
finance being monitored and the information available. Findings will always be subject
to a margin of error, so it is vital to avoid making unreasonable claims and to have a clear
idea of the extent to which the findings of a monitoring project are accurate, objective,
and representative. Likewise, where subjective calls have to be made—when, for exam-
ple, estimating the total cost to parties of monitored advertising, or deciding whether a
news item or documentary actually constitutes “hidden advertising”—the important rule
is to be open about the criteria applied.
A further issue affecting the validity of the findings is whether data is gathered
through direct or indirect observation. Tracking the amount of advertising space pur-
chased by political parties and candidates is a form of direct observation because all
instances of this type of activity can be observed and documented first-hand. A telephone
survey of voters on the subject of vote buying is an example of indirect observation, as
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Assessing the accuracy 
of monitoring findings
The NGO activists involved in the
Case Studies disagreed over the 
possibility of quantifying overall 
campaign costs. While the Ukrainian
Case Study claimed that the monitor-
ing project produced data on political
advertising that is “absolutely objec-
tive and beyond doubt,” the Slovak
monitors were skeptical about the
possibility of estimating the costs 
of political parties’ campaigns.
Monitoring of the 1995 election 
campaign in Zimbabwe provided 
evidence of the widespread abuse 
of state resources by the ruling party,
although the findings contained 
no estimate of the total volume 
of resources used.
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this does not provide direct and documented evidence, but testimonial evidence alone.
The results of direct monitoring can generally be presented as objective with more cer-
tainty than the results of indirect monitoring.
Using Monitoring Results 
and Evaluating Success
The project methodology should include both a clear strategy of how the monitoring
results will be used as well as a process for evaluating the success of the project. 
• Presentation of results—This is the first step once monitoring has been com-
pleted: the results are analyzed and interpreted, and key findings and recom-
mendations are presented to the relevant agencies and/or to the public.
• Advocacy—A strategy for advocacy is vital if the recommendations yielded by
the monitoring exercise are to have a chance of being implemented.
• Seeking redress—If the results of monitoring include hard evidence of corrup-
tion or violations of existing regulations, these may be used to file a formal
complaint.
• Evaluating success—Deciding in advance how the success of the monitoring
project will be measured will ensure that the objectives of the project are clearly
stated and that the project is well-designed to achieve them. Success can be
measured in terms of achieving the general objectives, strengthening the orga-
nization’s capacity for monitoring campaign finance, and benefits to the wider
monitoring community.
• Input into future monitoring—The ideal monitoring scenario involves not only
a well-designed and implemented project, but also an on-going process in
which the findings of one project are used to design a future one. In addition,
monitoring methods developed for and successfully applied in one project may
be replicated in future projects.
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Latvia Romania Slovakia Ukraine
Variables 
compared/evaluated
1. Compare monitored
spending against officially
declared spending
2. Analyze income 
declarations
Compare monitored 
spending to declared
income
1. Monitor as widely as possi-
ble to estimate total market
value of election campaign
2. Ascertain whether parties
observe spending limits
Compare monitored 
advertising with official
party declarations of 
spending
Categories of 
expenditure monitored
Political advertising and
hidden advertising in all 
TV, in significant radio sta-
tions, and in all national
and regional papers
Political advertising in 
outdoor media, national
press, radio, and TV
Press, outdoor advertising,
marketing activities, rallies,
promotional materials, 
organizational costs, 
other activities
Political advertising (direct
and indirect) in selected 
central and regional TV,
radio, and printed media
State funding for 
election campaigns
No Yes. Allocation formula
based on number of seats
won in parliament
Equal subsidies to 
nonparliamentary parties
with more than 1% of vote 
Yes No, but free space provided
for campaign posters 
Party income: limits, 
disclosure requirements
Maximum individual 
donation: e16,000
($20,500)
Strict disclosure require-
ments 
Yes (0.005% of state 
budget per party) 
Identities of persons 
who donate a sum 
larger than 10 minimum
salaries must be published
in the official gazette
No limits 
Very weak 
disclosure 
requirements 
Yes (unrealistically low, 
no corporate donations) 
Very strict disclosure
requirement, only to 
Central Election
Commission 
Campaign 
expenditures: 
limits, disclosure 
requirements
No limit
Very strict disclosure
requirements
No limits at time of moni-
toring. Yes in new law—a
multiple of minimum wage 
TV time allocated
No disclosure requirements 
Yes. TV and radio 
ads banned
Free TV 
time allocated 
Disclosure very weak 
Electoral fund max 
2.55m UAH (approx. 
U.S. $475,000)
TV and radio time 
allocated 
Strict disclosure to Central
Election Commission
Comparison of campaign finance monitoring projects 
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Latvia Romania Slovakia Ukraine
Transparency Agreement Yes
Parties either did not
observe them, filled out
forms incorrectly, or argued
that disclosing information
disadvantages the more
transparent parties by 
singling out their 
funding practices
Yes
Called “Code of Ethics,” ful-
filled unevenly but provided
some of the information
used to compare with mon-
itoring results 
Yes
Information on spending
and some other informa-
tion provided (e.g.,
on agencies working 
for parties) but late
Yes
Information 
supplied 
was not useful
Share of advertising 
expenditure in 
total campaign
Assumed to be 50-70%
(based on party declara-
tions) 
Largest single spending cat-
egory, but not more than
50%
Could not be 
determined
Officially 77% (based 
on Central Election
Commission figures) 
Estimated discount 
on political advertising
TV: 26% 
Press: 13%
Radio: 20%
None 50% on outdoor 
advertising
25% in the national press
40% in the regional press
Discounts prohibited; 
60% discount observed 
in one case
Hidden advertising 
monitored
Yes No Yes No
Declared income or 
spending (in U.S.$)
6.1 million (spending) 1.4 million (income) 2.2 million (spending 
during the official 
campaign period)
6 million (total 
campaign spending)
Monitored spending 
(in U.S.$) [per capita]
10.5 million 
[4.4]
14.2 million
[0.64] 
1.6 million (minimum 
estimate, excluding 
rallies and events)
[0.30] 
7.7 million
[0.16]
Cost of monitoring 
project (in U.S.$)
$50,752 $29,173 $64,273 $36,400
Comparison of campaign finance monitoring projects (continued)
3: Monitoring 
Campaign Expenditure
At a Glance
This chapter proposes a working definition of campaign expenditure and examines the
different categories of expenditure and how they can be monitored. The chapter also
reviews various factors that may affect the monitoring methodology, including the
degree to which a campaign is run in-house or outsourced. 
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Basic Issues
What Is Campaign Expenditure?
For the purposes of monitoring, this handbook defines campaign expenditure as
expenditure incurred by or on behalf of a registered political party or candidate to promote
the party or candidate at an election or in connection with future elections, including
expenditure that has the aim of damaging the prospects of another party or candidate.
Note that this definition includes not only expenditure incurred by a political party or
individual candidates, but also spending on behalf of political parties or candidates by
third parties, such as private companies or individuals, foundations or other nongovern-
mental organizations, state and public institutions, or institutions supported by the state.
Third-party spending may be treated as both income and expenditure. Some countries,
such as Romania, classify it as a component of parties’ or candidates’ income, while oth-
ers, such as the United Kingdom, define it as campaign expenditure. Because it is more
easily observed as expenditure, it will be treated as such in this handbook.
Third parties are often used as a way of evading legal limits on campaign expen-
diture, yet this form of spending may also be a perfectly legal and legitimate form of
political expression for individuals and organizations. The line between legitimate and
questionable third-party spending is not always clear. For monitoring purposes, all activ-
ities that fall under one of the categories of expenditure defined in this handbook should
be treated as campaign expenditure, regardless of who pays for them. Other activities,
such as a pressure group distributing literature to promote a party or candidate solely
because of a shared agenda on a specific issue, should not be included, unless there 
is evidence of an agreement between the party or candidate and the organization to 
conduct the activities. 
Despite the fact that spending on election campaigns by entities not themselves
running for election may be an important component of campaign expenditure, there 
is no generally applicable method for monitoring third-party expenditure directly. 
The approach suggested in this handbook—focusing on campaign outputs and estimat-
ing their costs or market value—aims to monitor the extent rather than the origin of
spending. Where third-party spending is thought to make a significant contribution to
campaign expenditure, any difference between declared and monitored spending might
be attributable to third-party spending. Armed with such a finding, an NGO would be
well-placed to advocate that third-party spending be declared as a donation in countries
lacking regulation of the issue. 
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Third-party spending on 
election campaigns
Third-party spending on election cam-
paigns is an established phenomenon
in a number of countries. For example:
• In Germany, there is a long history 
of spending on party election cam-
paigns by related foundations, such
as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation,
which has played an important role
in Christian Democratic Union elec-
tion campaigns.
• Civic associations and interest
groups in the United States often
spend money to promote issues
clearly supported by particular 
candidates. Examples range from 
the National Rifle Association and
antiabortion groups to the National
Organization for Women.
• Trade unions spend substantial
resources to support the Labour
Party in British elections.
• Most postcommunist countries 
do not directly limit spending by
independent groups on behalf 
of political parties or candidates.
Moreover, low limits on campaign
spending and prohibitions on 
funding from certain sources 
often lead parties to channel 
both campaign fundraising and
expenditure through third parties. 
• In Romania, evidence emerged 
that tobacco companies may 
have purchased advertising time 
for political parties in the 2000 
election campaign.
Categories of Campaign Expenditure
In order to monitor campaign spending effectively, the specific activities where
resources might be spent in a political campaign must be examined in turn. This hand-
book looks first at expenditures associated with political advertising and publicity, and
then at nonadvertising-related expenditures, such as rallies, operational costs, and mar-
ket research. Advertising is highlighted for two reasons: first as a dominant cost in many
election campaigns, and second as an area where significant information and experience
is available. The main categories of campaign expenditure, therefore, are the following:
1. Advertising and publicity
2. Hidden advertising
3. Nonadvertising expenditure, including:
a. Operational and administrative costs
b. Polling, market research, and campaign design and management
c. Rallies, events, and direct contact with voters
d. Distribution of money and other direct benefits to voters, including
vote buying
This breakdown of campaign expenditure is based on the UK Electoral
Commission’s classification of election expenditure,
1
as well as information drawn from
the Case Studies and other monitoring and research projects. It need not be followed
strictly. Campaign finance regulations in a given country may categorize spending dif-
ferently and require parties and candidates to disclose spending accordingly. Likewise,
the significance of various categories will vary from country to country. For this reason,
the Scoping Study is indispensable in deciding on the categories to be monitored and the
adjustments needed to suit local circumstances. In order to design an effective monitor-
ing project, it is essential to determine, as far as possible, the following:
• Who spends resources on campaigns?
• Which are the most important categories of campaign expenditure?
• Which categories should be monitored?
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Categories of campaign spending
The relative importance of different components of campaign spending varies greatly across countries 
Kevin Casas-Zamora’s research in Costa Rica found the following breakdown of campaign spending in 1998
Personnel costs and professional fees 26.6 %
Installation of party branches and campaign headquarters 13.9 %
Bond discount and other financial costs 15.0 % 
Party meetings and rallies 8.0 % 
Transport and fuel 16.7 % 
TV advertising 8.7 % 
Other advertising 7.3 % 
Various 3.8 % 
Marcin Walecki’s research on Poland provided the following estimate of party spending in 2001, an election year
Printed materials 12.5 % 
Posters, banners, and billboards 8.4 % 
Political consulting, market research, and polling 0.8 %
Transport costs 0.8 % 
Rallies and other events 4.2 % 
Individual candidates’ own spending 10.5 %
Routine constituency spending by members of parliament 12.5 % 
Mass media 25.1 % 
General administrative and staff costs 25.1 %
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Categories of campaign spending (continued)
A survey by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs on political party financing2 found the following
breakdown of spending in 12 African countries: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia
Mass media 10 %
Campaign materials 17 %
Rallies and meetings 9 %
Travel and logistics 26 %
Money and direct benefits 14 % (including 3.4 % on vote buying)
Personnel 22 %. 
The following breakdown was found in these 10 countries: Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Croatia, Guyana, India,
Macedonia, Nepal, Peru, and Romania
Mass media (TV and radio) 27 % 
Campaign materials (posters, T-shirts, etc.) 20 %
Rallies and meetings 13 %
Travel and logistics 14 % 
Money ad direct benefits 12 % (including 2.3 % on vote buying)
Personnel 10 %
For any project, categories selected for monitoring should constitute a major component of election campaigns, as identified in the
Scoping Study.
Monitoring Campaign Outputs
The general approach to monitoring spending advocated in this handbook is to monitor
campaign outputs, defined as campaign-related activities, including advertising and
staged events, organized and paid for by candidates, political parties, or independent
third-parties. The estimated value of the observed outputs is used to arrive at an estimate
of campaign expenditure. If the categories are well-defined and the sample outputs are
representative, an estimate of total campaign spending should be possible. 
Using the Results of Monitoring 
Figures obtained from monitoring campaign expenditure can be used for various 
purposes:
• To evaluate the accuracy of parties’ and candidates’ declarations of expendi-
ture, by comparing declared spending with total monitored spending
• To evaluate the accuracy of parties’ and candidates’ declarations of income, 
by comparing declared income with total monitored spending
• To evaluate existing regulations on campaign expenditure and income
• To draft recommendations for effective regulation of campaign expenditure
and income
• To underscore the benefits of transparency
The following sections examine each category of campaign expenditure in more
detail and discuss how each should be monitored.
Advertising and Publicity
Many observers consider advertising, in particular on television, as the key to modern
political campaigning. While the media’s dominant role in campaigning should not be
taken for granted, advertising is undoubtedly one of the main components of campaign
spending in many countries. This category of expenditure encompasses the following:
• Production (drafting/printing/design) of the party program and other policy
documents
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Visible effects of monitoring
Results pertaining to specific cate-
gories of expenditure monitored 
can have a direct effect on the
observed activity. For example, 
monitoring of hidden advertising 
in Latvia in municipal elections in
2001 seems to have resulted in a
marked drop in the phenomenon 
in parliamentary elections in 2002. 
• Political advertising in the electronic (e.g., TV, radio), print (e.g., newspapers,
magazines), and outdoor (e.g., billboards, posters) media
• Design and production of logos and promotional materials, such as buttons,
bumper stickers, posters, T-shirts, hats, etc.
Spending on advertising is a particularly attractive target for monitoring
because it often constitutes a substantial expense, and it can be monitored with a high
degree of accuracy, as there is an observable record of expenditure (the advertisements
themselves). Moreover, in most countries, there are agencies that monitor advertising
professionally and on a permanent basis. The Poder Ciudadano approach to monitoring
is to compare the costs of advertising alone to declared income or expenditure. This
model was applied in all of the Case Study exercises and has proven effective in contexts
where media advertising is in fact the dominant form of campaign spending. 
Assessing the Cost of Placing Advertisements
Three issues need to be addressed to ensure the accuracy of monitoring the cost of ad
space and airtime:
• Types of media and outlets
• Monitoring in-house or outsourcing
• Cost of advertising 
Selecting Media and Outlets
Carefully selecting the range of media to be monitored will help ensure that the results
are accurate and unbiased. Incomplete results, from a too-limited section of the media,
risk attracting accusations of bias because monitoring might record more of one party’s
or candidate’s spending than another’s. In order to avoid such accusations, the following
practices are recommended:
• Select the types of media (TV, radio, newspapers, billboards) where significant
election advertising takes place, as indicated in the Scoping Study
• If the information collected in the Scoping Study is insufficient to this pur-
pose, form an advisory group consisting of journalists, candidates or political
party members, media monitoring agents, former campaign managers, and
other experts
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Advertising by 
government agencies
Public service advertising by govern-
ment agencies should not be consid-
ered campaign advertising, even if
placed during the campaign period.
However, if “institutional advertising”
of this kind clearly promotes a partic-
ular party or candidate, then it can 
be classified as a misuse of adminis-
trative resources, an issue addressed
in detail in Chapters Five and Six.
• Once the types of media have been selected, monitor as many media outlets
as possible, given the resources available
• Select media outlets with the highest viewership, listening audience, or read-
ership
• Based on the advice of independent media experts, select a sample of media
outlets that covers as broad a range of political preferences as possible
If the objective of monitoring is to show only that parties or candidates are hid-
ing income or breaching expenditure limits, monitoring of a limited section of the media
may be sufficient, as long as steps are taken to avoid unfairly favoring certain parties or
candidates.
Deciding Whether to Outsource Monitoring 
Monitoring political advertising can be done in-house, but this represents a significant
investment of time and resources, and it requires a high standard of accuracy. Whenever
possible, monitoring should be outsourced to an independent media monitoring agency. 
Outsourcing Media Monitoring
In order to ensure that the services provided by an outside company are as useful as pos-
sible, it is important to assess the agency’s capabilities (i.e., monitoring-to-order versus
“off-the-shelf” data) and to negotiate an agreement that specifies precisely the type of
monitoring and data for which the agency will be responsible.
Some agencies can tailor their data to meet the specific needs of an NGO, as was
the case in Latvia, for example. Others might only be able to provide a set of standard-
ized results for purchase, as happened in Slovakia, where the monitors covered about 85
percent of billboard space but no other types of outdoor advertising. This difference may
have an impact on the monitoring methodology and the accuracy of results. For exam-
ple, the inability of the hired agency in Slovakia to monitor all outdoor advertising may
have led to the neglect of a potentially important indicator. Clearly, it is preferable to
choose an agency that can provide monitoring-to-order.
Whatever the capabilities of the selected monitoring agency or agencies, any
agreement with them should specify the following:
• The precise target of agency monitoring (e.g., advertisements of all dimen-
sions, rather than only those over a specific size)
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The importance 
of negotiations
The experiences of the monitoring
NGOs in the Case Studies underline
the importance of detailed negotia-
tions with agencies. In Latvia, the
NGO was initially led to believe 
that a certain monitoring agency
could monitor political advertising 
on the Internet—but negotiations
clarified that, in fact, they could 
not. In Slovakia, extensive discussions
were necessary in order to ascertain
exactly which types of outdoor adver-
tising the agencies could monitor. 
• The type of information the agency will provide and when it will be provided
• The format of the data
It is important to be specific about format because the data an agency provides
should be easy to understand and analyze without requiring a great deal of processing.
It is also worthwhile to negotiate with agencies the cost of the services provid-
ed. Given the noncommercial nature of a monitoring project and the likely favorable
publicity generated through association with the project, agencies may provide discounts
to monitoring NGOs. In Ukraine, for example, one firm granted the monitoring NGO a
considerable discount, and in Romania, the media monitoring agency charged a mere
U.S. $300 for 60 days reporting on political advertising for eight national TV stations,
six national radio stations, and twelve major daily newspapers. 
Monitoring In-House
Monitoring in-house is a serious undertaking—to monitor 24 hours of TV coverage per
day for one channel alone, for example, would likely require three persons. By extension,
to monitor three channels would call for nine people. In-house NGO monitors will need
to collect and synthesize a vast quantity of raw data themselves, including the following:
• Tapes of all TV and/or radio coverage on all stations monitored
• Copies of all issues of print media monitored
• A count of all outdoor advertisements in the locations selected 
for monitoring
The data then needs to be organized according to the following criteria:
• The number and length of all advertisements on the selected TV and radio
stations, broken down by party and candidate
• The amount of advertising space in print media 
• The number of outdoor ads
NGOs with limited resources may choose to monitor a targeted sample, such as 
programming during “peak” hours only, but such an option requires appropriate justifi-
cation in reporting and analysis, as the results cannot claim to be comprehensive.
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Estimating Advertising Rates
In order to estimate the amounts parties or candidates spend on advertising, it is neces-
sary to account for the discounts they may receive under two possible scenarios. In some
countries, discounts for political advertisements are regulated by law. In this case, the
regulated rate effectively represents the cost of ads, and calculating spending on ad time
and space are straightforward. However, in countries where discounts for political adver-
tising are not regulated, it becomes difficult to determine how much parties or candi-
dates are actually spending due to discounts. Extreme or biased discounts may even indi-
cate corrupt links between certain media outlets and political parties and candidates. 
Regulated Discounts on Political Advertising
In countries where discounts on political advertising are regulated in some way (banned
altogether, defined by law, or classified as in-kind donations), spending on advertising
can be calculated by multiplying the volume of advertising by the regulated discounted
rate. In this way, monitors can arrive at the market value of the advertising campaign, and
any additional discounts that cause rates to fall below the regulated rate should be treat-
ed as in-kind donations. This approach is particularly suitable where the objectives of
monitoring include assessing the adherence of parties or candidates to spending limits,
or assessing the accuracy of their income statements.
Nonregulated Discounts on Political Advertising
Where political advertising rates are not regulated by law, monitors will need to estimate
the discount rates in each category of the media (broadcast, print media, and so on). This
should be done as follows:
1. Conduct a survey across a broad selection of media buyers, including politi-
cal parties and candidates themselves, advertising agencies, and media out-
lets, to determine the typical range of discounts (or increases) applied to
political advertising in the national and local media. As a rule of thumb, at
least three media buyers, three advertising agencies, and three media outlets
in each media category should be interviewed.
2. Calculate the average maximum and minimum discount rates for each
media category.
3. Multiply the volume of advertising in each media category by the standard
published rates minus/plus (a) the average maximum discount and (b) the
average minimum discount. 
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The unpredictable effect of
discounts on expenditure 
Kevin Casas-Zamora’s research 
on Uruguay revealed that discounts
on ad placement varied considerably
and were sometimes as high as 95
percent. In Ukraine, one media outlet
offered one political party a 60 per-
cent discount, despite a legal ban on
discounts. In Russia, on the other
hand, all political parties were paying
20-30 percent above standard market
rates for TV advertising.
4. The difference between the two results indicates the likely range of actual
spending on advertising by parties or candidates. Wherever applicable, try to
include detailed information and fine-tune estimates to reflect the results of
the initial interviews. For example, if media buyers believe that discounts
tend to lie near the maximum level, include this information with the moni-
toring results. Bear in mind that since a maximum discount equals a mini-
mum expenditure for the party or candidate, the accuracy of such an estimate
is less likely to be contested. 
The information collected in this process may also prove valuable in formulating recom-
mendations for reforms designed to regulate discounts on political advertising. The
problem with this approach, however, is that it is based solely on estimates of standard
discounts, which may miss important variations. Discounts from a single source may
vary between parties, between different media outlets, and even between candidates of
the same party. There is a particular risk that smaller advertising campaigns will enjoy
systematically smaller discounts, simply due to the “volume discounts” typically provid-
ed for any large advertising campaign. If information is readily available on volume 
discounts, this should be incorporated into the estimates of expenditure.
Assessing the Cost of Producing Advertisements
The preparation of advertisements represents another important component of spend-
ing, separate from their placement. Where parties or candidates hire agencies to design
advertising campaigns, these costs may be sizable, although monitoring projects have
not typically focused on them to date. 
The cost of producing political ads can be estimated as follows:
1. Ask parties and candidates for estimates on the production costs of their
advertisements. 
2. Obtain independent estimates from at least three PR and/or advertising
agencies of the minimum cost of producing the same advertisements, at
market prices. 
3. Find an average figure based on the independent estimates.
4. The range between the parties’ and candidates’ estimates and the average
independent figure can be considered a reasonable estimate of the production
costs of political advertisements.
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Publicity and credibility
Information on advertising expendi-
ture is likely to attract attention, 
which may be critical in promoting
project goals. This requires that
NGOs be absolutely confident of their
findings. It is recommended that they
take the following steps:
• Show how advertising expenditure
varies from party to party and how
much each spends on different
media
• Publish data regularly (e.g., once 
a month) as election campaigns
progress in order to keep the 
issue in the public eye
• Stress that data refer to advertising
expenditure alone and do not reflect
total campaign expenditure
• Highlight any factors that might
affect results or lead to inaccuracies
(e.g., discounts that could 
not be estimated accurately)
Testing the methodology 
in advance 
Monitoring advertising happens in
“real time,” so it is important to 
have tested the methodology before
monitoring proper begins, to allow 
for possible adjustments. This is 
particularly necessary when a moni-
toring agency has been hired to 
conduct monitoring-to-order, outside
the scope of their normal activities. 
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Argentina
In Argentina, Poder Ciudadano consulted advertising 
experts and asked for estimates of “standard market 
discounts” enjoyed by political parties. Based on these 
interviews, a standard discount rate of 40 percent was 
applied to the published rates. 
Latvia
To compare parties’ publicity costs with their officially 
declared expenditure in the 2002 election campaigns,
Delna/Soros Foundation–Latvia selected two media intelli-
gence agencies to monitor political advertising on all TV 
and radio stations and all major national and regional 
newspapers. The agency that monitored national media
(except outdoor media, not included due to the confidential
pricing policies of the companies involved) was able to 
provide estimates of standard discounts according to 
media type: 26 percent for TV advertising, 13 percent for 
the print media, and 20 percent for radio. These discount 
rates were incorporated into the analysis. Advertising in 
regional newspapers and on the Internet was monitored 
by the second agency. Both provided data on a monthly 
basis. The findings revealed a substantial discrepancy 
between monitored advertising expenditure (e10.5 million) 
and the parties’ officially declared figures (e6.1 million).
Slovakia
The Fair Play Alliance carried out its own market research 
on discounts and consulted a selection of agencies, 
media outlets, and owners of outdoor advertising space 
on the prices applicable under a range of circumstances, 
such as the time of year, the type of advertisement, 
and the client. It then applied maximum estimates 
of market discounts: 50 percent for outdoor media, 
25 percent for national print media, and 40 percent 
for regional print media. 
Poland
Marcin Walecki interviewed numerous candidates, 
campaign managers, and representatives of advertising 
and other agencies in Poland and found that parties often
received a 50-70 percent discount on political advertising 
from printing houses, advertising agencies, and media 
outlets. In some cases, sponsors covered the difference
between the published and the discounted rates. 
In addition, during the 1997 and 2000 elections, 90 
percent of advertising agencies engaged by political 
parties received very profitable contracts from private 
or public companies prior to or following the elections.
Estimating discounts
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Asociatia Pro Democratia (APD) monitored campaign expen-
diture during the 2000 election year in order to compare an 
estimated “minimum” expenditure with parties’ declarations 
of income in the Official Monitor (the official gazette) for 
that year. As the goal was simply to establish minimum 
expenditure levels, comprehensive monitoring was not 
necessary.
Monitoring covered both the local and national elections 
during the official election campaign periods: 45 days 
for local, 60 for national elections. No discounts were 
calculated because, under Romanian law, discounts are 
classified as hidden donations and, therefore, qualify 
as income.
In the local elections, the project opted for in-house 
monitoring conducted in four major towns—Brasov, 
Cluj, Sibiu, and Constanta—focusing on local newspapers,
posters, billboards, and banners:
• Billboards were counted by volunteers, and an estimate 
of total spending was based on rates provided by the 
largest vendor of outdoor advertising space in Romania. 
• Newspaper ads were monitored by project assistants 
every day, and the market value of the ads was determined
according to the standard advertising rates published 
by each newspaper. 
• Spending on posters was based on an “indisputable 
minimum” number of 1,000 posters per candidate, 
which was then multiplied by the estimated cost of 
preparing and printing each candidate’s campaign 
poster. The cost of posters and banners was estimated 
by asking a sample of companies that produce such 
materials for representative figures.
Billboard advertising in Bucharest was also monitored by vol-
unteers and estimated expenditure was then calculated based
on information provided by the advertising agency. For some
parties, the agency was able to provide precise information 
on actual spending, for others it provided estimates of the
cost of advertising space comparable to the type of advertise-
ment observed by volunteers.
For the national elections, the project outsourced monitoring
to a private company specializing in media monitoring. 
The focus was on TV, radio, and press outlets, and monitoring
covered eight national TV stations, six radio stations, twelve
national daily newspapers, and twelve local newspapers 
(those with the highest circulation in Brasov, Cluj, 
Sibiu, and Constanta). The project team estimated expendi-
ture based on the number and size of monitored ads and 
the standard published rates for the media in question. 
One project assistant and two to five volunteers (mostly 
students) implemented the local and national monitoring 
in each city. The relationship between the NGO and the 
monitoring agency was productive. The agency provided 
very precise data on advertising time and space, as well 
as software that enabled APD to access the monitoring 
results easily. 
The results of monitoring both elections were dramatic.  
In 2000, spending on advertising alone exceeded total
declared income tenfold (U.S. $14.2 million monitored 
spending versus $1.4 million declared). Given that 
advertising is believed to account for 40-50 percent of 
total spending in the 2000 elections, it is reasonable 
to assume that the contrast between actual spending 
and declared income was even greater.
Monitoring political advertising in Romania
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Hidden Advertising
Hidden advertising refers to material that appears in the media as objective reporting or
analysis but in reality promotes one candidate or party, or attempts to discredit another.
In practice, hidden advertising is often broadcast or published due to a party or candi-
date’s influence or control over the media. Hidden advertising may be paid for by candi-
dates and parties, in which case it clearly qualifies as a category of expenditure. But even
where no money changes hands, hidden advertising qualifies as a form of third-party
expenditure when it provides parties or candidates with advertising that they would oth-
erwise have had to pay for. If the media outlet is state-run or state-controlled, then hidden
advertising qualifies as abuse of administrative resources (see Chapters Five and Six). 
Hidden Advertising: A Form of Media Bias
Media coverage can be biased qualitatively or quantitatively. Qualitatively biased cover-
age deliberately presents a candidate or party in a positive or negative light. Quantitative
bias refers to more extensive coverage of one candidate or party over others, even if that
coverage is neutral. 
Not all media bias qualifies as hidden advertising—the coverage must appear 
in a program or article that purports to be objective. An editorial opinion article that
openly supports a particular party is, therefore, not a case of hidden advertising, but the
inclusion of similar opinions in a news article in the same newspaper may be.
Monitoring hidden advertising can be conducted in much the same way as 
monitoring standard political advertising. The first step is to select the media categories
and outlets to be monitored and then to collect the raw data for analysis. Once the raw
data is collected, the individual instances should be assessed to determine whether they
constitute hidden advertising or not. 
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Hidden advertising
Engaging other media monitoring
NGOs as partners in any project 
to monitor hidden advertising is 
highly recommended, as such organi-
zations may already have experience
with monitoring media bias. It is also
a good idea to involve journalists in
the formulation of the exact definition
of hidden advertising to be applied 
for the purposes of monitoring. This 
is also an ideal opportunity to raise
awareness about journalistic ethics
and good practice. 
Identifying Qualitative Bias
Whether a specific news item is qualitatively biased should be judged against the follow-
ing seven criteria:
• Relevance: Does the news item refer to topics that deserve attention?
• Accuracy: Do the facts presented correspond to reality?
• Transparency: Is the presentation of controversial or problematic material
credited to an identified source?
• Balance: Are different political opinions presented equally within a specific
report or item?
• Diversity: Do the media present as wide a range of information as possible?
• Timeliness: Is information released when it is relevant?
• Comprehensibility: Is the item easy to understand?
Media and journalists’ organizations around the world define similar criteria in
their standards of professional journalism. The above criteria were developed during the
monitoring project in Slovakia by MEMO 98, a media monitoring NGO that labels
breaches of these criteria “media effects.”
3
Violations on the basis of relevance might
include the placement of a visual image of a candidate or of a party symbol without direct
bearing on the topic of a program, or the appearance of a candidate in a program with-
out obvious grounds, especially when the candidate is the only person expressing an
opinion or being featured. Breaches of balance include presenting the opinion of one
candidate without attempting to contact other parties or candidates, selectively featuring
a series of opinions in order to support a particular party or political agenda, or posing
interview questions that essentially grant the candidate free air time for campaigning. 
Where one or more of the criteria are clearly breached in a media item that pur-
ports to be objective, the item may be classified as hidden advertising. The assessment
of individual pieces of coverage will inevitably be subjective, and monitors must clearly
publicize the criteria used to identify bias. Whenever possible, journalists should also be
engaged in the assessment of individual items of coverage.
In some countries, the issue of media bias is addressed by law, often in provi-
sions governing television. Public television statutes usually require objective and 
balanced news coverage, and licensing conditions for private TV stations often contain
similar provisions. 
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Keeping the media free
The interests of transparency must 
be weighed carefully against media
freedom concerns. While it is desir-
able that controversial information
always be sourced, particularly if it
portrays candidates in a positive 
or negative light, it has long been 
recognized that journalists have 
a right not to reveal their sources, 
particularly where disclosure may
harm or endanger the source.
Monitors should bear this in mind
when gauging the likelihood that 
a biased report or documentary 
constitutes hidden advertising.
Balance in state media
The issue of balance in reporting
applies clearly in the case of state-
owned and state-funded media, which
are often obliged by law to maintain
balanced coverage of competing 
political groups. Private media are
less likely to be regulated by law, 
but may be nevertheless constrained
by codes of conduct or ethics to
maintain neutral coverage. However,
even in this case, imbalance in 
private media cannot be categorized
as hidden advertising absent com-
pelling evidence of party influence.
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Media ethics
Media and journalists’ organizations around the world define criteria for objective reporting and other ethical standards. NGOs
are strongly advised to contact journalist associations in their own countries and to seek additional guidance from the following
organizations: 
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) is the largest membership-based association. 
The IFJ’s code of conduct can be found on its website. 
www.ifj.org/docs/ethics.doc
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has one of the most comprehensive codes of ethics in the world,
which includes a special section on elections. The elections-related provisions are very specific to the United
Kingdom, however, and not necessarily applicable in other countries.
www.bbc.co.uk/info/policies/producer_guides/
The International Center for Journalists website publishes a list of compiled codes from journalists’ associations
throughout the world:
www.ijnet.org/FE_Article/CodeEthicsList.asp?UILang=1
Other useful publications regarding media and elections coverage can be found on the websites of Article XIX
(www.article19.org) and the European Institute for the Media (www.eim.org). 
Identifying Quantitative Bias
Quantitative bias is more easily identified than qualitative bias, by simply comparing the
number of appearances and references to political parties and candidates throughout the
monitoring period in each media outlet monitored. The results of the comparison
should be presented in the form of statistics on the amount of coverage for each candi-
date or party, broken down by media outlet. However, unless there are strict regulations
requiring equal coverage of different candidates, more coverage cannot immediately be
classified as hidden advertising, as active campaigners may naturally receive extensive
coverage, and incumbent parties may receive coverage in their capacity as government
figures. Therefore, results on quantitative bias should generally be presented in raw
form, together with a clear explanation of the basis for classifying individual items as
instances of hidden advertising, where found. 
Estimating the Value of Hidden Advertising
Once news or other items have been classified as hidden advertising, monitors may
attempt a monetary estimate of the cost. This should be done with great caution, howev-
er, and only where the rates for political advertising are regulated by law or where rea-
sonably accurate estimates of political advertising rates in the period and outlets con-
cerned can be made. 
The procedure for estimating the value of hidden advertising is the same as for
standard political advertising: multiply the estimated rates by the volume of hidden
advertising and classify the data according to party or candidate. When a reasonable esti-
mate of advertising rates is difficult or impossible to determine, monitors could simply
present findings on the number of cases to underscore the magnitude of the problem,
or they can analyze specific instances of hidden advertising in detail in order to familiar-
ize the public with the nature of the phenomenon and draw attention to its existence.
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Publicizing the methodology
Perhaps more than with any other cat-
egory of expenditure, the importance
of publicizing the methodology used
to identify hidden advertising cannot
be overemphasized. Ideally, the
methodology should be developed
with the participation of entities that
may come under criticism, such as
representatives of political parties and
the media. It is also essential not to
make greater claims than are realisti-
cally justified by the monitoring
results.
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Monitoring hidden advertising in Latvia
The Latvian monitoring project was the only one of the Case Studies to attempt to monitor hidden advertising systematically 
in an election campaign. Unable to find any previous experience on the issue, in 2001 Delna/Soros Foundation–Latvia consulted
a wide range of media experts and established three basic principles for identifying hidden advertising:
1. Violation of existing regulations
2. Unwarranted placement of images of particular candidates or parties
3. One-sided presentation of issues, candidates, or parties
A media intelligence agency was hired to monitor advertising on television and in the press. The agency collected TV items that
constituted possible cases of hidden advertising, as well as all articles from the national and regional press where parties and/or
candidates were mentioned. These were then analyzed by groups of students, supervised by an NGO member. In order to ensure
credibility, a group of journalists also reviewed selected cases to determine whether they qualified as hidden advertising.
Monitoring election coverage in the Chilean media
PARTICIPA, an NGO in Chile, monitored election coverage in the run-up to the December 2001 parliamentary elections. 
The project tracked 12 news sources for 59 days prior to the elections. All articles and reports that mentioned candidates 
for congress or the competing political parties or coalitions were included in the study. The exercise monitored coverage accord-
ing to quantitative (e.g., report word counts), as well as qualitative (e.g., relevance, specific mention of policies or positions, 
and balance) variables. The results included a ranking of the candidates according to the amount of coverage they received, 
broken down by type of media, as well as information on the nature of the coverage based on the qualitative criteria. 
The project managers stressed the importance of establishing a diverse and credible advisory council and of performing 
a monitoring “test run” before the official monitoring period in order to resolve any unforeseen problems.
Source: Transparency International, The Corruption Fighter’s Toolkit 2002, Section 111.1, CD-ROM, 2002.
Nonadvertising Expenditure 
Operational and Administrative Costs 
The category of operational and administrative costs generally consists of the following:
• Rent for office space used for campaign purposes
• Utilities (water, gas, electricity, etc.)
• Communications (telephones, fax, Internet)
• Office supplies (paper, pens, computer and other equipment, furniture, etc.)
• Staff salaries
It may be difficult to distinguish routine operational costs from campaign-relat-
ed operational costs with any degree of certainty. Although this distinction is not rele-
vant where the purpose of monitoring is to compare monitored spending with declared
total (or annual) income or expenditure, when the objective is to capture campaign
expenditure in particular, it becomes necessary to separate the two. One way to do so is
to note any changes in certain types of expenditure between an election year and a non-
election year. Increases in an election year may reasonably be classified as campaign
spending in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Any observed increase not evi-
denced in a declaration, such as extra staff, is a sign of inaccurate reporting. Conversely,
parties or candidates may attempt to conceal funds used for one purpose by classifying
them under another category—hence increases might be declared in categories where
no increase is observed. 
A number of sources may be consulted to estimate operational and administra-
tive costs:
• Official party documents, such as annual reports or financial declarations,
supplemented by Transparency Agreements, where available, can show
which organizational costs are being declared. 
• Data collected by other institutions, such as political research institutes, 
may provide information on the size and organizational structure of 
political parties.
• Interviews with candidates or party managers can include detailed questions
regarding the costs of running the party’s central headquarters.
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The accuracy of the figures obtained from these sources can then be tested 
by conducting first-hand research into the operating costs of running party offices,
assuming accurate information can be collected on the amount of office space, the types
of equipment and utilities available, and staff numbers. The party headquarters and 
a sample of local branches should be included in order to gain an accurate figure for
national expenditure. 
Polling, Market Research, 
and Campaign Strategy Design
As techniques for measuring voters’ moods and opinions have become more sophisticat-
ed, the costs of conducting polls and market research have become a significant compo-
nent of campaign spending. Many parties employ consultants on a permanent basis 
to conduct opinion polls and run focus groups in order to read voter intentions, and these
activities intensify during election periods. Parties may also pay external managers or 
public relations agencies to design and manage entire election campaigns—from strate-
gy to implementation. This is an increasingly common practice that tends to result in
minimum transparency and provides numerous opportunities for covert party funding by
third parties who make payments directly to the agency. More commonly, parties will
carry out some campaign activities themselves (such as formulating the party program
and agenda) and outsource other activities (such as polling, market research, and the 
specific campaign strategy) to professional agencies or managers. The degree to which
campaigns are outsourced will directly influence the monitoring strategy.
Costs in this category of spending typically comprise the following: 
• Research consultants and polling agencies
• Telephoning or otherwise contacting voters
• Running call centers 
• Hiring PR agencies, campaign managers or other specialists to design and/or
implement a campaign strategy 
These costs are usually evidenced in one of two ways. If the services are per-
formed internally, i.e., by the candidates or parties themselves, the costs are likely to be
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classified under an internal research department or think tank, probably under the
broader category of operational costs. In such cases, the costs in this category will be
high and deserve special attention.
Outsourcing need not involve a single provider—a party may hire one agency 
to carry out polling and market research, another agency to develop their campaign strat-
egy, and a third agency to design the party’s campaign logo or image. All these services
can be monitored independently using the following approach:
1. Request information from the parties or candidates regarding which of 
the following campaign activities have been outsourced and to whom:
• Opinion polls and other market research
• Election program and manifesto formulation and production
• Campaign strategy design
• Other campaign activities (e.g., negotiations with media, 
organization of local events)
2. Interview experts in order to obtain independent confirmation of the 
activities outsourced by different parties and to whom
3. Request a specific list of services provided from the agencies or managers
engaged by the parties
4. Obtain a reasonable estimate of the minimum market value of the 
services provided by talking to other professionals in the same field 
(such as PR professionals and campaign managers)
5. Generate an estimate of total expenditure in this category by applying 
the estimated minimum market value to the specific services that were 
outsourced
If a significant discrepancy emerges between observed and declared income or
spending, then a strong argument can be made that parties or candidates are not accu-
rately disclosing their expenditure.
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Rallies, Events, and Direct Contact with Voters
Organized events, rallies, and door-to-door campaigning are likely to be a core compo-
nent of election campaigns in countries where media penetration is low or where polit-
ical advertising on TV and radio is banned or limited. But this type of “traditional” cam-
paigning also plays a role in developed democracies such as the United States, where
candidates are eager to demonstrate that they are in touch with the general population.
Although the popularity of such practices may have decreased as media campaigning
has increased, it should not be assumed that such methods are obsolete or disappearing. 
This category of spending typically comprises the cost of organizing campaign
events of all kinds, including election rallies, meetings, concerts, competitions, shows,
and fundraising events, which may include some of the following items:
• Renting space or premises
• Hiring personnel to organize events
• Renting equipment and other facilities used at events
• Utilities (electricity, water, heating)
• Transporting and accommodating staff or event participants
• Hiring individuals or groups to participate in events (e.g., entertainers)
Door-to-door campaigning and canvassing typically includes the following costs:
• Hiring staff to conduct door-to-door campaigns
• Distributing materials to staff or mailings to voters
• Transportation
Monitoring Events
There are two basic approaches to monitoring events organized by parties and candi-
dates during an election campaign: the first is to provide a detailed factual description of
events, and the second, more ambitious approach, is to supplement this information
with an estimate of spending. Estimating the cost of these events is a complicated task
which, in most cases, can only be performed with limited accuracy. However, an attempt
to do so may at least point to a lack of transparency or other regulatory problems. 
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Monitoring events in Slovakia
The Slovakian project monitored elec-
tion rallies and other local campaign
events. A representative sample of
municipalities was selected by two
demographic experts and divided 
into three groups: regional capitals,
district capitals, and other municipali-
ties. An analyst in the NGO’s central
office created a database of all
planned events, and regional monitor-
ing was conducted by 24 paid moni-
tors, most of them students who had
already worked on other NGO proj-
ects. They attended and reported on
all activities that were taking place in
the selected municipalities. 
The monitors arrived in advance 
of each event, in order to observe the
number of staff and the technology
involved. During the event, they filled
in a questionnaire, collected any pro-
motional materials and gifts distrib-
uted at the events, and registered 
all outdoor advertisements, including
fliers. The data for all events were
then analyzed centrally, and profiles 
of the parties’ campaigns were creat-
ed. In addition to information on
advertising and promotional materials
and publications, the profiles con-
tained detailed descriptions of all
recorded events, including schedules
and programs, as well as a listing of
equipment used. 
(continued on page 77)
Monitoring campaign events involves the following steps:
1. Requesting Information
Information on campaign events can be requested from parties or candidates using a
standard questionnaire. This serves two purposes. First, accurate information, if provid-
ed, this will make the task of monitoring easier. Second, refusal to provide information
may be used as direct evidence of a lack of transparency and bolster the case for stricter
disclosure requirements. 
2. Organizing the Monitoring
To begin monitoring, form a coordinating team that will perform the following tasks:
• Create a database of events
• Inform local monitors about planned campaign events and create a 
monitoring schedule
• Manage the flow of information from local monitors
Once a coordinating team and tasks are established, a sample of locations
should be selected for monitoring. To arrive at a representative sample, demographic
experts or sociologists should be consulted. Once the locations have been selected, form
a team of regional monitors and equip them with a standardized template for recording
details of the events. 
The quality of the regional monitors’ work is crucial to the success of the 
project. As direct supervision is more difficult in these circumstances, it is important 
to train monitors well and to provide them with sufficient information and support. 
3. Describing Events
In producing a factual description of events, the data should be processed to provide the
following:
• A detailed breakdown of different types of events, including statistics on the
number of events of each type
• A profile of each political party’s or candidate’s campaign, including the type
of events they organized, where they were staged, and how often
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Monitoring events 
in Slovakia (continued)
Although the costs of staging the
events were not estimated, the
Slovakian monitors believe that the
descriptions alone demonstrated a
significant financial investment,
greater than had previously been sus-
pected. Perhaps most importantly, the
monitoring demonstrated that regu-
lated limitations on certain types of
expenditure (such as advertising)
were likely offset by expenditure on
events and other nonregulated cam-
paigning methods.
The standardized questionnaire and templates used by the local monitors play
an important role here, as they allow for information to be classified relatively quickly.
For example, data can be analyzed according to the number of events of each type, the
number of events organized by each party or candidate, and so on. Detailed templates
also enable the NGO to provide a good general description of the kinds of specific cam-
paign activities that have taken place at each event. 
A standard questionnaire for political parties and candidates, a template for
recording the details of events, and a set of possible guidelines for monitors to follow are
all included in Appendix Three. 
4. Estimating Expenditure
Estimating the costs of campaign events is difficult. Yet it may be possible to produce
rough estimates of minimum costs by creating a database of minimum market prices of
the principal items that typically comprise campaign events. By focusing on minimum
costs, much controversy can be avoided, and the results may prove significant. For exam-
ple, if the minimum estimated cost of a party’s campaign events exceeds that party’s offi-
cial declaration, the party’s reporting is clearly deficient. Monitoring based on estimates
of minimum costs can be performed in the following way:
• Monitor all components of an event that can be described completely and
accurately. 
• Request information on the costs of these individual components from the 
relevant party or candidate.
• Request the same information from three agencies that organize such 
activities.
• Apply the costs provided by parties or candidates to all the events monitored.
• Apply the lowest, average, and highest estimates of minimum costs obtained
from agencies to all the events monitored.
• Present the minimum estimate of total costs as the project estimate of spend-
ing on the events monitored, and provide the other estimates together with
assumptions on which each was based. This way, the media or other inter-
ested parties can judge for themselves whether the higher estimates are
more likely to be accurate.
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Obstacles to estimating 
costs of campaign events
Estimating the cost of organizing
campaign events cannot be done pre-
cisely. In Slovakia, the two marketing
agencies consulted both considered
the task impossible, due to the vary-
ing rates charged by different events
organizers. The Slovakian project,
therefore, chose not to estimate the
cost of events. Other activists point to
a number of factors that can dramati-
cally affect costs, such as the type 
of equipment used or the number 
of events purchased from the same
provider. For example, a Latvian 
political party produced a TV com-
mercial featuring a popular rock 
band whose participation was
rumored to have cost U.S. $200,000.
Party officials, however, claimed 
that the band was hired for a mere 
$20,000. With no investigative pow-
ers to access parties’ financial and
accounting records, the monitors
could not determine the actual costs.
Similar problems arise with other
events-related expenditures.
If it proves impossible to obtain sufficient information for even a minimum cost
estimate, the project can simply provide a detailed description of the events, and make a
tentative judgment of their contribution to each party’s or candidate’s overall campaign.
The failure of parties or candidates to provide requested information may be invoked as
evidence of insufficient transparency in recommending reforms.
Monitoring Door-to-Door Campaigning
Door-to-door campaigning involves staff or volunteers visiting potential voters directly
and encouraging them to vote for a particular candidate or party. Monitoring this 
practice can focus on the cost of producing materials for distribution and on the cost 
of personnel and transportation, both of which may represent substantial categories 
of expenditure. 
Although door-to-door campaigning is difficult to monitor independently, par-
ties or candidates are likely to have accurate and detailed information about the cost of
materials and the personnel required, and they will often be happy to discuss the details
at length, on the assumption that their determination to communicate directly with vot-
ers is evidence of their democratic credentials.
Monitoring should, therefore, be carried out in two stages: requesting informa-
tion from parties and candidates, followed by limited, local sample testing of the accura-
cy of the information. 
Requesting Information 
Information on door-to-door campaigning can be requested from parties or candidates
via a formal request or by conducting interviews with party officials, campaign man-
agers, or agencies to whom this aspect of campaigning has been outsourced. The follow-
ing questions should be asked:
• Do you conduct door-to-door campaigning? If so, how much and which con-
stituencies do you cover?
• Is door-to-door campaigning organized and run in-house, or is it outsourced
and to whom? 
• Who visits homes—party staff, external paid staff, activists, 
volunteers? How many people are involved?
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• Are they paid? If so, how much?
• How many households are scheduled to be visited and how 
many times?
• Which materials are distributed to each household?
• How do the materials for distribution reach staff and volunteers? 
What transportation or shipping costs are incurred as a result?
• What other follow-up activities take place: direct mailings, 
telephone contact, etc?
• What is the total cost of your door-to-door campaign?
Sample Testing
The information obtained from parties or candidates should be checked for accuracy by
conducting limited monitoring of sample locations. This should be done in the munici-
palities for which the most detailed information was provided. The staff or volunteers
carrying out the door-to-door campaigning should be interviewed to determine
• the number of staff and/or volunteers working on the campaign 
in the selected locality;
• the number of homes visited and how often;
• the amount of election materials distributed.
If election materials are distributed through a limited number of collection
points, it may be relatively easy to estimate the volume of such materials. Obtaining sam-
ples of all materials distributed will make it possible to estimate production costs with
reasonable accuracy. The cost of door-to-door campaigns in each locality can then be esti-
mated by adding the costs of materials and staff. Staff costs can be estimated by multi-
plying the minimum estimated number of staff by their minimum estimated wages, and
the minimum cost of campaign materials can be estimated by multiplying the mini-
mum estimated volume by the minimum estimated production costs. 
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Distribution of Money and 
Other Direct Benefits to Voters
During election campaigns, parties or candidates often provide targeted groups of citi-
zens with cash payments or free goods, services, or other benefits in order to gain their
support. A typical example includes food packs distributed to voters in poor areas.
This category excludes the provision of refreshments at campaign events or 
the distribution of small promotional items such as T-shirts or buttons, which can 
be tracked as part of the general events monitoring described above. Such items are gen-
erally of negligible value and benefit to the voter, and, therefore, unlikely to “buy” their 
support. 
We include the distribution of goods, services, and other benefits to voters in
our methodology for two reasons. First, it may qualify as vote buying, a form of corrup-
tion. Second, the provision of money and direct benefits may account for a significant,
even dominant, portion of campaign spending. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky notes that the
cost of “old-style, patronage politics,” involving the distribution of direct benefits to vot-
ers, can be very high, exceeding the cost of modern media-style campaigns. The mass
distribution of imported hams, turkeys, and other giveaways in the 1999 elections in
Antigua and Barbuda,
4
for example, amounted to a massive campaign expenditure item. 
The distribution of cash, goods or benefits should be monitored as a category 
of expenditure, which can be done using surveys and direct observation of sample 
constituencies. 
Surveys
An anonymous survey of households may yield useful information on how many
respondents were offered benefits by parties or candidates. While this approach cannot
provide reliable information on how many individuals actually accepted those benefits,
and, therefore, on how much parties or candidates actually spent on them, it can offer a
rough estimate of the resources reserved for this purpose. The following procedure
should be followed where there is strong evidence from the Scoping Study that the 
practice of vote buying is widespread:
1. Conduct a telephone survey of a representative sample of voters. A scientifi-
cally valid sample should be selected in consultation with sociologists or sur-
vey agencies.
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance :  81
Vote buying in Armenia
The Center for Regional
Development/Transparency
International Armenia attempted 
to monitor vote buying during the
2003 parliamentary election campaign
by carrying out a telephone survey of
600 citizens. Of those surveyed, 75
percent replied that they or their rela-
tives had been offered a bribe to vote
for a particular candidate or party; 52
percent said they had been offered
cash, varying in amount from 500-
10,000 dram (U.S. $1-17); 26 percent
had been offered goods of various
kinds; 11 percent were offered servic-
es, such as payment of household
utility bills or building repairs; and 11
percent would not specify what they
were offered.
These figures did not provide 
direct evidence of the actual extent of
vote buying, as those surveyed were
not asked whether they accepted the
bribes or not. According to the moni-
toring NGO, anecdotal evidence sug-
gested that many voters accepted
cash or benefits from parties but then
proceeded to vote as they would have
voted otherwise.
2. Ask the respondents whether they were offered money or other benefits,
and, if so, how much money or what benefits were offered.
3. Calculate the average value of the benefits offered each voter.
4. Multiply this figure by the total number of voters in communities where
vote buying is believed to take place (based on information collected for the
Scoping Study and other preliminary research) to produce a rough estimate
of the resources reserved for this purpose.
Monitoring Sample Constituencies
The distribution of benefits to voters in selected constituencies can also be monitored
directly in the following way:
• Where the monitoring organization is already monitoring local events and ral-
lies, monitors should be instructed to document the nature and quantity of all
goods or services distributed at local events. This is, to some extent, already
covered under “promotional materials” in the template for monitors in
Appendix Three.
• The minimum cost of benefits provided to voters can be estimated by apply-
ing the minimum market value of the goods and services in question to the
estimated number of attendees.
• The local media should also be monitored for announcements of any free ben-
efits offered to voters as part of an election campaign, and minimum costs can
again be calculated based on market value and the estimated number of vot-
ers in the community. 
• The resulting figures may then be used as an example of the minimum cost
of vote buying in the constituencies monitored.
• An average of the estimates produced for individual constituencies may then
be used to reach a very rough estimate of spending on vote buying nationally. 
82 :  Open Society Justice Initiative
Vote buying in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe, a team coordinated 
by John Makumbe monitored vote
buying during the 1995 parliamentary
elections. They collected data that 
was overwhelmingly qualitative and
derived from surveys of the independ-
ent press and reports from teams of
monitors (mainly graduate students
of the University of Zimbabwe) sent
to observe campaign practices in
selected constituencies.
The Zimbabwe project collected 
substantial information on alleged
and confirmed vote buying practices,
particularly in the primary elections.
According to the project coordinators,
“allegations were made throughout
the country of blatant vote buying,
which took various forms during the
campaign for the primaries: cash, 
free supply of food and beverages. . .
cigarettes, even some distribution of 
medicine.”
The Zimbabwean project yielded
strong evidence of actual vote buying,
supported by powerful individual
examples, which were then used to
argue the seriousness of the problem.
Notes:
1. The Electoral Commission, Campaign Expenditure: A Guide for Political Parties, January 2003, Section 3.
http://www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/templates/search/document.cfm/6307.
2. Africa Political Party Finance Initiative (APPFI), conducted by NDI in 2003, publication forthcoming. 
3. For a detailed description of the “media effects” approach, see Monitoring Media, MEMO ’98, Bratislava 1999,
p. 34-36.
4. Douglas W. Payne, The Failings of Governance in Antigua and Barbuda: the Elections of 1999, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1999; cited in M. Pinto-Duschinsky, “Financing Politics: A Global View”, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 13 No. 4, October 2002, p. 83.
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4: Monitoring 
Campaign Income
At a Glance 
This chapter examines how political parties or candidates obtain the resources used in
election campaigns. It describes the different types of resources that can be categorized
as campaign income and discusses traditional ways of monitoring political donations,
including the local prerequisites needed to conduct a monitoring exercise. Special atten-
tion is devoted to analyzing disclosure statements, used to uncover unlikely and inter-
connected donors, as well as to monitor quid pro quo donations. The final section out-
lines an investigative approach to monitoring income.
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.
Basic Issues
What Is Campaign Income?
There are various ways to finance election campaigns: donations, loans, in-kind or third-
party contributions, membership dues, earnings from assets and property or business
activities, and the use of state or public administrative resources. From the perspective
of this handbook, the point of interest is the way in which these resources are distributed
or used, i.e., the existing potential for corruption. Donations are covered in some detail
below. Loans, while different from donations (as they have to be repaid), may neverthe-
less be awarded to parties or candidates in return for political favors. Loans can be treat-
ed similarly to donations as long as they are covered by disclosure requirements. Third-
party contributions refer to goods or services paid for on behalf of a political party or can-
didate. In-kind benefits and donations are goods and services offered to candidates or
campaigns free of charge or at a discount. Both should be treated as income equal to
their market value. The same is true of state administrative resources when misused for
campaign purposes. Membership dues are rarely a source of corruption. The corrupt use
of earnings from assets, property, or business activities, on the other hand, is beyond the
scope of this handbook.
For the purposes of monitoring, then, the sources of income that warrant the
most attention are direct donations, loans, third-party and in-kind contributions, and the
misuse of administrative resources, as these are most likely to be linked with corruption.
We have already seen how third-party contributions can be monitored as expenditure,
and the misuse of administrative resources will be discussed in detail in following chap-
ters. This chapter, therefore, focuses on monitoring direct donations and loans.
Analyzing Disclosure Statements
Disclosure Requirements
Monitoring direct donations and loans relies on disclosure requirements. Depending on
the disclosure requirements of a given country, three types of monitoring projects can be
attempted: 
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• Comparing income declarations to monitored expenditure: Where parties or can-
didates are required to disclose total income, the declared total can be com-
pared to monitored campaign expenditure.
• Assessing the veracity of disclosure statements: Where parties or candidates are
required to disclose individual donations, including donors’ identities and the
amount of donations, income statements may be analyzed for unlikely and
interconnected donors. 
• Tracking quid pro quo donations: Where parties or candidates are required to
disclose individual donations and information is available on candidates’ or
parties’ political decision-making or public contracts, disclosure statements
can also be analyzed for quid pro quo donations.
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky’s research on campaign finance legal frameworks
1
indicates that, as of late 2002, political parties are subject to disclosure requirements of
some kind in 67 out of 104 countries surveyed. In 36 of the 104 countries, political par-
ties were specifically required to disclose individual donations. However, monitoring
individual donations will only be feasible if the following conditions are also met:
• Donors must be disclosed at least once per year
• Donors’ names (as persons or companies) and their ID/registration numbers
must be disclosed
• The amounts donated must be disclosed
• Information on the financial attributes of donors must be publicly available
(e.g., in commercial registers or tax returns)
Comparing Declared Income to Monitored Spending
Declared income can be compared to monitored campaign expenditure in order to test
the veracity of income declarations. If monitored spending exceeds declared income, 
it is likely that a portion of the income is being concealed. Results of this kind can be dra-
matic. The Romanian monitoring project found that advertising expenditure exceeded
total declared income by 11 times in the case of the largest party. The credibility and
strength of such a conclusion, however, relies on the accuracy of the estimates.
Candidates or parties may raise campaign funds for a much longer period than the dura-
tion of the campaign itself, possibly over an entire electoral cycle. It is, therefore, impor-
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tant to take into account income from previous years that may be used for the campaign.
At the same time, monitors should be cautious not to overestimate spending. 
A comparison of monitored expenditure and declared income might follow
these steps:
1. Estimating Expenditure
1. Define the methodology for monitoring expenditure (see Chapter Three).
2. Record the highest reasonable level of expenditure and the underlying
assumptions (for example: “assuming no discounts on published advertis-
ing rates”).
3. Record the lowest reasonable level of expenditure and the underlying
assumptions (for example: “assuming the highest discounts available on
published advertising rates”).
2. Estimating Income
1. Select the source of the data on income.
2. Record the highest reasonable level of income and the underlying assump-
tions (for example, that campaign income is raised over the entire previous
electoral cycle).
3. Record the lowest reasonable level of income and the underlying assump-
tions (for example, that campaign income is raised only in the year in which
the election takes place).
3. Making Comparisons 
1. Provide comparisons for all possible combinations of expenditure and
income, as in the hypothetical example on page 86. 
2. If there is information that favors particular income or expenditure esti-
mates, then this should be added to the numerical results. For example, if it
is widely believed that parties raise almost all of their campaign income dur-
ing the year in which the elections take place, and that discounts for media
advertising tend toward the higher end of the range, it should be noted in
the findings that the most likely, or “best estimate,” is based on the mini-
mum assumptions for both income and expenditure.
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Advocating disclosure reform
Given that, even in most developed
democracies, disclosure requirements
are often inadequate, a likely objective
of any monitoring project will be to
advocate reforms leading to improved
disclosure.
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How to estimate income and expenditure 
A hypothetical project to monitor parliamentary elections aimed to compare political parties’ declared income with their spending on 
advertising. Monitoring yielded the following data:
Declared Income $1 million in 2001; $2 million in 2002; $3 million in 2003
Advertising Expenditure $10 million, assuming market (standard published rate) prices for political advertisements and no discounts. 
Maximum Discount 60%. 
Based on these variables, as well as different assumptions of how much of the past three years’ income was spent on campaign activities, 
the following range of estimates of income, advertising expenditure, and “hidden income”, i.e., the difference between declared income and
monitored expenditure, might be produced.
Declared Advertising Income minus 
Assumption Income Expenditure Expenditure
Maximum income (3 years)
Maximum expenditure (no discount) $6 million $10 million - $4 million
Maximum income (3 years)
Minimum expenditure (60% discount) $6 million $4 million + $2 million
Minimum income (1 year)
Maximum expenditure (no discount) $3 million $10 million - $7 million
Minimum income (1 year)
Minimum expenditure (60% discount) $3 million $4 million - $1 million
Negative numbers in the “Income minus Expenditure” column indicate “hidden income.” The presentation of results could include all four possible
scenarios, accompanied by commentary explaining which scenario is most likely and why. 
Assessing the Veracity of Disclosure Statements
In countries where income disclosure is required, parties or candidates may seek ways
to avoid having to reveal the full amounts received from particular donors. Income 
declarations can be analyzed to uncover unlikely donors, i.e., individuals whose status
cannot be confirmed or who are not likely to possess the funds required to make the
donation for which they are credited, and interconnected donors, i.e., the use of multi-
ple individuals, such as family members, to conceal a large donation from a single
source. 
Identifying Unlikely Donors 
Where donors’ identities are disclosed, individual or corporate contributors may be
checked to gauge the likelihood that they actually made the donation for which they are
credited. This can be done by assessing their ability to pay, based on independent
sources, and by contacting them directly. When assessing a donor’s ability to pay, clear
criteria according to which a declared donor is identified as suspect (i.e., unlikely to be
the true donor) must be defined. The criteria will vary according to whether the donor
in question is a company or an individual.
If the source of a significant donation is a corporate entity, the following infor-
mation should be collected, whenever possible:
• Company profitability
• Taxes paid and owed
• Applications for bankruptcy
• Attempts to recover debt from the company
If a company is unprofitable, owes significant taxes, is in danger of going into
bankruptcy, or has other significant outstanding debts, yet is listed as a significant con-
tributor to a political party or candidate, there is reason to question whether the compa-
ny is the real donor.
In the case of noncorporate individual donors, it is more difficult to assess net
worth and the ability to donate. Useful indicators of individual wealth can be found in
company listings of shareholders, owners, or managers. If no such indicators are avail-
able for a given person, it is reasonable to query whether he or she is a likely donor, or
is being used to conceal the identity of the true donor.
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Latvia’a Lursoft database
A key instrument for monitoring
donors in Latvia was the Lursoft data-
base of companies (www.lursoft.lv).
The database contains a list of all
enterprises registered in Latvia, their
managers and shareholders, as well
as the companies’ fixed capital and
annual accounts, including profit 
and loss statements. The database
allows users to obtain cross-refer-
enced information on the business
activities of listed individuals. For
example, if an individual is identified
as a shareholder or manager of 
one company, the database can 
be searched to reveal the same
individual’s holdings or titles in 
other companies registered in Latvia.
Charges made on the basis of investigations into unlikely donors must be care-
fully formulated. Where possible, the investigation of the indicators outlined above
should be supplemented by direct contact with the declared donors to ask for confirma-
tion of the donation. If donors confirm their donations, monitors should request evi-
dence.
Identifying Interconnected Donors
Large donations from one entity (a company or individual) may be concealed by being
divided among a number of different donors. For example, an individual may openly
donate a small amount and then make substantial additional donations covertly through,
for example, companies of which the person is the director, or through his/her spouse
or children. Such practices are likely where there is a legal limit on the size of individual
donations.
Connections among a candidate’s or party’s donors can be revealed as follows:
1. Randomly select 100 donors for each political party or a selection of candi-
dates.
2. For each of the selected donors, calculate the de facto donation, by assuming
that money donated by an individual donor, his or her spouse, and any com-
pany of which the donor is the director or owner all come from a single
source. 
3. If there is legal limit on individual donations, calculate the number of sam-
ple donors whose estimated actual contribution exceeds the limit. This num-
ber is an “index of interconnectedness,” i.e., a rough indicator of the per-
centage of donors who are concealing their full contribution to a given party
or candidate. 
4. Different parties and candidates can be ranked according to their indices.
The indices provide an indication of the extent to which individual parties or
candidates are evading or circumventing legal donation limits: the higher the index rat-
ing, the more parties rely on this practice. 
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Unlikely donors 
in the Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, the Civic
Democratic Party’s annual report 
for 1995 included a list of individual
donors to the party. In 1996 (an 
election year), it was reported in the
media that several of the declared
donors either had not contributed or
did not exist—in one case, the donor
was deceased. A year and a half later, 
it became evident that the true source
of several donations was a company
that had won a privatization tender to
purchase the country’s third-largest
steel mill. The scandal triggered the
collapse of the government in
November 1997, and the case provid-
ed evidence of institutionalized cor-
ruption in political party finance. The
media investigation had simply used
the data supplied by the party itself to
contact the listed donors.
Source: Quentin  Reed, “Corruption in
Czech Privatization; the Dangers of 
‘Neo-Liberal’ Privatization,” in S. Kotkin
and A. Sajo (eds.), Political Corruption in
Transition: A Skeptic’s Handbook, Central
European University Press, Budapest/New
York, 2002, p. 281. 
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The Latvian monitoring project did not originally intend to
focus on party income, but several factors led to a change 
in project strategy to include an analysis of party income 
statements:
• A lively media debate about unlikely donors raised the issue
high on the political agenda. 
• Delna received several phone calls from people who had rec-
ognized certain donors and knew that these individuals or
companies were not in a position to make contributions. 
• In several parties’ disclosure statements, there were sudden
surges in the amount and/or number of donations immedi-
ately preceding the election, with a number of people typical-
ly making donations close to the legal limit. 
• Campaign spending of two parties that appeared on the
political scene just a few months prior to the elections 
was comparable to that of more established parties, 
raising questions regarding their rapid acquisition of 
significant funds. 
• There was a legal cap of approximately e16,000 ($20,500)
per year on the amount any one contributor could donate.
Moreover, as there were no state subsidies for election cam-
paigns, parties received 99 percent of their income from pri-
vate donations. Taken together, these two factors provide an
incentive for concealing the scope of individual donations. 
• Recent amendments to party financing regulations required
parties to publish all donations and their sources on the
Internet within ten days of receiving the funds, thus provid-
ing a valuable new source of information for monitoring.
Monitors checked the declarations against the Latvian Lursoft
business register database for the following: 
• Individuals who donated large amounts of money (more than
$4,200) but were neither shareholders nor CEOs of any reg-
istered companies.
• Companies that, based on their revenue, profits, paid taxes,
and tax liabilities, did not appear likely to possess the funds
to donate to a political party.
• Connections among different individual donors, as well 
as among individual and corporate donors. 
Unlikely donors figured prominently on the donor lists 
of two political parties. Latvia’s Way had the highest number 
of unlikely donors, followed by the Farmers’ and Greens’
Union, which appeared only four months before the election
and was allegedly sponsored by oil interests. 
The information was published five days before the election
and received extensive media coverage. According to Delna, 
it served as an important alternative source of information 
for voters, given the political parties’ extensive advertising
campaigns.
Monitoring declared donations in Latvia
Tracking Quid pro Quo Donations
Correlations between political decisions and the political donors who stand to benefit from
them serve as indicators of possible corruption. The types of political decisions that are typ-
ically made in exchange for donations include, but are not limited to, the following:
• Public contracts awarded
• Licenses and concessions granted to companies or individuals
• Sales of state assets (for example, privatization contracts or sales of real estate)
• State subsidies and other public funds provided to companies or individuals
• State guarantees on loans issued to companies or individuals
• Discretionary decisions to write-off tax debts
• Regulatory decisions in specific sectors (for example, decisions to permit or
reject mergers, pricing decisions for pharmaceutical products, or the supervi-
sory framework for investment funds)
Information on these types of decisions can be found in public databases, by
invoking existing legal or constitutional rights to information, or by conducting a survey
of the media. 
The Quid pro Quo Monitoring Period
Monitoring income will often be a longer-term process than monitoring expenditure.
This is clearly the case when identifying quid pro quo donations. While it is generally
assumed that political decisions favoring donors take place after donations have been
made, the opposite scenario is also quite common. In fact, the exchanges between
donors and candidates, politicians, or political parties are generally not one-off events.
Rather, they tend to be more complex, long-term relationships in which the timing 
of corrupt exchanges may be often the reverse of the “bribe then benefit” scenario. 
The monitoring activities of NGOs (particularly those in the United States) that track
donations and political decisions to reveal possible links between them tend to be semi-
permanent activities.
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Creating a database of donors
and decisions in Slovakia
As part of its “Complex Party Finance
Reform” project begun in 2003, the
Slovak NGO Fair Play Alliance is con-
structing a database (www.fair-play.sk)
to include the following:
• Private and corporate donors to
political parties
• All current and previous members of
parliament
• All parliamentary candidates
• All current and previous members of
government, including deputy secre-
taries 
• All mayors and members of regional
and municipal parliaments
• Institutions (e.g., ministries) with
the highest vulnerability to corrup-
tion and illegal funding
• Funds and subsidies managed and
awarded by these institutions
• Private or corporate loans issued
based on state guarantees
• Private or corporate tax debts that
were written off
• Contracts awarded to private per-
sons and corporations in public pro-
curement processes 
• Key decision makers in public pro-
curement processes and any con-
nection that these individuals
had/have with private business
• Data on “Who’s Who in Slovak
Business”
(continued on page 94)
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Following the money in the U.S.
A number of NGOs in the United States compile and present information on contributors and spending in congressional and
presidential races, presenting powerful examples of monitoring possibilities in practice. These organizations provide journal-
ists, or anyone who wishes to analyze political donations, with virtually complete information on disclosed donations in feder-
al and state elections, together with substantial information on the possible links between donors and candidates or parties.
The most active of these organizations are profiled below.
The Campaign Finance Information Center (www.campaignfinance.org) trains journalists in news-gathering and database
skills to enable them to track political donations, and educates them on campaign finance and its influence on the alloca-
tion of contracts, jobs, and legislation, so that they can interpret their own findings effectively. 
The Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit research group based in Washington,
D.C., that tracks money in politics and its effect on elections and public policy. The Center conducts computer-based
research on campaign finance issues for the news media, academics, activists, and the public at large. 
Common Cause (www.commoncause.org) is a pressure group that campaigns on key political issues, one of which is cam-
paign finance and its links to lobbying. Common Cause regularly publishes investigative studies on the effects of money in
politics and reports on a variety of ethics and integrity-in-government issues. For example, the organization published
reports on the links between money provided by organizations that lobbied against stricter accounting regulations, an issue
that came to the fore with the collapse of energy giant Enron (See “Accounting For Disaster: Congress, Arthur Andersen,
And The $60 Billion Enron Meltdown,” available at:www.commoncause.org/ news/default.cfm?ArtID=76).
The Center for Public Integrity (www.publicintegrity.org) conducts investigative research and reporting on public policy
issues in the United States and around the world. It has published numerous reports on its monitoring of donations to
election candidates and the favors that they appeared to provide in return after election.
The National Institute on Money in State Politics (www.followthemoney.org) tracks political contributions in all 50 United
States states in an easily searchable format online. It has, for example, released reports on contributions to state politicians
from alcohol, tobacco, and gambling interests.
The organizations listed above all obtain information on donors and donations from the Federal Electoral Commission (see
www.fec.gov) and state electoral commissions. They present the data in an accessible fashion and use a combination of tech-
niques—ranging from reviewing databases on public procurement to journalistic investigation—to determine what donors may
have received in return.
Public Databases
Information on the types of decisions outlined above is increasingly available to the pub-
lic, especially on the Internet. Individual donors can often be checked against company
registers in order to reveal all of the donor’s corporate connections. These companies can
then be cross-referenced against a register of public contracts or licenses awarded, or a
public procurement register (all EU member states are required to maintain such a reg-
ister in electronic format). Corporate donors, as well as companies associated with indi-
vidual donors, can also be cross-checked with any pending or concluded antimonopoly
legal proceedings, a record of which is also often publicly available on the Internet.
Freedom of Information Provisions
In areas where information on political decisions is not made readily available by state
authorities, NGOs can proactively seek it out. There are a number of possible legal pro-
visions that can be invoked:
• Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a right of access to official docu-
ments, or general protection of the right of freedom of information
• Administrative provisions requiring disclosure of administrative acts and
other documents and information held by the authorities
• Laws concerning petitions that may permit individuals to solicit information
from certain authorities
• Freedom of Information or Access to Information laws
A law granting access to public information, such as a freedom of information
(FOI) act, is the strongest tool for obtaining documents and information. It helps to
ensure that the request meets the criteria specified by the law. For example, some laws
state that the requestor need provide only his or her name and an address for delivery of
the response. In other countries, the applicant may be asked to fill out a specific form.
Identifying the person responsible for handling information requests and making sure
that your request reaches them will also improve the chances of success. Note that an
NGO should not be required to state the reason for the request, nor to provide any other
information about the monitoring project. 
If the initial request is rejected, or there is no response from the relevant author-
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Creating a database of donors
and decisions in Slovakia 
(continued) 
• A list of lobbying groups and their
interests
• Analyses of public procurement 
procedures and contracts awarded
• A database of party foundations
The Fair Play Alliance hired two 
experienced journalists to work on 
the database project (full-time and
part-time) and one programmer. The
search engine was officially launched
in May 2004, but even before it was
fully operational, information from 
the databases helped to identify 
several cases of donors whose 
companies were awarded questionable
public tenders.
ity, an appeal may be filed. In the first instance this is likely to be an administrative
appeal, followed by a court process. In some countries, an ombudsperson, public
defender, or access to information commissioner can review the request and help chal-
lenge the refusal to provide information. 
It is worthwhile to become familiar with the FOI laws in the country to be mon-
itored. If there is an NGO specializing in FOI in the country, it is wise to consult them
about the best way to request information. 
A Survey of the Media
Where there is effective investigative journalism, information on decisions that benefit
donors can often be obtained from press or other media reports. However, it is impor-
tant to treat such reports with caution and not to assume that the information they con-
tain is necessarily true. Judgments about their trustworthiness are best made on a case-
by-case basis, taking account of the extent to which reports are backed by verifiable evi-
dence and the reputation of the journalist and media outlet in question.
Using the Data
Where an NGO finds that a company donates money to a political party, and the party,
in turn, makes a decision that is favorable to the company, a correlation has been found
between the donation and the political decision. Such correlations, however, do not con-
stitute direct evidence of corruption. It may be the case that the decision was legitimate,
made in the public interest, and entirely uninfluenced by the donation. Absent further
information, a monitoring NGO should document correlations between donations and
political decisions without making assumptions about the nature of this relationship.
Further investigation can be undertaken by responsible authorities, journalists, or other
NGOs, or at a later date.
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Freedom of Information 
Advocates Network
There is a network of activists around
the world promoting FOI, and they
can provide a wealth of information
and advice on how to access informa-
tion of this kind. The Freedom of
Information Advocates Network 
can be found at www.foiadvocates.net.
The Justice Initiative’s Freedom of
Information Program (www.justiceini-
tiative.org/activities/foifoe/foi) is
another useful place to obtain links 
to such organizations and additional
information.
The Investigative Approach 
to Monitoring Income
An investigative approach to monitoring income is particularly well-suited to contexts
where the Scoping Study indicates substantial or massive hidden or illegal activities in
campaign funding, but where information cannot be obtained from Transparency
Agreements, official sources, or independent monitoring of campaign outputs.
Although interviews tend to yield subjective views on campaign finance, they can also
uncover vital aspects of the mechanisms of party finance that may not be apparent from
documentary evidence alone. An investigative approach is likely to be useful for obtain-
ing estimates of total income and/or the proportion of income that comes from dona-
tions, but it is less likely to yield information on individual donors.
Surveying the Media 
The first step in an investigative approach should be to conduct a focused media survey
based on the information collected in the Scoping Study. The survey should concentrate
on suspect patterns of financing. Where the Scoping Study identifies press articles indi-
cating that private interests are funding political parties, for example, a follow-up survey
could then target such relationships directly. Media reports in Romania identified alco-
hol producers who made substantial contributions to political parties and then received
massive tax exemptions or other favorable treatment. In the Czech Republic, too, the
media proved to be a rich source of information on private financing of political parties.
Building Credibility
Investigating party or candidate income can be a highly sensitive matter. Some sources
may need to remain anonymous. The information obtained may be controversial and
might not be as incontestable as data on spending on political advertising. An NGO
embarking on a project of this type should, therefore, engage one or more public figures
or institutions (preferably both) to help build credibility. 
Former high-ranking politicians that command respect across the political spec-
trum are obvious candidates for this job, and an NGO should attempt to secure their
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Researching political 
finance in Poland
Marcin Walecki’s research provides 
an excellent example of an investiga-
tive approach to party finance. The
research yielded rough but well-found-
ed estimates of party income and was
based mainly on the following sources
of information:
• More than 200 reports and articles
from the press
• Interviews with investigative 
journalists
• Approximately 50 one-to-one 
interviews with political party 
officials (former and present) 
and election candidates
The research and credibility of the
study was considerably strengthened
by cooperation with the Institute for
Public Affairs (a respected Polish
think tank), which contacted all the
officials to be interviewed.
With respect to income, one of the
more important findings of Walecki’s
research was that large donations
from individual or corporate donors
constituted approximately 8 percent
of political party income in 2001,
whereas, by contrast, official party
financial declarations had shown a
much lower share of donations as a
proportion of total income (4.2 per-
cent in 1999 and 4.6 percent in
2000), an indication that parties
failed to report donations accurately. 
backing. This can be useful not only in building credibility, but also as a way of gaining
access to the valuable contacts that such people have. A highly respected independent
research institution is another good candidate from whom to seek support. The engage-
ment of an institution widely regarded as professional, independent, and unbiased can
both enhance the credibility of the project and provide useful input for the project itself.
Conducting Interviews
On the basis of the information obtained in the focused press survey, a set of targeted
interviews should be carried out with persons identified as knowledgeable on the specif-
ic phenomena identified, as well as with some or all of the following:
• Senior and former party officials who are regarded as trustworthy
• Current and former members of parliament
• Current and former party officials who have direct responsibility for campaign
finance, such as treasurers, fundraisers, and campaign managers
Where useful interviewees are identified but are reluctant to cooperate, the monitoring
NGO should offer them anonymity. For more information on conducting interviews, in
the context of administrative resource misuse, see pages 117-121.
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5: The Misuse of
Administrative
Resources in Election
Campaigns
At a Glance 
This chapter introduces the misuse of administrative (i.e., state or public) resources 
for electoral campaign purposes as a target of monitoring. The material presented here
is original and intended as an introduction to a new dimension of campaign finance
monitoring. It draws heavily on monitoring experience in Russia. The first section is
devoted to developing a definition of administrative resource abuse. The types of
resources at issue are categorized as: coercive, regulatory, legislative, institutional, finan-
cial, and media. A following section examines the impact of administrative resource mis-
use on campaign financing and on the political system as a whole. The final section pro-
vides a detailed explanation of the three types of resources most directly involved with
campaign finance: institutional, financial, and media resources. Techniques for monitor-
ing administrative resource misuse are discussed in Chapter Six.
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The Misuse of Administrative 
Resources—An Overview
What Constitutes Misuse 
of Administrative Resources?
Corruption in campaign finance is generally assumed to involve campaign contributions
by private persons or companies in return for illicit benefits. Less attention has been
paid to a related phenomenon, whereby political parties or officials use the resources
attached to public office for electoral campaign purposes. Such misuse is a form of cor-
ruption, and it appears to be a major, if not the dominant, form of election campaigning
in many countries. 
In this handbook, the misuse of administrative resources for electoral campaign
purposes is defined as:
the use of state and public sector powers and resources (including coercive capacities,
personnel, financial, material, and other resources) by incumbent politicians or polit-
ical parties to further their own prospects of election, in violation of legal and/or other
norms and responsibilities governing the exercise of public office.
A spotlight on “administrative resource” abuse emerged in Russia after the
1996 presidential elections, and the phenomenon has also been discussed extensively in
Ukraine.
1
Since the mid-1990s, the use of the state apparatus for electoral purposes has
also been noted in countries spanning different continents and levels of economic devel-
opment, from Zimbabwe to the United States.
Types of Administrative Resources
Incumbent politicians and parties in power have a wide range of resources at their dis-
posal through which they can gain unfair and systemic advantages in the electoral
process. Abuse of these resources goes beyond concerns with corruption per se to raise
fundamental questions of democratic process. 
Administrative resources can be classified in the following way: 
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Coercive Resources
Coercive resources include the police and other law enforcement institutions, as well as
any bodies with direct coercive powers, ranging from customs to intelligence agencies.
Coercive resources may be used to intimidate, harass, obstruct, or even eliminate politi-
cal opponents. Typical examples include using the police or militia to arrest or assault
opposition campaign workers or to physically prevent a candidate from holding an elec-
tion meeting.
Regulatory Resources
The abuse of regulatory resources involves the biased enforcement of existing regula-
tions to benefit incumbent parties and candidates. Examples vary widely, from an elec-
tion commission that “deregisters” an opposition candidate, to tax authorities imposing
a sudden tax inspection on an opposition party in the middle of an election campaign.
Legislative Resources
Incumbent political forces may use their influence in the legislature to pass laws to fur-
ther their own political interests by, for example, hindering the participation of inde-
pendent candidates in elections (as in recent amendments to Russian electoral laws),
instituting a system for the appointment of electoral commissions that hands control to
one political party (also Russia), or designing a system of state financing of political par-
ties that benefits a single party (in Zimbabwe).
Institutional Resources
Institutional resources are the material and human resources of the state. These include
office space, office equipment, vehicles, and other infrastructure, all of which might be
used by incumbent political forces for campaign purposes, such as staging events on
public premises, using public offices, computers, and telephones to canvass voters,
using state facilities to print and store campaign documents, or transporting citizens to
the incumbent party’s campaign events in state vehicles.
Personnel employed by the state might be made to participate in campaign activ-
ities that directly benefit the incumbent. Ordinary public officials may serve as election
campaign staff for a political party. Senior public officials who might themselves be affil-
iated with a political party might also use their position to support their party or its can-
didates. A key factor to be considered here is whether state employees or public officials
engage in campaign activities during official working hours or in their capacity as
employees of the state. 
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The OSCE on 
administrative 
resources
The OSCE has issued clear statements
against the misuse of administrative
resources in election campaigns:
“It is the responsibility of the govern-
ment not to misuse State resources,
both human and material, in support 
of the ruling party’s or parties’ own
candidates. For example, government
vehicles, office space, and telecommuni-
cations should not be used for partisan
purposes unless equal access can be
provided to the other contestants.
“Additionally, while the incumbent may
get media coverage concerning State
affairs, campaign events should not 
be confused with issues of State. 
“Problems that can arise: defamation 
of candidates by State-owned media,
exclusion of particular parties or candi-
dates from State-owned media coverage
or coverage only at times of low pene-
tration, intimidation or harassing of
media in the context of the elections,
manipulation of paper and ink supplies,
interference with distribution networks
for printed media.”
Source: www.osce.org/documents/
odihr/1999/04/1558_en.htm
Financial Resources
Money from public budgets may also be used to benefit incumbent political forces that
might either siphon money directly from state enterprises to political parties or use
budget money to finance election campaigns or to buy votes. Public funds might also be
used to finance “quality of life” initiatives, such as pre-election increases in pensions,
designed to boost the electoral prospects of incumbent parties or politicians.
State Media 
State-run or state-controlled media can also be used to promote incumbent political par-
ties or candidates. The misuse of media in this way is a widespread feature of election
campaigns in many countries. In Russia, for example, systematic abuse of state-con-
trolled media was identified as one of the defining features of the campaign for the
December 2003 Duma elections. 
Different categories of administrative resources are often misused in parallel, as illus-
trated by the example from Mexico on page 104. In addition, most resource abuse can
be interpreted as financial resource abuse, either direct or indirect. Public budgets
finance the police who harass opposition supporters as well as the state employees 
who serve as election campaign staff and the public premises used for hosting campaign
events. The above categorization is intended simply as a framework for organizing 
the range of abuses in question and the methodologies that can be applied to monitor-
ing them. 
The Impact of Administrative 
Resource Misuse on Campaign 
Finance and the Political System
The misuse of administrative resources has a damaging effect both on the financing 
of election campaigns and on the political system in general. The misappropriation 
of public resources for campaign purposes constitutes a form of undeclared income 
and fundamentally undermines standard regulation of campaign finance. More gener-
ally, misuse of such resources may undermine civil liberties, the quality of democracy,
the functioning of state institutions, and it necessarily involves a misallocation of 
public resources.
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Zimbabwe: 1995 
parliamentary elections
John Makumbe’s research on Zimbabwe
showed that the use of state resources
to finance the ruling ZANU (PF) party
and keep it in power had become 
so well developed by the 1990s that 
it shaped the basic legislative and 
institutional structures of the state. In
November 1994, for example, all public
sector and civil service employees were
sent forms “requesting” that they
donate 1 percent of their income to
ZANU (PF). Further, Makumbe notes
that the Ministry of Political Affairs 
is almost indistinguishable from the 
ruling party. It is located in the ZANU
(PF) building, its staff are former party 
officers, and it functions almost like 
a secretariat for the party. The ruling
party also advertised development sub-
sidies (often financed from foreign aid) 
as “gifts” from ZANU (PF). These “sub-
tle” campaign efforts were further sup-
ported by widespread intimidation and
violence against opposition candidates.
Administrative Resources and 
Campaign Finance Regulation
Campaign finance regulations are designed to create a level playing field for competition
between political parties and candidates. For example, disclosure requirements on
income prevent certain parties from enjoying an unfair advantage from undisclosed
donations to fund electoral campaigns. Likewise, restrictions on campaign spending are
designed to prevent parties with greater financial means from translating their financial
edge into electoral advantage. Bodies entrusted with enforcement should ensure that
these provisions are, in fact, observed.
However, when government parties use the administrative resources at their
disposal for electoral purposes, campaign finance regulations may be fatally undermined
or rendered counterproductive. Standard disclosure statements fail to capture the extent
of resources available to the incumbent party or candidate, and restrictions on income
and spending become irrelevant, as actual income and expenditure remain undeclared
and invisible. In fact, in this context, restrictions on income and spending will work to
the disadvantage of nonincumbents, making the “playing field” less, rather than more,
“level.” Where incumbent parties are willing to use the coercive and other enforcement
capacities of the state for electoral purposes, an “effective” regulatory framework is like-
ly to have exactly the opposite of the intended effect. Incumbent parties can enforce
restrictions on a discriminatory basis, and use enforcement authorities (such as finan-
cial inspection agencies) to hinder their opponents.  In this situation, campaign finance
regulations can actually institutionalize the advantages of resource access enjoyed by
incumbent parties. 
Restricting the use of administrative resources should, therefore, be regarded as
a necessary condition for the proper functioning of standard campaign and political
finance regulations.
Administrative Resources and “State Capture”
The abuse of administrative resources damages the political system and society by
• undermining civil liberties and/or personal security (e.g., the detention of
campaign workers by the police);
• undercutting the quality of democracy, specifically the quality of political
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Ukraine, 2002 
parliamentary elections
The OSCE concluded the following:
“The abuse of State resources (so called
administrative resources) has been a 
common feature of election campaigns 
in Ukraine that, once again, created 
an uneven campaign environment. 
In over half of all constituencies visited,
observers received allegations of improp-
er or preferential use of State owned
resources for campaign purposes.
“Some candidates benefited from office
space and transportation directly deriv-
ing from their official position in local
administrations. Also, local officials put
State resources at the disposal of can-
didates who visited an area. The main, 
but not exclusive, beneficiary of such
violations was FUU [For a United
Ukraine], which took advantage of State
officials to obtain meeting venues and
use official events to promote the bloc.
FUU campaign material was predomi-
nant and could be seen throughout the
country, often in local administration
buildings and even DEC [District
Election Commission] premises.
Furthermore, governors and other 
officials were seen campaigning in
favor of some candidates in direct con-
travention of the Election Law. These
failings demonstrate a political tradi-
tion that fails to adequately distinguish
between State and party activities, and
uses incumbency to gain undue cam-
paign advantage.”
Source: OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, Final Report
on 2002 Ukraine Parliamentary Elections, 31
March 2002, p. 12. www.osce.org/docu-
ments/odihr/2002/05/1293_en.pdf
rights and the ability of citizens to participate effectively in the political
process by providing incumbent parties and candidates with systemic 
advantages that are not available to other participants;
• undermining the integrity of state functions by using them as a means for
conducting electoral campaigns rather than for their established purposes; 
• diverting public resources from their intended uses (presumably for the 
public interest) to serve private interests, imposing a financial cost on the 
public purse.
Each instance of misuse will have a different impact, but most will affect sever-
al areas of the political system and society at once. For example, the use of state employ-
ees to conduct campaign activities for the ruling party misallocates funds, weakens
democracy, and undermines the integrity of state functions, but it may have no measur-
able effect on civil liberties or personal security. 
If left unchecked, the misuse of administrative resources may lead to a structur-
al monopoly of power that permanently benefits one party or political group at the
expense of all others—in effect, “state capture” from within. Zimbabwe is a clear exam-
ple of a monopoly of power by one party that maintains its position through the system-
atic misuse of a wide range of administrative resources.
The Financial Impact of Misusing
Administrative Resources
Although the overall impact of the misuse of coercive, regulatory, and legislative
resources may be significant, their financial dimension is difficult to measure systemat-
ically or accurately. Monitoring of these categories is therefore probably best left to 
general election observers. Therefore, the focus in this handbook rests on the remaining
three categories: institutional, financial, and media resources.
The definitions presented in the following sections are adapted from a typology
originally developed to monitor election campaigns in Russia. As a result they are, to a
significant degree, country specific and reflect the practices and electoral legislation of
Russia. The methodology below is not intended to be applied “off-the-shelf” to other
countries. Instead, it should serve as a guide to developing a specific typology to suit the
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Poland 2003
Marcin Walecki’s research on party
financing in Poland concludes that
“the misuse of state resources has
constituted the principal source of
funds for governing parties in Poland”
since the early 1990s. The tradition of
using state enterprises and banks to
channel money to parties was highly
developed under the communist
regime, and although such practices
were radically restricted in 1989, they
have re-emerged as a system that
includes the following:
• Rampant political party patronage in
the state administration and in the
management of state-owned enter-
prises, resulting in public contracts
being awarded by state enterprises
and agencies to public relations
companies to carry out election
campaign-related activities on 
behalf of parties or candidates.
• Money being channeled from state
enterprises to parties: state enter-
prises would purchase the services
of public relations companies at 
several times the market price, and
the PR companies would transfer 
a cut to the parties or candidates
with whom they were affiliated. 
Such contracts led to an estimated
U.S. $25–38 million in extra income
for political parties between 1999
and 2001.
local circumstances where monitoring is to take place. As in the Russian case, the sub-
categories for institutional, financial, and media resources should reflect the unique
national context, including:
• The existing legal framework—activities proscribed in existing regulations
should be monitored.
• Prior experience—an analysis of previous election campaigns can help 
determine which types of misuse are most common and/or important.
These may also include types of misuse that are not covered by 
existing regulations. 
Research on previous campaigns may point to areas of abuse for which there are
no legal provisions. For example, there may be no law prohibiting a political party from
using state budget money to fund its election campaign. Clear instances of abuse should
be classified as such, despite any lack of regulations, and accompanied by a clear expla-
nation of the reasons for their inclusion.
Institutional Resources 
Incumbent parties and politicians may use the institutional resources of the state 
agencies they control to promote their electoral interests. This includes the use of 
public premises, office equipment, and public employees for campaign purposes. 
• Senior state officials, in their capacity as employees of the state, may publicly
endorse a particular candidate or party.
• State employees may engage in campaign activities for one particular party
or candidate during working hours. 
• State and municipal premises may be used for campaign purposes (e.g.,
meetings with voters, rallies, or storage of campaign materials) by one party
or candidate, where other parties or candidates are denied equal access. 
• State enterprises, institutes, think tanks, and state-supported nonprofit
organizations may be engaged in campaign activities on behalf of a particu-
lar party or candidate to conduct electoral research, develop and produce
campaign materials, or pay for campaign activities.
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Mexico, 2000 
general elections
In Guerrero, Mexico, 16 violations of
voters’ rights were observed by moni-
tors, including the following: 
• Governmental bodies were used to
induce, buy, and coerce votes; state-
financed opinion polls were initiated
to determine electoral preferences.
Local and national media coverage
was unequal for different parties.
• Voters were transported to special
voting stations en masse by individu-
als identified as local leaders of the
ruling party. 
•The right to vote by secret ballot was
violated by positioning (nonelectoral)
public officials next to voting booths
to “help orient” voters.
• The State Electoral Council refused
to investigate a parallel counting
center, which was discovered in gov-
ernment offices in the state capital,
Chilpancingo.
Source: www.globalexchange.org/ coun-
tries/mexico/election2000/guerrero.html
• State employees or employees of publicly funded entities may be required 
to attend the campaign events of a particular party or candidate.
• One party or candidate may be granted sole access to the logistical infra-
structure of public offices and agencies, such as telephones and fax
machines, office supplies, computers, and Internet access. 
• Public (state or municipal) vehicles may be loaned free of charge or at dis-
counted rates to a particular party or candidate for campaign purposes, such
as transporting candidates, attendees, and election materials to campaign
events.
• Nonelection-related public events may be organized by state or municipal
agencies at public expense, in order to promote a particular party or candi-
date. Such events might include official festivals, parents’ meetings, or sport-
ing events.
• Official reports on activities related to public office may be designed and/or
timed in a way that clearly benefits one particular party or candidate. Reports
of this kind are typically published at public expense immediately prior to
elections.
Financial Resources 
Public funds are another category of administrative resource that may be used to 
promote the electoral prospects of incumbent parties and candidates. Russian legisla-
tion, for example, sets specific budget allocations for elections and prohibits publicly
funded organizations from making political contributions. All budget allocations must
be included in the annual federal or regional budget laws, which prohibit changes 
in budget items unless approved by the Duma. Typical misuses of budget resources 
for campaign purposes include the following:
• Direct distribution to voters of public funds or goods and services purchased
with public funds
• Unauthorized overspending on a budget item legitimately earmarked for
elections, without a clear explanation of the increase
• Expenditure of a component of the election budget for purposes that are not
expressly authorized and legitimate
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• Adding extra subcategories to election budget items without clear explanation 
• Unplanned disbursement of public funds during an election campaign 
period without clear explanation—for example, increases in state employees’
salaries, increases in social payments such as pensions, and discounts 
on public transportation or other public services and utilities
• Introducing new unplanned publicly funded investment projects, such as
the construction or renovation of state or municipal housing, medical and
social service facilities, schools, parks, or roads
• Unplanned, nonbudgeted allocation of public funds to state companies,
institutes, think tanks, state enterprises, and state-supported nonprofit
organizations
• Institutional advertising, i.e., boosting the image of incumbent parties 
or politicians by increasing advertising of government activities
Some instances of misuse of budgetary funds are clearly inappropriate, while
others may be considered legitimate efforts by public officials to curry electoral favor in
a democracy. Thus, while the direct transfer of budget funds to parties or candidates
clearly constitutes abuse, cutting taxes, increasing social payments, or introducing pub-
lic investment projects may be widely accepted as entirely legitimate.
It is important to establish clear criteria to distinguish illegitimate from legitimate
pre-electoral spending and to apply them consistently. Such criteria might include
• whether the spending emerged from a normal policy process or not;
• whether the spending was consistent with the declared aims and objectives
of the incumbent party or politician;
• whether the spending was officially and publicly justified in a persuasive
manner;
• whether the public at large benefited, or only certain subgroups of the 
population.
Media Resources
The abuse of media resources is typically manifested in two ways: through unequal
amounts of coverage of candidates and parties in state-controlled media, and through
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bias in individual items in the same media. Unequal coverage typically employs the 
following strategies:
• Censoring campaign news items
• Not providing equal advertising time or space to all parties and candidates,
or their relatives
• Disproportionate amounts of news and programming featuring one party or
candidate 
Biased coverage may involve the following:
• A deliberately flattering portrait of a particular candidate or party
• Disproportionate coverage of a particular candidate’s participation in social,
cultural, and sporting events
• Extensive negative coverage of an opposition candidate or party, including
negative analysis pieces
State-controlled media are usually owned directly by the state. However, exam-
ples of undue state control over private media can take the form of regulatory pressures,
such as threats to withdraw a broadcasting license or the manipulation of ambiguous tax
regulations to exert financial pressure. Private media may also be included in monitor-
ing, but it is important to state clearly the criteria for their inclusion.
The Interaction of Different Types of Resources
The relative importance of the three different categories of administrative resources 
outlined above will vary across countries. In a large country, where the media are the 
primary means of communication with voters, extensive misuse of media resources may
prevail, whereas in smaller countries with limited media penetration, the misuse of
institutional and financial resources at the local level may be more significant. The
Scoping Study plays a key role in determining which resources to monitor.
Notes:
1. For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of “administrative resource” abuse in Ukraine, see Ukrainian
Center for Economic and Political Studies (Razumkov Center), National Security and Defense No. 12(24), 2001.
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Russia, 2003 Duma elections 
In Russia, the OSCE notes:
“The improper use of administrative
resources by political parties or candi-
dates is commonplace. In particular,
there are verified instances of public
buildings being made available,
including for use as campaign head-
quarters, solely to those candidates 
or parties supported by the local
administration. In almost all
instances, the beneficiary has been
United Russia whose proportional 
list includes 28 federal subject heads,
as well as numerous highly placed 
figures in the State and regional
administrations. In several cases,
such officials do not appear to have
taken a leave of absence from their
administrative functions, as required
by law. . . . In a widely publicized case,
cashiers in a national supermarket
chain have been provided with United
Russia paraphernalia to wear as part
of ‘an advertising contract’. . . .
The State-owned TV channels have 
so far exhibited clear bias in favor 
of United Russia and against the
CPRF [Communist Party of the
Russian Federation]. . . . State-funded
broadcasters have openly promoted 
United Russia outside of free 
airtime slots. . . .”
Source: OSCE Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, Election
Observation Mission Interim Report on
December 2003 Duma elections, 3-10
November 2003. www.osce.org/odihr/doc-
uments/reports/election_reports/ru/
6: Monitoring 
the Misuse of
Administrative 
Resources
At a Glance 
This chapter provides a framework for monitoring the misuse of administrative
resources in an election campaign. The chapter begins by discussing how to select a
monitoring methodology. It then reviews five recommended monitoring methods:
media monitoring, direct observation, interviews, budget monitoring, and case studies.
Finally, it discusses which monitoring method is best suited for the most common mis-
uses of administrative resources and examines the advantages and limitations of each.
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Selecting a Monitoring Approach
The approach to monitoring the misuse of administrative resources presented here 
follows the general methodology advocated in this handbook: conducting preliminary
research in the form of a Scoping Study, followed by the selection of a monitoring
approach and its implementation. Some of the methods discussed earlier may effective-
ly be applied here, especially those for monitoring campaign events and hidden adver-
tising. These are supplemented by additional methods specifically targeting administra-
tive resources, discussed below. 
A clear and detailed methodology defining the categories and instances of abuse
to be monitored is critical to a well-designed project. This chapter focuses on the two
most important stages:
1. Identifying the types of administrative resources to be monitored
2. Selecting and implementing the monitoring methods
Identifying Categories for Monitoring
Preparation for a project to monitor the abuse of administrative resources should
include (a) an analysis of previous election campaigns to determine which categories of
administrative resources to monitor and (b) a survey of the relevant laws and regula-
tions. 
Analyzing Previous Electoral Campaigns
Where prior knowledge exists that administrative resource abuse is a significant problem,
a typology of abuses may be developed as part of the Scoping Study. If the significance of
the problem emerges from the Scoping Study itself, an additional stage of preliminary
research is necessary in order to identify the specific categories for monitoring. Useful
sources of information include the following:
• Reports from other election monitoring organizations
• Literature on the use of administrative resources in the country in question,
such as reports, academic books and journal articles on previous elections,
and relevant press articles 
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• Interviews with experts on electoral campaigns and political finance, 
including academics, election monitors, and campaign managers 
The information collected should be used to produce as detailed a list as possible of the
types of administrative resources that warrant monitoring. The list should be organized
according to the broad categories of institutional, financial, and media resources.
Conducting a Survey of Existing Laws and Regulations
An analysis of relevant laws and regulations, as well as the enforcement framework, fol-
lows. Provisions designed to prevent the misuse of administrative resources should be
sought, as well as any loopholes. This task may be time consuming since, unlike other
areas of monitoring, the relevant laws needn’t apply explicitly to campaign finance. Other
laws that are likely to be relevant include the following:
• Media regulations
• Budget regulations
• Codes of administrative procedure
• Regulations governing the conduct of public officials and state employees
• Public procurement legislation
• Regulation of the management of state-controlled enterprises
Defining the Monitoring Methodology
Once an organization has identified which categories to monitor, the next task is to
decide how to monitor them. A combination of approaches is usually required. The fol-
lowing lists a number of possible methods from which an NGO may choose or combine:
1. Monitoring the media 
2. Direct observation of election campaign activities
3. Targeted interviews
4. A case study approach
5. Monitoring the budget
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The Scope of Monitoring
As each of the monitoring approaches and categories to be monitored will require con-
siderable resources, NGOs may find it necessary to limit the scope of their effort to spe-
cific categories of administrative resources, or to specific constituencies, parties or can-
didates. Administrative resources can also be tracked as part of a broader election mon-
itoring exercise, as done by OSCE election observers in the Russian elections.
Monitoring the Media
The media monitoring methods presented in Chapter Three may be applied for the pur-
poses of monitoring the misuse of administrative resources, although the context and
objectives of monitoring will change. Media are monitored for three purposes:
• State-controlled media are monitored to track media coverage for direct evi-
dence of bias, i.e., misuse, particularly in the form of hidden advertising.
• All media, but particularly nonstate media, are monitored to collect reports of
all types of administrative resource misuse.
• All media are monitored for institutional advertising. 
Hidden advertising—material that appears in the media as objective reporting
or analysis but in reality promotes one candidate or party or attempts to discredit anoth-
er—is described in depth on p. 68-71. When it occurs in state media, it amounts to a
form of media resource abuse. “Institutional advertising” refers to promotional materi-
als produced and placed at public expense by the state or public sector to raise awareness
about government agencies and services. When such publicity actually promotes incum-
bent or other favored parties or candidates, particularly in the run-up to an election, it
qualifies as an abuse of financial administrative resources.
The following sections take a closer look at these three targets of media monitor-
ing: hidden advertising (media resource abuse), other kinds of administrative resource
abuse reported in the media, and institutional advertising (financial resource abuse).
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The legal framework in Russia
Russian legislation requires the media
to treat political parties and candidates
equally, both in terms of political adver-
tising that may be placed in the media
and the coverage of the election cam-
paign. The laws further require state
and municipal authorities to provide 
all parties or candidates with premises
for campaign events, either at no cost
or on equal terms. All individual cam-
paign activities must be paid for from
the legally established electoral funds
of each party or candidate. State
financing of campaigns is thus effec-
tively prohibited.
The Political Parties Law and electoral
laws prohibit the use of public office
for electoral campaign purposes. The
following are specifically forbidden:
• Engaging public and municipal
employees during working hours in
activities that facilitate a candidate or
party’s nomination and/or election
• Using state or municipal premises for
activities that facilitate a candidate or
party’s nomination or election, unless
other candidates are granted use of
the same premises on equal terms
• Using state or municipal telecommu-
nications, information services, 
and office equipment for campaign
purposes
• Using state or municipal transporta-
tion facilities on gratuitous or prefer-
ential terms to facilitate the nomina-
tion or election of a particular candi-
date or party
Monitoring Hidden Advertising 
(Misuse of Media Resources)
When monitoring for media resource abuses, state-controlled media should be the
focus. Hidden advertising in state-run or state-controlled media can be monitored in
terms of qualitative or quantitative bias in coverage, using the standard monitoring
methods discussed in Chapter Three. In monitoring the abuse of media resources, the
collection of media materials may be outsourced to an agency that monitors coverage of
the election campaign. However, the analysis of the media coverage should be conduct-
ed in-house, that is, the monitoring NGO should decide which items qualify as instances
of hidden advertising and estimate their financial value.
Monitoring Media Reports of 
Administrative Resource Misuse
In addition to monitoring the state-controlled media for direct evidence of misuse of
media resources, both state and private media can be an important secondary source of
information on all types of misuse. Such reports should be monitored in-house by a spe-
cial project team, who can select media items containing evidence of misuse using the
typology developed for the project. Monitoring can focus on the following:
• Standard reports that capture instances of abuse—for example, media 
coverage of a municipal press conference that the local mayor treats as a
campaign event, or reports of unplanned, pre-election increases in pension
payments or discounts on utility bills
• Investigative pieces that specifically target and report on instances of abuse
Where the press and broadcasting media are all controlled by the state, 
it is unlikely that the media will provide useful information on the misuse 
of institutional or financial resources, and priority should be given to other monitoring
methods.
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Monitoring Institutional Advertising 
(Misuse of Financial Resources)
Institutional ads may appear in either public or private media—the crucial point is that
advertising time and space is purchased with public funds. Monitoring institutional
advertising can be done from a qualitative or quantitative perspective, or a combination
of the two. Examples from Latin America (see page 116) proceeded by monitoring all
institutional advertising during a two-year period, noting significant increases in the pre-
election period, and arguing that such increases reflect an intention to assist the incum-
bent party’s re-election efforts. This approach does not attempt to judge whether individ-
ual ads are biased specifically toward a particular party or candidate; the mere fact that
the total volume of advertising increases is evidence that state money is being used more
intensively during the election period to advertise government activities that are likely to 
be associated positively with incumbents. 
This type of institutional advertising might be tracked either through media
monitoring methods, as described in Chapter Three, or through analysis of government
agency budgets or financial reports, if these are sufficiently itemized and publicly 
available. 
Some increases in government spending on advertising can be explained 
by ordinary seasonal factors. Therefore, if using this approach, NGOs must also moni-
tor government advertising in the most recent nonelection year in order to provide 
a point of comparison to determine whether the election-year increases are, in fact, 
seasonal or not. If sharp increases in spending occur only during an election year, 
this would be a strong indicator of election-related institutional advertising.
As always, the results of monitoring should be presented cautiously. Rather
than claiming an observed increase in election-related government advertising, project
organizers can simply demonstrate an otherwise unexplained increase in government
advertising prior to the election.
Institutional advertising may also be misused for electoral purposes where indi-
vidual ads directly associate public policies or activities with incumbent parties or candi-
dates. This can be monitored by tracking all instances of institutional advertising during
the monitoring period, and then identifying any cases among them designed to promote
incumbent parties or candidates. Government advertisements constitute election-relat-
ed institutional advertising in cases where: 
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Guess the election month: institutional advertising in Latin America
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• a party or candidate holding office is credited with a particular public policy
or measure, rather than the public institution that introduced or implement-
ed it;
• the rationale for launching an institutional ad campaign lacks justification
other than promoting a positive image of the incumbent. For example,
advertising a social benefits policy introduced two years prior suggests that
the campaign is deliberately timed for electoral purposes rather than to
inform citizens about the program.
The value of institutional advertising identified above may be estimated in the
same way as standard political advertising (see pages 61-68).
Recording the Findings of Media Monitoring
The information collected from monitoring the media should be recorded systematical-
ly to facilitate further analysis and reporting. Findings should be divided into primary
data, or direct evidence of media or financial resource abuse (i.e., hidden or institution-
al advertising), and secondary data, or indirect evidence of abuses of all types of admin-
istrative resources. 
The findings can then be stored in a database for easy analysis and reporting on
• the types of misuses observed;
• the number of cases of each type of misuse observed;
• instances of misuse that were observed directly (hidden advertising 
or institutional advertising);
• instances of misuse that were observed indirectly;
• the party or candidate that benefited from each case of misuse.
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Date Description Source 1 Source 2 Source 3
Party/
Candidate
Involved
Form 
of misuse
Follow-up Remarks
November 15, 2003
Campaign 
event held 
in municipal 
premises
Channel One,
News 6 pm
Channel Three,
News 8 pm
“Mayor Kicks 
off Youth 
Celebration,” 
The Daily 
Times, p. 6
United 
Russia (UR)
Institutional,
Media
Event supposed
to be official 
youth celebration.
Mayor present  
and campaigned 
for UR 
November 18, 2003
Unplanned 
increase 
in pension 
payments
Channel One,
News 6 pm Moscow Radio, 
Morning News
“Bigger Pension
Checks in 
December,” 
The Daily 
Times, p.6
United 
Russia (UR)
Financial, Media
Increase in
pensions  was 
unplanned and 
not budgeted
A record of media monitoring in Russia
In Russia, scorecards were used to record the results of media monitoring documenting instances of the misuse of administrative resources during the 2003
Duma election campaign. The example below features hypothetical entries for purposes of illustration only.  
Administrative Resource Scorecard
Direct Observation of Electoral Campaigns
Monitoring the use of institutional or financial resources is best performed through
direct observation of campaign activities in selected electoral districts, especially in cases
where the media is not a useful source of information either due to state control, a low
level of professionalism, or a lack of investigative spirit. The approach to monitoring
events and campaign activities outlined in Chapter Three can be applied here in observ-
ing the following categories of administrative resources:
• Engagement of state employees in campaign activities during working hours
• Use of public (state and municipal) premises for campaign purposes by one
particular party or candidate, where other candidates are denied equal access
on equal terms
• Engagement of state enterprises, institutes, think tanks, and state-supported
nonprofit organizations in campaign activities
• Organization of campaign events with the mandatory attendance of employ-
ees of the state administration, other state institutions (such as medical facil-
ities), state-controlled enterprises, institutes, or think tanks
• Use of the physical or logistical infrastructure of public offices and premises
for campaign activities
• Use of public (state or municipal) vehicles for campaign purposes free of
charge or at discounted rates
• Campaigning by state officials during the course of work-related appearances
or business trips
• Use of public events organized by state or municipal government for cam-
paign-related purposes
• Direct distribution of budget money to voters
• Distribution of goods and services purchased with public funds to voters
• Payment for vehicles to transport voters to elections
Special attention should be paid to the following issues:
• Event locations (are the premises state-owned?)
• Individuals involved in campaigning (are public officials campaigning?)
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• Attendees at campaign events (is there forced/mandatory attendance for
public employees?)
• Ownership of vehicles used for transportation of attendees to political events
(are state vehicles being used for campaign purposes?)
• Goods, services, or cash distributed to voters (are they paid for from the state
budget?) 
• Campaign materials (who paid for printing them, where are they stored?)
Interviews
Monitoring based only on surveying the media and direct observation of previously
selected categories of administrative resources may miss other significant instances 
or categories not represented in the typology. Interviews are an excellent way to gain
more general knowledge about a relatively new issue in campaign finance and to identi-
fy new categories of resources and the way in which they might be misused. Interviews
can be used to
• obtain information on the use of administrative resources in general, when
other monitoring instruments are unavailable or of limited value;
• highlight the role of administrative resource abuse in parties’ or candidates’
overall campaign strategies;
• provide first-hand accounts on the use of administrative resources from
those who actually use them;
• test preliminary hypotheses or conclusions based on findings from other
monitoring methods;
• compile case studies.
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Ask fellow monitors
Other organizations that monitor
elections can also provide useful data
on administrative resource abuse,
especially at the local level. It is a
good idea to establish contact and
ask them to incorporate categories of
administrative resources into their
project, or simply to share their
results and findings. They may have
come across evidence of abuse even
where this was not a specific objec-
tive. Other organizations engaged in
elections monitoring were given the
project typology and asked to record
instances of abuse of administrative
resources encountered during their
own monitoring.
Whom to Interview
Interviews should target two broad categories: experts and practitioners. 
Experts include the following:
• Representatives of electoral commissions or bodies that officially 
administer and supervise elections
• Monitors from other organizations
• Experts from research institutes and other institutions, such as polling 
agencies
• Academic observers
Practitioners are individuals who are, or have been, directly engaged in campaigning:
• Former or current representatives of winning parties or candidates
• Former or current representatives of losing parties or candidates
• Campaign managers
• Campaign staff or volunteers
• Employees of state or local administration
General Interviews
Interviews can be general or targeted. The purpose of general interviews is to obtain
information on the types of administrative resources used for campaign purposes and
the ways in which they are used. When conducting general interviews, an effort should
be made to interview as many experts and practitioners as possible. Interviews could
cover the following questions:
1. Which parties or candidates are in a position of incumbency and which state
or public resources do they control or have access to for electoral purposes?
2. What is the best estimate of the breakdown (overall or for a specific party or
candidate) of campaign income? 
3. What is the best estimate of the breakdown (overall or for a specific party or
candidate) of campaign spending? 
4. Which campaign strategies do parties or candidates pursue and how?
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Preparing for interviews
Preparing well for an interview is half
the battle. Being able to ask specific
and relevant questions and explore
issues in-depth requires prior knowl-
edge. In addition, the more you know
about a subject, the more obvious it
becomes what you don’t know, and,
therefore, what you need to ask about.
Finally, the interviewees themselves
will appreciate your effort and take the
interview more seriously if they see
that you have “done your homework.”
For each category of administrative resource, ask specific questions designed to elicit
information on the use of resources:
5. Where is the party’s or candidate’s campaign headquarters located? Are the
premises rented and at what cost?
6. Who works on the party’s or candidate’s campaign, and how much are they
paid?
7. Where and how are a party’s or candidate’s program and manifesto 
prepared?
8. Who conducts polling and market research, and who pays for it?
9. Does the party’s or candidate’s media strategy rely on paid advertising 
or other types of media coverage?
10. Which media are used in the campaign and why? 
11. What is the approximate cost (in terms of space/time) of advertising in the
selected media? 
12. Can the party or candidate secure positive coverage in certain media outlets
without paid advertising? If so, how and in which outlets? 
13. How many events, rallies, and meetings are scheduled during the 
campaign?
14. Where are the events, rallies, and meetings held and at what cost? 
15. How many people typically attend meetings, and how is sufficient 
attendance ensured?
Targeted Interviews
Targeted interviews should be conducted to obtain more detailed information on specif-
ic instances of misuse, especially for in-depth case studies. The targets of such interviews
will depend on the category of administrative resource being addressed. For example, a
case study on the use of financial resources in one constituency will require interviews
with representatives of the local authorities in charge of budget allocation. A study on the
use of media resources will be well served by interviews with representatives of the elec-
tion commission responsible for supervising the media during election campaigns, as
well as editors and journalists from media outlets. 
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The questions posed in targeted interviews should be detailed and precise,
which will, naturally, require some prior knowledge of the subject of the interview.
Examples of precise questions include the following: 
• Does the candidate of the governing party use a state vehicle for campaigning?
• Do any members of the mayor’s staff on the public payroll campaign for the
candidate of the governing party while on the job?
• Is the campaign for the governing party’s candidate run from the mayor’s
offices?
• Do the assistants of the governing party’s candidate use mobile phones pro-
vided and paid for by the mayor’s office?
The status of the interview as “on the record” or anonymous will naturally affect
the responses that can be expected, so this should be settled up-front. “On the record”
interviews will add credibility to the project findings, but the sensitive nature of the issue
at hand may justify conducting some interviews anonymously or “off the record.” 
Monitoring the Budget
Monitoring the budget, i.e., detailed monitoring of public spending and changes in
spending on individual budget categories over time, should be a key component of any
project that aims to monitor abuses of financial resources. However, there is very little
experience with such monitoring to date—the following merely outlines how budget
monitoring might be organized and conducted in this context. 
Many categories of financial resource abuse should appear as budget spending
items, and they ought to be identifiable through detailed monitoring. This is the case 
for institutional advertising, for example, but also for campaign-motivated change in
budgetary allocations in pre-election periods. 
Monitoring misuses of financial resources should be performed in two phases:
first, examining budgets to record how much is spent in which categories. Second, ana-
lyzing the actual expenditure, to determine which items constitute abuse. Monitoring
the budget needs to be a long-term exercise if findings are to be useful. Many categories
of abuse, including institutional advertising and pre-election changes in budget alloca-
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tions, will only be positively identified by comparing the pre-election period to a similar
period in the previous year or years.  The expertise of organizations with previous expe-
rience in budget monitoring will almost certainly be required in interpreting the budget
data in areas identified as likely targets of financial resource abuse. 
The monitoring organization can then conduct further analysis to identify actu-
al instances of misuse. Clear criteria for identifying misuse are critically important to the
validity of budgetary monitoring. The typology in Chapter Five suggests criteria for iden-
tifying misuses of financial resources, as opposed to legitimate pre-election spending. 
This is an area in need of further methodological development—the monitoring
community will benefit greatly from the lessons and experience of future efforts to tack-
le this issue.
Case Studies
Based on the data and anecdotal evidence acquired using the methods described above,
an NGO may decide to compile one or more case studies in order to provide a detailed
analysis and explanation of specific cases of administrative resource abuse and to
demonstrate why they qualify as such. Typically, case studies can be used to do the fol-
lowing:
• Describe a particular instance of abuse in detail
• Illustrate a form of abuse identified as prevalent
• Analyze the financial impact of a particular instance of abuse
• Highlight violations of existing laws, regulations, or procedures
• Reveal loopholes in the existing laws, regulations, and procedures that 
make administrative resource abuse possible
• Make recommendations for reform
Structuring a Case Study
A case study of a specific instance of misuse of administrative resources should incorpo-
rate media monitoring, direct observation, budget monitoring, and/or interviews. The
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data collected using these various methods should provide the following information:
• A definition and description of the specific instance of misuse
• The main sources of information on the case 
• The party or candidate involved
• The role of specific incidents of misuse in the party’s or candidate’s overall
campaign
• An estimate of the frequency of similar misuses of administrative resources
in the election campaign
• Other types of misuse that tend to occur together with the specific instance in
question 
• Any information about the identified abuse from other monitoring groups,
the electoral commission, experts, and/or the media 
• An analysis of applicable laws and regulations, noting laws or procedures that
were breached, or identifying loopholes in laws or procedures that render the
specific instance of misuse legal 
• An estimate of the “minimum cost” of the identified abuse (if feasible)
• Conclusions resulting from the case study
The Case Study Analysis
Legal Analysis
A legal analysis identifies the laws regulating the specific instance of abuse in question,
i.e., laws that were breached and those containing significant loopholes. Enforcement
problems should also be identified. This analysis should, as well, cover other standards
adopted within the public administration sector, whether or not they are legally binding.
Such standards might include codes of conduct, guidelines on ethical behavior, codes of
administrative procedure, such as the procedure for the use of public premises or vehi-
cles by private organizations, and so on. 
Case studies allow both detailed analysis and targeted recommendations. In prac-
tice, effective restriction of each type of administrative resource will require different laws
and regulations. For example, transportation of citizens to political rallies using public
vehicles is best regulated in the charter or statute establishing the transport company,
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specifying the vehicles’ uses and the procedure for renting them out. Likewise, ad hoc
budgetary allocations to benefit particular groups of citizens prior to an election are most
effectively curbed by detailed budget regulations and effective auditing mechanisms.
The aim of the analysis is to establish the “legal minimum,” i.e., to define which
regulations, if properly enforced, are required to prevent this particular kind of abuse. 
Analysis of Financial Impact 
Where possible, an analysis of the financial impact of the abuse in question should also
be conducted. The aim of this analysis is to calculate the “minimum cost” of a resource
used in the campaign, should the party or candidate have had to pay for it at market or
regulated prices.
• The minimum cost of the appearance of a party representative in a news
program on state-controlled TV would be calculated at the standard advertis-
ing rate per second (or the standard rate minus the maximum published
discount, where discounts are permitted) multiplied by the length of time
the person in question appeared in the clip. 
• The minimum cost of the use of public vehicles to transport party support-
ers to election rallies would be calculated using the regulated rates that an
ordinary citizen would be charged to rent the same vehicles.
• The minimum cost of a meeting with voters held on state premises may 
be calculated using the official declared price for renting the facilities. 
If the meeting was held during office hours and the audience included 
state employees, the cost of their time would be calculated by multiplying
the number of employees present by the minimum salary for state employ-
ees by the number of hours spent at the meeting, and this would be added
to the estimated minimum cost of the premises. 
Choosing a Methodology 
The choice of monitoring method will depend on the categories of administrative
resource targeted. Each type of administrative resource is used for different campaign
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activities. The table on pages 127-128 outlines which methods are most suitable for mon-
itoring some of the most common categories.
Findings Produced by Different Monitoring Methods
The choice of methods used to monitor the misuse of administrative resources will in
part determine how findings are presented.
• The findings of media monitoring and direct observation of local campaigns
are likely to be amenable to presentation in statistical form, e.g., listing the
number of instances monitored according to each subcategory of the typology. 
• Interviews tend to produce anecdotal evidence or qualitative findings that
are primarily of orientational value.
• Information presented in the form of case studies is primarily of use in 
formulating recommendations for reforms to legal, procedural, and enforce-
ment frameworks. On occasion, they may yield sufficient information on 
specific violations to initiate litigation or other attempts to seek redress.
Each of the monitoring methods outlined in this chapter has its advantages and
limitations. The Russian monitoring project relied heavily on monitoring the media
because the media is widely regarded as playing a dominant role in Russian election
campaigns. But while monitoring the media may yield comprehensive findings on the
misuse of media resources, it is unlikely to provide thorough data on the misuse of insti-
tutional and financial resources. Nevertheless, the media may provide good anecdotal
accounts of financial and institutional misuse, depending on the quality of investigative
reporting and the level of media independence in the country.
Direct observation of election campaigns, if conducted diligently, is likely to be
the best method for monitoring local misuses of administrative resources, as the results
are usually objective and quantifiable. However, this requires significant human and
financial resources. 
Case studies allow the presentation of in-depth findings on a more selective
basis, but their significance will depend on their relevance to the campaign as a whole. 
Interviews provide first-hand responses from individuals directly involved in the
election campaign. To the extent that interview responses are accurate, they are a highly
effective way of obtaining a snapshot of an election campaign as a whole, and of assess-
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ing whether the findings of media monitoring and case studies are in accordance with
events on the ground. However, the number and range of interviews conducted will
determine the degree to which the results can be considered representative. In addition,
while interviews can provide a useful overall snapshot, they are unlikely to produce find-
ings that can be characterized as objective.
NGOs need to be very careful not to make claims that their findings cannot fully
support. For example, indirect evidence of institutional or financial resource abuse col-
lected from media monitoring should be presented not as actual occurrences of abuse,
but simply as those reported in the media. On the other hand, if a project monitors a local
campaign comprehensively, the findings may be suitable for presentation as an actual
breakdown of instances of abuse of administrative resources in that location. Similarly,
a finding that the ruling party’s use of public premises for campaign purposes far
exceeds that of nonincumbent parties does not immediately constitute evidence of insti-
tutional resource abuse—it may be that the opposition was not denied access to state
premises, but simply never requested it.
A final cautionary note—findings on the misuse of administrative resources 
are likely to identify the ruling party as the main beneficiary. It is, therefore, strongly rec-
ommended that the findings be depersonalized to the extent possible in order to avoid
allegations of targeting selected parties or candidates. Support for reforms is often need-
ed across the political spectrum. Such support is more likely to be won when findings
are presented as evidence of systemic problems that ultimately disadvantage everyone
(since all parties may potentially find themselves in opposition) and undermine democ-
racy itself.
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Administrative resource Examples of misuse Recommended monitoring method(s)
Institutional resources
Engagement of state employees 
in campaign activities
Collecting signatures
Working as campaign staff 
Conducting electoral research
Preparing campaign materials
Media monitoring
Direct observation of campaign activities
Interviews with candidates or party 
representatives, campaign managers and staff  
Case studies (legal and cost analysis)
Use of public (state and municipal) 
premises for campaign purposes
Use of offices as campaign 
headquarters
Meetings with voters
Rallies
Storage of campaign materials
Direct observation of campaign activities
Interviews with candidates or party 
representatives, campaign managers 
and staff
Case studies (legal, procedural, and 
cost analysis)
Campaign events with 
organized or mandatory 
attendance of state employees
Attendance of a significant 
number of people from same 
(state or public) institution 
at a political event
Media monitoring
Direct observation of campaign activities
Interviews with candidates or party 
representatives, campaign managers and staff
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
Use of public (state or municipal) 
vehicles for campaign purposes
Candidates’ short- or long-
distance travel 
Staff members’ travel
Transportation of campaign materials
Transportation of citizens to meetings and rallies
Media monitoring
Direct observation of campaign activities
Interviews with candidates or party 
representatives, campaign managers and staff 
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
Production and use of reports 
or analyses of activities related 
to public office for campaign 
purposes and/or as campaign 
materials
Reports on government activities 
that criticize particular parties or directly 
associate government activities 
with a particular party
Media monitoring (observation 
of central and local print and 
electronic media) 
Case studies (legal analysis)
Direct observation of campaign 
materials
Methods for monitoring selected types of administrative resources
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Methods for monitoring selected types of administrative resources
Administrative resource Examples of misuse Recommended monitoring method(s)
Financial resources
Distribution to voters of goods and 
services purchased with public funds
Distribution of food, free medicine, 
education materials, etc.
Direct observation of campaign activities
Targeted interviews 
Case studies (legal and cost analysis)
Spending beyond the allocated 
amount on budget items 
legitimately earmarked for elections 
without a clear explanation 
of the reasons
Media monitoring
Budget monitoring 
Expert and targeted interviews
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
Disbursements from the 
public budget during the
course of an election campaign 
without a clear explanation 
or justification
Increases in pension/maternity/
child support/welfare payments
Discounts on transport services/housing 
services/utilities/telephone
Media monitoring
Budget monitoring
Expert and targeted interviews
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
Introduction of budget-supported 
projects of social importance 
that were not announced 
in advance and not included 
in a state or municipal 
development plan or other plan.
Building/renovation of public 
housing/roads/public premises/health 
services/schools premises/
social service facilities
Introduction of ecological/health 
service projects
Organization of public 
festivals/cultural events
Media monitoring
Budget monitoring
Direct observation of campaign activities
Expert and targeted interviews
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
State purchased 
“institutional advertising”
Advertising by specific 
government agencies
Media monitoring
Budget monitoring
Media resources
Direct misuse of media 
resources in order to provide
advantages to incumbent 
parties or candidates
Unequal coverage of parties 
and candidates
Biased coverage of parties and candidate
Censorship of campaign materials
Media monitoring
Expert and targeted interviews
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
Hidden advertising See Chapter Five for definition and 
examples of hidden advertising
Media monitoring
Case studies (legal, procedural, and cost analysis)
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The Russian project to monitor the misuse of institutional, financial,
and media resources during the December 2003 Duma election cam-
paign consisted of three main components:
1. Monitoring the media for instances of media bias, as well as
reports of the misuse of institutional and financial resources. 
2. Compiling case studies of five instances of misuse: two cases 
of misuse of state-controlled media, one at the national and the
other at the local level; two cases of misuse of public premises,
one in Moscow and another in a provincial city; and, finally, a case
of pre-election discounts on electricity tariffs without prior
announcement or clear justification.
3. Conducting interviews with 12 current and former campaign 
managers, electoral candidates, and experts from polling agencies,
research institutes, and the media, to gain a better understanding 
of campaign methods in general, as well as a detailed description 
of the use of administrative resources for electoral purposes 
in practice.
Reports from other monitoring organizations were also taken 
into account. The following were among the project’s conclusions:
• All three types of administrative resources (institutional, financial, 
and media) were misused during the election campaign.
• Media resource abuse played a pivotal role in the campaign, both 
as a method of campaigning in its own right and as a means 
of maximizing the impact of misuse of other resources, by 
covering local campaign events of the incumbent party on 
state premises, attended by public employees, and by publicizing
pre-election “quality of life” changes in budget spending.
• Public premises were frequently used for campaign purposes.
• The United Russia party and its candidates benefited from the vast
majority of the observed instances of misuse of institutional and
media resources.
• The estimated value of the media resources used to benefit United
Russia alone exceeded the total party spending limit for the 
campaign as a whole, which underlines not only the scale of the
problem but the inefficacy of standard campaign finance regulations
in Russia.
• Significant misuse of coercive resources was observed (although
this was not specifically identified as a target of monitoring).
• Russian electoral laws were clearly violated, as demonstrated by 
the case study findings of illegal campaigning, including the illegal
use of public office for campaign purposes.
• Electoral commissions at all levels failed to enforce electoral laws,
despite numerous complaints by parties and candidates, as well 
as complaints and reports by other monitoring organizations.
• The courts were an ineffective tool for enforcing campaign regula-
tions, mainly because candidates and parties failed to file suit
against violators and because court decisions upholding provisions
of the electoral laws were not enforced.
Monitoring the misuse of administrative resources in Russia
Marcin Walecki’s research included estimates of political parties’
income received from the use of state employees, financial resources
of state enterprises, and official subsidies provided to members 
of parliament. Initial research was based on ten articles from the
national press, which were used to select and organize interviews
with political fundraisers, electoral candidates, and representatives 
of the major political parties and of all institutions with a role in 
regulating political finance.
Walecki included estimated costs of maintaining political advisors 
as a category of political party income (and misuse of institutional
resources). He interviewed individuals in various ministries to 
determine the total number of political advisors employed within 
the public administration—estimated at approximately 1,000.
Interviews with some of these appointees indicated that, during a
campaign year, a majority of their working time was spent on party
matters. The cost to the state—and the de facto income to the gov-
erning parties—was estimated by multiplying the number of advisors
by their estimated wages (U.S. $500–1,250 per month), plus the cost 
of office facilities (space, computer equipment, mobile telephones,
etc.), estimated at $1,000–2,000 per year. Walecki arrived at a figure
of $18 million captured by the governing parties in the year 2001.
Walecki estimated that, in Poland, various forms of misuse of 
administrative resources accounted for about 67 percent of total
party income in 2001. 
The misuse of institutional and financial resources in Poland
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7: Using the Results 
of Monitoring
At a Glance
Using the results of monitoring efficiently and effectively is crucial to the success of 
a monitoring project. This chapter provides guidance on how to do so. Following discus-
sion of the presentation of monitoring results, the chapter looks at the uses to which 
they can be put—public dissemination, advocacy, seeking redress, and as input for fur-
ther monitoring. A section is devoted to the issue of reform, which is the substance 
of advocacy.
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How to Use Monitoring Results
Monitoring results can be used in different ways: 
• Dissemination refers to publicizing the project findings.
• Advocacy involves using the results of monitoring to promote targeted
reforms that will reduce the likelihood of corruption in campaign finance.
This, too, involves the media, but invariably (and perhaps primarily) also
requires the support of official institutions with the authority to initiate or
influence reform. 
• Seeking redress involves initiating legal action or filing formal complaints
with courts or other enforcement agencies, based on observed breaches of
legislation or other legally binding regulations. The primary aim of litigation
might also be to highlight a problem and set legal precedents, rather than to
seek redress in a particular case.
• Monitoring results can also serve as input for further monitoring, to identify
appropriate additional monitoring targets, and to refine and improve moni-
toring methodologies.
Presentation of Project Findings
Typically the first task that follows completion of monitoring and analysis of the results
is to prepare the findings for the public.
Presentation Format
The presentation format will depend on the nature of the results, the specific project
objectives, and the expected reaction of the various stakeholders. Monitoring results, or
“outputs,” can be presented by means of
• printed materials, including reports, summaries, press releases, case 
studies, training manuals, and other similar documents;
• organized events or activities, such as press conferences, roundtable discus-
sions, seminars, and meetings with relevant institutions.
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In most cases, the materials produced can serve as a basis for events and activ-
ities. Likewise, the information collected for a case study may provide the raw material
for a formal complaint to an enforcement institution. The table on page 135 shows the
kinds of materials that may be used in generating different events on behalf of the vari-
ous objectives. 
Rules of Presentation 
Results should be presented with two basic rules in mind:
1. The findings should be comprehensible and relevant. The public is unlikely
to be interested in raw data showing parties’ daily spending on advertising
for a 60-day campaign period, broken down by media outlet. On the other
hand, a summary of the same data—indicating, perhaps, that spending in
the 60-day period alone exceeded spending limits for the entire campaign—
would likely draw attention. Data should, therefore, be processed to address
the specific objectives of monitoring and be presented in a form that the
media and the general public can easily understand.
2. Do not make unfounded claims. In order for monitoring results to have an
impact, they must be presented in a way that is difficult to discredit:
• Clearly state how accurate you believe the results to be and why.
• Do not overstate your case. For example, results on hidden advertis-
ing should be presented as possible rather than definitive cases.
• Do not confuse correlation with cause and effect. A relationship
between two phenomena does not prove that one caused the other.
For example, if findings indicate that the parties or candidates who
received the most in campaign contributions were also the most
successful in the elections, do not argue that the contributions
affected the election results; contributions, especially corrupt ones,
may go to parties or candidates that are already most likely to win.
Dissemination of Results
At a minimum, the results of a monitoring exercise should be posted on the monitoring
organization’s website and made available in printed format to serve as a permanent
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record and source of information for interested parties. Beyond this, active circulation of
results constitutes the first stage of an advocacy strategy. An NGO’s relationship with the
media plays a crucial role here. Results may be disseminated to the following:
• The media
• Other monitoring organizations and NGOs
• Political parties or candidates
• Enforcement bodies (e.g., electoral commissions, supreme audit institutions
or anticorruption bureaus, prosecutors and courts) 
• Legislative bodies (e.g., parliament) 
• International organizations such as the World Bank, the United Nations
Where a monitoring project uncovers evidence of corruption, or carries the
potential to generate public support for reform, it will be helpful to develop a media strat-
egy. The target audience will depend on the nature of the results: the more surprising
and controversial they are, the wider the audience they might reach. In Romania, for
example, the report on election year 2001 indicated that parties spent up to ten times
more than they had declared in income, and the findings drew extensive media cover-
age. An effective media strategy will involve organizing press conferences, contacting
journalists with a known interest in the issues, and building media alliances. 
If a clear breach of regulations has been uncovered, the results might first 
be distributed to the relevant enforcement body. In this case, the media should 
be approached only after ascertaining that there is no risk of undermining a possible
investigation. When monitoring reveals breaches of international standards or when 
corruption might affect the policy of international organizations toward the country, the
relevant international organizations should be alerted. 
Timing the dissemination of results is another important consideration. The
decision to release results prior to or following the elections is likely to depend on whether
the information is intended to inform the voting decisions of the general public or to seek
longer term reforms that rely on the support of the political parties being monitored. In
either case, any party or institution mentioned in the report should be given the opportu-
nity to review the findings and respond to them before they are made public, in order both
to bolster credibility and address any potential errors or weaknesses.
Advocacy 
In order to build support for recommendations for reform, a monitoring organization
should take great care in presenting its case and building relationships with stakeholders.
Presenting the Case for Reform
Recommendations for reform should be formulated in a simple, clear, and compelling
message. Uncomplicated reform proposals are more likely to succeed because they are
• accessible to the broader public;
• easy for the media to cover;
• difficult for opponents of reform to manipulate or misrepresent.
In addition, each assertion should be supported with strong arguments and con-
crete examples or data. Invoking public opinion in advocacy efforts can also be a very
effective strategy. The Latvian monitoring project conducted an opinion poll and used
the results as an argument for reform.
Building Relationships with Stakeholders
A basic paradox facing advocates of reform is that the support of politicians elected
under the current regulations is required in order to push through reforms of those
same regulations. For this reason, it is crucial to build relationships with important
stakeholders from the very beginning. Involving stakeholders in a continuing dialogue
from the onset of the project dramatically increases the probability that the recommen-
dations will be accepted. Whenever possible, stakeholders should be
• given the opportunity to comment on the monitoring methodology during
its development;
• informed regularly of the project’s development and results as they emerge;
• asked to participate in events organized during or after the monitoring to
encourage debate on the findings and recommendations 
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Make it interesting
The dissemination of monitoring
results can be made more interesting
or appealing by using innovative 
presentation methods that will them-
selves draw attention. For example, 
if Transparency Agreements were 
initiated as part of the project, parties
or candidates might be awarded
“transparency scores.” 
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance :  135
The forms and uses of campaign finance monitoring results
Materials Events and Activities
Dissemination of findings Presentation and interpretation 
of monitoring findings
Press releases and articles
Press conferences
Seminars/roundtables
Meetings with parties
Advocacy Analysis of campaign finance regulations 
and enforcement
Identification of weaknesses in regulations 
and institutions
Report on regulations and institutions 
in other countries
Proposed laws or amendments to existing laws
Press conferences
Seminars/roundtables
Meetings with government officials/legislators
Attendances at meetings of legislative initiators 
(government bodies, parliamentary 
committees, etc.)
Seeking redress Preparation of a case indicating 
the grounds on which an observed action 
constitutes a violation of existing regulations
Filing suit or a formal complaint 
with the courts or electoral commission
Input to further monitoring Monitoring methodology
“Baseline” data for future comparison.
Results identifying specific categories 
for focus of future monitoring
Training materials
Building coalition of NGOs with long-term 
interest in campaign and political 
finance monitoring
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The relevant stakeholders may vary considerably across countries, but they 
generally include the media, political parties or candidates, enforcement institutions,
and officials from the legislative or executive branches of government responsible for
campaign finance issues. International organizations can also prove to be important
partners in advocating reforms, especially in countries that rely on international aid. A
joint statement from the NGO and international donors can lend a project and the
resulting recommendations much credibility and leverage. On the other hand, in some
countries, the involvement of international organizations or donors may carry implica-
tions of bias or neo-colonialism, and such cooperation should be publicized with some
caution. 
Seeking Redress: Litigation 
and Other Complaint Procedures
Where monitoring reveals clear violations of existing regulations, litigation and other
forms of formal complaint can be used to do the following:
• Test the enforcement framework
• Encourage better enforcement of the regulations in question
• Draw public attention to the violations
The main rule where litigation is concerned is quite simple: don’t be wrong! A
reputable, experienced lawyer should be consulted before submitting any complaints, in
order to ensure that the complaint is factually correct and rests on solid legal ground.
Complaints should be filed with the relevant institution: either a court or the
agency responsible for supervising and enforcing campaign finance regulations, such as
the electoral commission, the supreme audit institution, a parliamentary committee, a
special anticorruption agency, or the prosecutor’s office. 
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The Fair Play Alliance’s media strategy, prepared at the outset
of the project, included three basic components:
• Forming media partnerships
• Organizing regular press conferences
• Passing on important information or offering
interesting topics to journalists
The Alliance formed formal media partnerships with Twist 
(a private radio station), Sme (a leading daily), and Trend
(a leading economic weekly). The first two partners visited 
the Alliance’s press conferences regularly and published 
articles or broadcast programs on the issues raised by the
Alliance’s work. They also provided free space for advertising,
interviews, or columns. Close contacts were also established
with TA3 (a news channel) and Radio Free Europe, which reg-
ularly invited Alliance representatives for on-air discussions
and reported extensively on their monitoring activities.
The Fair Play Alliance organized two press conferences before
the elections and two more afterwards. Partial media monitor-
ing results were published every two months, accompanied by
criticism of the loopholes in restrictions on political party
expenditure, inadequate state controls, low transparency of
political financing, and other problematic issues. The NGO
focused media attention on conflict-of-interest issues and
pointed to several instances of political parties receiving
uncommonly high discounts or inexpensive advertising space
from individuals who appeared on their candidate lists,
including one candidate who himself owned several media
outlets. 
The press conferences generally focused on party spending,
specifically the data received from political parties, the 
published rates for media advertising, and estimates of 
the minimum costs incurred by parties. Experience showed
that journalists preferred to focus on one issue at a time, and
that presentation of more than one type of information tend-
ed to be confusing. 
Two weeks before the elections, a seminar was held to evalu-
ate political party financing in the pre-election period, includ-
ing the existing framework and its flaws. Two months after the
elections, a press conference was held to identify the political
parties that had signed Transparency Agreements but failed to
comply with them. As the conference was held on Saint
Nicholas’ Eve (December 5), parties that had disclosed their
income and spending were given sweets (traditionally given
to children who were “good” in the previous year), while par-
ties that failed to fulfill their obligations received detergent (to
signify becoming “cleaner,” i.e., more transparent) and coal
(traditionally given to “bad” children). The press conference
also criticized the government for failing fully to investigate
possible breaches of the legal expenditure limit.
Developing a media strategy in Slovakia
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Building Support for Reform
A primary aim of advocacy is to promote improvements in, and/or enforcement of, the
laws and regulations affecting campaign finance directly or indirectly. The specific focus
of advocacy efforts will depend on the objectives of monitoring and on the nature of the
findings. 
Campaign Finance Regulations
Recommendations for reform may focus on one or more of the following areas of cam-
paign finance regulation:
• Disclosure requirements on income and expenditure
• Restrictions on donations and other aspects of income
• Restrictions on campaign expenditure
• State subsidies
• The powers and sanctions of institutions that supervise and 
enforce campaign finance regulations
Other Relevant Regulations
Other types of regulations may have an impact on campaign finance and represent legit-
imate targets for reform. Laws and regulations that only indirectly address campaign
finance are likely to be targeted when the monitoring project focuses on phenomena
where a number of different laws and regulations apply, such as the misuse of adminis-
trative resources. Recommendations for reform may focus on any of the following:
• Media regulations that apply during election campaigns
• Electoral laws (e.g., defining which types of campaign activities 
are permitted)
• Anticorruption laws
• Freedom of information provisions
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Presenting results and advocacy in Latvia
Dissemination and advocacy strategies are so closely linked that they should, whenever possible, be incorporated into
all events organized in connection with the project. The Latvian monitoring project provides a very good example of
how to do this in practice. A striking characteristic of the Latvian strategy was the extensive effort devoted to gaining
advance support from important actors leading up to and following the elections to the Saeima (parliament).
Monitoring timeline of the 2002 Latvian parliamentary election campaign
Date Event Goal
February 4–8, 2002 Consultations with political parties Foster support for extensive 
changes in regulations
February 11–28 Consultations with political parties about 
the project methodology and approach 
Begin negotiations about possible Transparency
Agreements to be used in the event that legislation
requiring declarations of income and expenditure 
could not be passed 
February 13 Press conference with the participation of Christian 
Gruenberg of Poder Cuidadano, Argentina
Introduce the project and inform the public 
about the Argentinean experience
March 18–April 30 Work with the parliamentary commission 
responsible for legislative reforms
Monitor, comment on, and influence the work 
on party finance legal reform
April 17 Presentation of report on the legal shortcomings 
made evident by 2001 party declarations
Additional push for changes in party finance 
regulations
May 7 Roundtable discussion with elected 
representatives, media, and advertising 
agencies
Raise awareness and advocate reforms
Secure promises of support from members 
of parliament
May 27 Agreement signed with the National Council 
for Radio and Television on joint project for 
monitoring hidden advertising
Boost project legitimacy and ensure prompt use
of monitoring results by the National Council for
Radio and Television
continued on the next page
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Monitoring timeline of the 2002 Latvian parliamentary election campaign (continued)
Date Event Goal
June 11 Press conference on political party 
expenditure in first quarter of the year 
and poll conducted to clarify discount rates
June 14 Discussion with media representatives to invite media:
• to provide information about their 
receipts from political advertising
• to voluntarily avoid hidden advertising 
Inform media representatives about the project
and neutralize their opposition
June 18 NGO forum. 51 NGOs signed an invitation 
to all media to: 
• provide information about their receipts
from political advertising before the election
• voluntarily avoid hidden advertising
Raise public awareness on issues of political party
financing and hidden advertising
Engender public sense of ownership over 
political issues
Involve the media and make them responsible for
improvements in reporting on election processes
July 8 Media gathering one month prior to start 
of monitoring: presentation of initial strategy 
for monitoring hidden advertising
Introduce project and obtain feedback 
on methodology from media
August 5 Media gathering: presentation of final 
methodology of hidden advertising project
Raise awareness, strengthen sense of 
involvement in the monitoring process 
among the media
August 14–30 Eight regional seminars dealing with:
• legislative changes in political party finance 
regulation and the possibilities for control 
they provide
• the concept of hidden advertising
• political party expenditure on political advertising
Raise public awareness, generate broader 
societal support for project activities, 
encourage more civic engagement in 
political party monitoring
continued on the next page
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Date Event Goal
August 28–
September 30
Weekly meetings of the journalists’ working group to review
and comment on cases of hidden advertising
Encourage consensus among journalists on the
damaging nature of hidden advertising
Secure their participation in monitoring outputs
September 12 Seminar on hidden advertising for regional media, analyses
of specific publications inviting comments by journalists
Improve coverage of campaign in regional media,
particularly raise awareness of improved journalis-
tic standards
October 1 Presentation of main report: “Analyses of Parties’ Income
and Expenditure Before the 8th Saeima Election”
Present analysis of parties’ income
Summarize and analyze the results of monitoring
campaign expenditure compared with parties’ dec-
larations
Present and analyze data on advertising receipts
provided by public TV and radio
Draw first conclusions on cost of electoral cam-
paign for each party in comparison with other
democracies’ cost per voter
October 5 8th Saeima elections
October 31 Presentation of the report on hidden advertising: “Analyses
of Occurrences of Hidden Advertising in the Media Before
the 8th Saeima Election”
Analyze dynamics of hidden advertising and
instances of hidden advertising across parties and
media outlets
Comment on individual cases, offer recommenda-
tions of how issues of hidden advertising should
be tackled before the next election
January 28, 2003 Expert roundtable on the results of the 
report “Analyses of the 8th Saeima Electoral 
Campaign Expenditures”
Introduce wider audience of recognized 
experts to project conclusions
Invite comments on recommended 
amendments to party financing regulation 
prepared for parliament
Monitoring timeline of the 2002 Latvian parliamentary election campaign (continued)
continued on the next page
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Date Event Goal
January 28–31 Consultations with political parties about the 
conclusions of the “Analyses of the 8th Saeima 
Electoral Campaign Expenditures” report
Invite comments from parties regarding 
discrepancies between their financial 
declarations and the monitoring results
Ask for parties’ comments on further 
changes in regulations 
February 3 Roundtable discussion with political parties 
about project conclusions
Introduce parties to project conclusions
Make parties aware of the published information 
so that they can be familiar with the original 
monitoring data when approached by the media
February 4 Visit the Latvian parliament’s anticorruption 
committee
Introduce recommendations to MPs
Outline alternative scenarios for reform 
February 19–
March 4 
Sponsor essay competition for university students: 
“Political Advertising and Our Right to Choose,” 
in cooperation with public policy portal www.politika.lv.
Broaden debate on political party expenditure 
and link it to the issue of political advertising
Raise societal awareness on these issues
March 19 
(Postponed to 
April 9)
Societal forum: “Political Advertising and 
Our Right to Choose”
Draw together a wide coalition of NGOs to sign an 
invitation to political parties to amend legislation in
order to stop escalation of political party expenditure
Broaden debate on political advertising, introduce 
broader spectrum of views
The initial project in 2001 recommended stricter disclosure requirements. Proposed amendments to the party finance law were accordingly
submitted by one political party. The head of the monitoring project then attended the meetings of the parliamentary commission responsi-
ble for the amendments to ensure that they were not neglected or diluted, and the media were immediately notified of any efforts to do so.
The Latvian monitors indicate that nearly 100 percent of their original recommendations were accepted.
A second set of recommendations also emerged from the 2002 monitoring. These were published in February 2003 and were considerably
more radical than the first set, including a ban on political advertising in the electronic media. A public opinion poll was also conducted in
order to promote understanding and support for the recommendations.
Monitoring timeline of the 2002 Latvian parliamentary election campaign (continued)
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• State budget regulations
• Codes of conduct for public servants
• Rules of appointment of upper management of state institutions 
and agencies, as well as state-controlled enterprises
• Codes of administrative procedure
• Regulation of public procurement
Enforcement
The laws and regulations governing campaign finance are often less problematic than
their enforcement. This applies not only in less-developed or transitional countries, but
in the most advanced democracies as well.
1
Several Central and Eastern European coun-
tries stand out as having relatively advanced campaign finance legislation, which
remains ineffective due to inadequate or nonexistent measures of enforcement. In such
situations, advocacy should focus as much on enforcement as on the regulations them-
selves, and recommendations for regulatory change should be put forward only if there
is a real possibility that they will be enforced. 
Advocacy to improve enforcement might recommend reforms such as the fol-
lowing:
• Establishing an agency responsible for supervising parties’ adherence to
campaign finance regulations, or relegating such supervision to an existing
agency, such as a central election commission.
• Changing the status of an agency to improve its enforcement capacity, e.g.,
increasing independence of electoral commissions by changing the rules of
appointment.
• Widening the enforcement authority of existing agencies, e.g., by giving tax
authorities full access to all political party accounts.
• Introducing adequate sanctions for violations of campaign finance regula-
tions, such as substantial fines or deregistration of a party or candidate, cou-
pled with clear powers of the relevant agencies to impose them.
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The Importance of Local Circumstances
Needless to say, recommendations for reform must be tailored to local circumstances,
especially when dealing with the following issues:
• Disclosure requirements: Disclosure is a prerequisite for transparency in
campaign finance and is a relatively noncontroversial target for advocacy.
Transparency in campaign finance is a priori desirable under a very wide
range of circumstances. However, if disclosure requirements are enforced on
a discriminatory basis, or if disclosure might put donors in physical danger,
(stricter) disclosure requirements may very well have the opposite of the
intended effect and serve to preserve existing power structures.
• State funding of election campaigns: Different countries may have different
priorities relating to political finance. In some countries, such as Sweden,
state funding of election campaigns aims to minimize parties’ dependence on
potentially corrupt private interests. In other countries, however, regulations
governing state funding may be designed specifically to support incumbent
powers, such as in Zimbabwe, where only the ruling ZANU (PF) party
receives state funds. In others still, such as the United States, state funding 
of election campaigns may be perceived as undermining individuals’ rights 
to freedom of expression by barring them from supporting the candidate or
party of their choice. In sum, the desirability and impact of state funding will
vary widely according to the nature of the political system itself.
• Spending restrictions: Restrictions on campaign expenditure may seem like
a good way of “leveling the playing field” and preventing campaign costs from
becoming prohibitive (which increases the potential for corruption, as parties
and candidates scramble to secure funds). However, in countries where
incumbent parties have sole access to state resources for campaign purpos-
es—ranging from state-controlled media to state employees and infrastruc-
ture—restrictions on spending will only give incumbents an even greater
advantage. Paradoxically, unrestrictive spending provisions may then be a
means of allowing newcomers to challenge incumbents more effectively.
When reforms are well-targeted and designed with local circumstances in mind,
the results are encouraging. Reforms of the disclosure laws in Poland in 2002, calling
for stricter disclosure requirements and a stronger enforcement framework, have had a
significant positive effect. Likewise, increases in state funding for political parties in the
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Czech Republic appear to have curbed the incidence of corrupt links between political
parties and private donors. The progressive reform of Latvian party finance legislation
has resulted in radical improvements in disclosure.
Input for Further Monitoring
Campaign finance reform is not a one-off event but a permanent process. Given the like-
lihood that compromises will be made and imperfections will arise, and given parties’
and candidates’ skill in circumventing established rules, no single monitoring project
can hope to achieve permanent and far-reaching reforms single-handedly. Providing
input for new monitoring exercises will help accelerate the reform process and thus con-
stitutes an important component of any monitoring project. 
The experience gained and lessons learned in the course of a monitoring proj-
ect may also provide important lessons for the local and international monitoring com-
munities. A monitoring project, by exposing the potential pitfalls of particular strategies
and methodologies, can help to identify what works best and thereby contribute to the
development of sound monitoring tools with broader applications. For example, differ-
ent projects implemented in several countries to monitor campaign spending on media
advertising have highlighted the importance and difficulties of estimating advertising
discounts accurately. 
A methodology that proves successful in one monitoring exercise can be repli-
cated in others, allowing for meaningful comparison of results and the tracking of a
given situation over time. 
The data and findings gathered during one monitoring project can provide a
basis for continued oversight. For example, donor lists obtained for one project can serve
as input to another project aiming to track political decisions by elected candidates in
order to identify correlations with previous campaign donations. In addition, the specif-
ic findings of a monitoring exercise will invariably yield valuable information that can be
used to better focus future monitoring projects. The Ukrainian findings on political par-
ties’ spending on media advertising served as the basis for designing a follow-up project
to be carried out in cooperation with the Ukraine Ministry of Economy and the World
Bank, with the aim of pushing through changes in party finance regulations to enable
monitoring of a broader range of categories of expenditure (see www.vybory.org.ua).
The implementation of specific reforms adopted as a result of one monitoring
exercise can be monitored during a future project. 
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Notes
1. See Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Financing Politics: A Global View,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 13 No. 4, October
2002, p.80.
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8: Project Evaluation
At a Glance
This chapter looks at how the success of a project to monitor campaign finance can be
evaluated. The first section discusses campaign finance monitoring projects, using stan-
dard project management terminology (inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes). The
final section is devoted to the logistics of the evaluation process, i.e., who should conduct
the evaluation and when.
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Criteria for Measuring Success
The success of a project to monitor campaign finance should be measured against the
objectives it was designed to pursue, not merely by whether it was carried out as planned
(often the only formal measure of success required by donor organizations). A proper
evaluation process provides a focused account of the effects of monitoring and the les-
sons learned. Before carrying out a project evaluation it is worth considering what crite-
ria to use, when to do it, and who should do it. 
In standard project management language, any project has four basic compo-
nents:
• Inputs: materials and resources used to execute the project (e.g., staff, equip-
ment, facilities, funding)
• Activities: the actions or processes undertaken to conduct and complete the
project (e.g., collecting and analyzing data, collecting information for reports,
organizing a press conference)
• Outputs: the “products” delivered by the project (e.g., data collected through
monitoring, reports produced, media coverage, draft of a new campaign
finance law)
• Outcomes: changes resulting from the project (e.g., reform of campaign
finance legislation, improved enforcement, improved disclosure, improved
methodology)
Project Inputs: Evaluating the 
Allocation of Project Resources 
The aim of this stage of project evaluation is to assess whether the materials and
resources allocated for a project were sufficient for its effective realization by asking the
following questions:
• Were enough people employed to implement the project?
• Were the technical facilities and equipment used for the project sufficient
(for example, TV sets used for media monitoring, number of video cassettes
allocated to record media content)?
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• Were sufficient funds allocated to implement the project as planned?
• Was the quality of inputs adequate (for example, were staff and volunteers
sufficiently able and qualified to carry out the various monitoring tasks)?
• Was sufficient time allocated to plan and prepare the project adequately?
Where inputs were insufficient (or, by contrast, superfluous), the difference
between allocated and necessary inputs should be stated or estimated. 
Project Activities: Evaluating 
the Implementation of Monitoring
The second part of project evaluation uses questions to focus on the actual implementa-
tion of monitoring:
• Was the monitoring carried out as planned? 
• Were any changes in the methodology carried out during the course of 
monitoring?
• Which additional changes would be desirable if such a project were to be
repeated?
• Did the findings support the selection of targets for monitoring? In other
words, were the findings of the Scoping Study consistent with the project
results, or did monitoring reveal that other areas should have been targeted
in place of, or in addition to, the ones actually monitored?
Project Outputs: Evaluating 
the Products of Monitoring
Evaluating success in terms of outputs is relatively straightforward and consists of 
comparing actual with planned outputs. The outputs of a campaign finance monitoring
project generally include (but are not limited to) the following:
• Data collected from monitoring
• Press conferences
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• Press articles and other publications 
• Seminars, conferences, roundtable discussions, and public meetings
• Recommendations for reform
• Meetings with legislators, government officials, and/or political parties
• Collaboration with law making and drafting institutions 
These outputs may be assessed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. For
example, evaluation may take into account the number of meetings held with legislators
as well as assess how productive these meetings were. Although outputs may be used as
an indicator of project success, they are of little use on their own. Outputs are, instead,
a pre-condition for achieving positive outcomes, which is how the ultimate success of a
project should be measured. 
Project Outcomes: Evaluating the Project Results
An NGO monitoring campaign finance is ultimately interested in outcomes: changes in
campaign finance practices that contribute to establishing an environment more resist-
ant to corruption. The success of outcomes can be measured in terms of the following:
• Benefits to the campaign finance system overall that ultimately correspond
to the general objectives of promoting greater transparency, exposing 
areas vulnerable to corruption, and assessing the legal and enforcement
framework
• Benefits to the monitoring organization that improve an organization’s
capacity to monitor campaign finance (e.g., number of monitors trained,
useful data generated, methodologies and tools developed, expertise 
gained, etc.)
• Benefits to the wider monitoring community, such as developing new 
monitoring methodologies or tools, publishing training manuals, and 
sharing experiences that might help other NGOs conduct more successful
projects in the future
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Successful outcomes of a campaign finance monitoring project
Benefits Quantitative Qualitative
To the campaign 
finance system
Opinion poll findings
Indicators of change in 
campaign practices
Improving transparency in 
campaign finance
Influence on the legislative 
process: reforms adopted
Drawing public attention to 
corruption in campaign finance
To the monitoring 
organization
Number of monitors trained
Monitoring tools developed
Partnerships with other organizations 
(e.g., media, other NGOs, regulators)
Capacity building: methodology, 
experience of staff, ability to 
conduct in-depth monitoring 
Developing expertise 
in monitoring techniques and 
campaign finance issues
To the monitoring 
community
Building coalitions
Number of requests from other 
monitoring organizations for 
methodological assistance
Providing results as a basis 
for future monitoring efforts
Use of methodology in different 
countries
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The basis for evaluating outcomes lies in initial project preparation. In essence,
the specific objectives defined at the outset should correspond to measurable outcomes.
An objective whose fulfillment is impossible to detect should not be part of a monitor-
ing project.
The degree to which outcomes are successful according to these criteria may be
measured in quantitative and qualitative terms, as outlined in the following table.
The Logistics of Conducting Evaluations
In addition to identifying the criteria for measuring the success of a monitoring project,
it also needs to be decided when the project should be evaluated and by whom. 
The Benefits of Independent Evaluation
Evaluating project outcomes is not just a matter of measuring simple indicators, but also
of making judgment calls that are inevitably subjective. Ideally, an evaluation should be
carried out by someone who does not have a personal interest in the success of the proj-
ect, such as representatives of other anticorruption or campaign monitoring NGOs, or
academic experts on campaign finance. Where peer review is impossible or unfeasible,
the monitoring organization will have to conduct its own evaluation. In both cases, the
objectivity of evaluation will be maximized by defining clear criteria according to which
the project should be evaluated.
A roundtable discussion or similar event involving peers, a sample of relevant
election participants (political parties, elected or nonelected candidates), and representa-
tives of relevant enforcement institutions (such as a central election commission),
organized specifically to comment on the success of the project, may also be a valuable
tool in the evaluation process.
Timing: The Problem of Long Term Outcomes
Timing the evaluation of a monitoring project will depend on several factors. Donors
generally require projects to be evaluated shortly after completion. The NGO may also
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Country Project outcomes Unrealized objectives
Latvia Reduced hidden advertising
Legislative input
Legislative change
Drew public attention 
to campaign financing
Romania Drew public attention 
to campaign financing
Received extensive media coverage
Developed a methodology for future monitoring
Produced usable data for future monitoring 
(e.g., prices of campaign activities)
Proposed party finance law
Failed to push through 
proposed reforms
Slovakia Produced large amount of systematic 
quantitative and qualitative data on 
campaign practices and the legal and 
institutional framework
Recommendations for reform of party 
finance regulations
Failed to estimate total 
cost of campaign
Ukraine Produced information to support 
reforms of campaign finance regulations
An evaluation of monitoring projects in Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine
The Case Studies provide excellent examples of different outcomes of campaign finance monitoring projects, as well as of failures to realize 
certain pursued objectives.
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want an immediate evaluation in order to demonstrate its effectiveness and to be able to
plan further monitoring. However, outcomes may be difficult to evaluate definitively
because their ultimate effects may not be evident for some time. Outcomes may be short
or long term. Long term outcomes may not be visible if projects are evaluated too soon.
In particular, the time required to see an actual reduction in levels of corruption in cam-
paign finance may make it impossible to include this as a criterion for evaluation. The
full impact of a project may not be felt for several years, and an evaluation carried out
immediately upon its completion will, by definition, be incomplete. 
Certain outcomes are, by their very nature, subjective and unpredictable. In par-
ticular, the introduction of new campaign finance legislation may initially be regarded as
a successful project outcome, but this assessment may change if the legislation has
unforeseen negative effects or if the new laws are not enforced. Furthermore, it may be
difficult to gauge whether observed outcomes are a result of the project alone or a num-
ber of other factors operating independently. The conclusions of a project evaluation
should, therefore, generally not be considered final, lending further support to the idea
that monitoring should not be a one-off event. Repeated monitoring of campaign finance
will not only help create a permanent “watchdog” in the community, but also enable the
NGO to improve the monitoring methodology through experience and to refine evalua-
tions of past monitoring projects. 
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Concluding Remarks
Corruption in the financing of electoral campaigns is a complex issue. The covert nature
of the relationships involved makes it difficult to identify corrupt transactions, and even
more difficult to prove them in court. 
Yet we have seen that it is possible to curb corruption despite these challenges.
Civil society watchdogs can effectively fill the gaps that official enforcement bodies leave
behind due to a lack of will, resources, or simply the unflagging creativity of individuals
intent on illicit gains. Examples abound of dedicated NGO activists and journalists dis-
rupting “business as usual” through careful and sustained vigilance. 
In corruption involving campaign finance, NGOs from Argentina to Zimbabwe
have had notable success at different stages of this process: first in identifying and
understanding the mechanisms through which corruption takes place, then in elaborat-
ing recommendations for improving the regulatory framework and its enforcement,
and, finally, in advocating that the recommendations be implemented. Progress on all
these fronts may not come at once, and NGOs should not be discouraged—reform is a
long-term process, and the fight against illicit campaign finance practices is a perma-
nent one. We urge you to put the practices suggested in this handbook to the test, to
apply them to your local environment, to modify them and improve on them. Each well-
designed and conducted monitoring project represents a vital step toward winning the
battle against corruption. 
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Appendix 1 
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation Rec (2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers to member
states on common rules against corruption in the funding of political par-
ties and electoral campaigns.
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 8 April at the 835th meeting of the
Ministers’ Deputies) 
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute of the
Council of Europe, 
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity
between its members; 
Considering that political parties are a fundamental element of the democratic
systems of states and are an essential tool of expression of the political will of cit-
izens; 
Considering that political parties and electoral campaigns funding in all states
should be subject to standards in order to prevent and fight against the phenom-
enon of corruption; 
Convinced that corruption represents a serious threat to the rule of law, democra-
cy, human rights, equity and social justice, that it hinders economic development,
endangers the stability of democratic institutions and undermines the moral
foundations of society; 
Having regard to the recommendations adopted at the 19th and 21st Conferences
of European Ministers of Justice (Valetta, 1994 and Prague, 1997 respectively);
Having regard to the Programme of Action against Corruption adopted by the
Committee of Ministers in 1996;
In accordance with the Final Declaration and the Plan of Action adopted by the
Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe at their Second
Summit, held in Strasbourg on 10 and 11 October 1997; 
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Having regard to Resolution (97) 24 on the twenty guiding principles for the fight
against corruption, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 6 November 1997
and in particular Principle 15, which promotes rules for the financing of political
parties and election campaigns which deter corruption; 
Having regard to Recommendation 1516 (2001) on the financing of political par-
ties, adopted on 22 May 2001 by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly; 
In the light of the conclusions of the 3rd European Conference of Specialized
Services in the Fight against Corruption on the subject of Trading in Influence
and Illegal Financing of Political Parties held in Madrid from 28 to 30 October
1998; 
Recalling in this respect the importance of the participation of non-member
states in the Council of Europe’s activities against corruption and welcoming their
valuable contribution to the implementation of the Programme of Action against
Corruption; 
Having regard to Resolution (98) 7 authorising the Partial and Enlarged
Agreement establishing the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and
Resolution (99) 5 establishing the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO),
which aims at improving the capacity of its members to fight corruption by fol-
lowing up compliance with their undertakings in this field; 
Convinced that raising public awareness on the issues of prevention and fight
against corruption in the field of funding of political parties is essential to the
good functioning of democratic institutions, 
Recommends that the governments of member states adopt, in their national
legal systems, rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and elec-
toral campaigns which are inspired by the common rules reproduced in the
appendix to this recommendation—in so far as states do not already have partic-
ular laws, procedures or systems that provide effective and well-functioning alter-
natives—and instructs the “Group of States against Corruption – GRECO” to
monitor the implementation of this recommendation. 
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Common rules against corruption in the funding of political parties and electoral
campaigns 
I. External sources of funding of political parties 
Article 1 Public and private support to political parties 
The state and its citizens are both entitled to support political parties. 
The state should provide support to political parties. State support should be
limited to reasonable contributions. State support may be financial. 
Objective, fair and reasonable criteria should be applied regarding the distribu-
tion of state support. 
States should ensure that any support from the state and/or citizens does not
interfere with the independence of political parties. 
Article 2 Definition of donation to a political party 
Donation means any deliberate act to bestow advantage, economic or other-
wise, on a political party. 
Article 3 General principles on donations 
a. Measures taken by states governing donations to political parties should pro-
vide specific rules to: 
– avoid conflicts of interests; 
– ensure transparency of donations and avoid secret donations; 
– avoid prejudice to the activities of political parties; 
– ensure the independence of political parties. 
b. States should: 
i. provide that donations to political parties are made public, in particular,
donations exceeding a fixed ceiling;
ii. consider the possibility of introducing rules limiting the value of dona-
tions to political parties; 
iii. adopt measures to prevent established ceilings from being circumvented.
Article 4 Tax deductibility of donations 
Fiscal legislation may allow tax deductibility of donations to political parties.
Such tax deductibility should be limited. 
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Article 5 Donations by legal entities 
a. In addition to the general principles on donations, states should provide: 
i. that donations from legal entities to political parties are registered in the
books and accounts of the legal entities; and
ii. that shareholders or any other individual member of the legal entity be
informed of donations. 
b. States should take measures aimed at limiting, prohibiting or otherwise
strictly regulating donations from legal entities which provide goods or serv-
ices for any public administration. 
c. States should prohibit legal entities under the control of the state or of other
public authorities from making donations to political parties. 
Article 6 Donations to entities connected with a political party 
Rules concerning donations to political parties, with the exception of those con-
cerning tax deductibility referred to in Article 4, should also apply, as appropri-
ate, to all entities which are related, directly or indirectly, to a political party or
are otherwise under the control of a political party. 
Article 7 Donations from foreign donors 
States should specifically limit, prohibit or otherwise regulate donations from
foreign donors. 
II. Sources of funding of candidates for elections and elected officials 
Article 8 Application of funding rules to candidates for elections and elected rep-
resentatives 
The rules regarding funding of political parties should apply mutatis mutandis
to: 
– the funding of electoral campaigns of candidates for elections; 
– the funding of political activities of elected representatives. 
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III. Electoral campaign expenditure 
Article 9 Limits on expenditure 
States should consider adopting measures to prevent excessive funding needs of
political parties, such as, establishing limits on expenditure on electoral cam-
paigns. 
Article 10 Records of expenditure 
States should require particular records to be kept of all expenditure, direct and
indirect, on electoral campaigns in respect of each political party, each list of
candidates and each candidate. 
IV. Transparency 
Article 11 Accounts 
States should require political parties and the entities connected with political
parties mentioned in Article 6 to keep proper books and accounts. The accounts
of political parties should be consolidated to include, as appropriate, the
accounts of the entities mentioned in Article 6. 
Article 12 Records of donations 
a. States should require the accounts of a political party to specify all donations
received by the party, including the nature and value of each donation. 
b. In case of donations over a certain value, donors should be identified in the
records. 
Article 13 Obligation to present and make public accounts 
a. States should require political parties to present the accounts referred to in
Article 11 regularly, and at least annually, to the independent authority
referred to in Article 14. 
b. States should require political parties regularly, and at least annually, to make
public the accounts referred to in Article 11 or as a minimum a summary of
those accounts, including the information required in Article 10, as appropri-
ate, and in Article 12.
Monitoring Election Campaign Finance :  161
V. Supervision 
Article 14 Independent monitoring 
a. States should provide for independent monitoring in respect of the funding
of political parties and electoral campaigns. 
b. The independent monitoring should include supervision over the accounts of
political parties and the expenses involved in election campaigns as well as
their presentation and publication. 
Article 15 Specialised personnel 
States should promote the specialisation of the judiciary, police or other person-
nel in the fight against illegal funding of political parties and electoral cam-
paigns. 
VI. Sanctions 
Article 16 Sanctions 
States should require the infringement of rules concerning the funding of polit-
ical parties and electoral campaigns to be subject to effective, proportionate and
dissuasive sanctions.
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Appendix 2: Sample 
Transparency Agreement
Transparency Agreement
This transparency agreement is signed between:
Civic association: Aliancia na podporu fair play
Safárikovo nám. 7
811 02 Bratislava
Represented by: 
Executive Director Zuzana Wienk
And
Political party:
Represented by:
Article I
Civic association Aliancia na podporu fair play (hereafter: APFP) and political party (hereafter:
Party) ....... sign this agreement, through which the Party guarantees transparency and free access
to information about its finances during the pre-election period.
Article II
The pre-election period, for the purposes of this agreement, is the period defined by Act number
239/1994 (coll.) about the limitation of expenditure of political parties on promotion before the
elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic; that specifically means the time period
from June 13, 2002 to September 21, 2002.
Article III
The Party agrees that APFP will execute the monitoring and control of financing of its activities,
operations, and the origin of sources used for these activities and operations in the period specified
in Articles I and II of this agreement. 
ˇ
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Article IV
The Party is obliged to submit reports stating its income and expenditures for the months of June
2002, July 2002, August 2002, and September 2002. These reports will also include the review of
income from public and private sources and expenditures, the origin of sources, details about types
of usage of these sources, quantity and prices of ordered services and products, in the structure
mutually agreed by both signatories. 
Article V
Reports for the months of June 2002 and July 2002 must be delivered to APFP at the latest by
August 30, 2002; report for the month of August 2002 at the latest by September 30, 2002 and
report for the month of September 2002 at the latest by October 30, 2002.
Article VI
The Party is obliged to explain to APFP any numerical inaccuracies that might occur by comparing
submitted reports with data resulting from APFP’s monitoring. 
Article VII
APFP accepts its duties stated in this agreement and attests that, with the help and cooperation
from partnering non-governmental organizations, independent experts and professional independ-
ent agencies, it will monitor expenditures of political parties during the pre-election period and
that it is obliged toward the Party to clarify all inaccuracies that might occur. APFP is also obliged
to withhold this information and reports from the political competitors of the Party. 
Article VIII
APFP will, on a monthly basis, publish its monitoring report, compare this report with the data
submitted by the Party, and submit this report to the Party and the mass media. Reports will be
published in August 2002, September 2002, and October 2002.
Article IX
After the Central Election Committee announces results of the parliamentary elections, taking
place on September 20 and 21, 2002, APFP will prepare a final report and discuss the text of this
report with each signatory political party and will subsequently publish this report in the mass
media. 
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Article X
APFP is obliged to monitor and evaluate monitored data objectively, truly and professionally, using
all available sources of information. APFP is also obliged not to publish false, distorted and uncom-
pleted monitoring results as well as unverified information and must explain all possible misun-
derstandings that may occur. 
Article XI
The report submitted by the Party to APFP must include the following items and categories:
I. Costs related to parliamentary elections: 
a) Costs of outdoor advertisement (advertisement on billboards, big boards, mega-boards,
city posters, city lights, posters, and other small outdoor advertisements), expenditures
related to production, material, staff, printing, creative design and distribution of this
advertisement
b) Costs of other advertising types and costs of promotional items and presents, separated
into different types (leaflets, travel tickets, invitations, stickers, cups and glasses, pens,
coins, washing powders, T-shirts, coupons, lighters, hats, beer mats, balloons, political
parties’ newspapers, badges, bags, can openers, product covers—for example, for
sugar, key rings, umbrellas, books, postcards, etc.), expenditures related to production,
distribution, obtaining promotional items and presents and other advertising types 
c) Costs of advertisements in print media, costs of producing these advertisements, print-
ing, creative design
d) Costs of advertisements in electronic media, costs of producing these advertisements,
material, creative design, purchasing the broadcasting time, honoraria for actors
e) Costs of legally permitted advertising of political parties in public media, costs of pro-
ducing these advertisements, material, creative design, purchasing the broadcasting
time, honoraria for actors
f) Costs of advertisements on the internet
g) Costs of activities related to parliamentary elections, political rallies, meetings, meet-
ings with citizens, events, conferences, and all other organizational costs related to stat-
ed events
h) Costs of research and surveys, legal services
j) Costs of PR, media, advertising agencies, consulting and creative activities
k) Costs of renting premises, technical equipment, vehicles, etc.
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II. Costs of regular activities:
a) Energy and material costs f) Insurance costs 
b) Transportation costs g) Rental of premises 
c) Representative costs h) Costs related to political work 
d) Costs of services i) Administrative costs 
e) Salaries 
Article XII 
APFP’s monitoring will be based on common market prices of products and services listed in
Article XI of this agreement, as well as on market discounts imposed on stated products and serv-
ices and the official value of products and services. 
Article XIII 
APFP will monitor compliance with Act number 80/1990 (coll.) concerning the elections to the
Slovak National Council, Act number 424/1991 (coll.) concerning association in political parties
and political movements, and Act number 239/1994 (coll.) concerning the limitation of expendi-
ture of political parties on promotion before the elections to the National Council of Slovak
Republic, and will inform the public about results of this monitoring. 
Article XIV 
The Party will also complete the questionnaire (Appendix A) and allow APFP to contact its suppli-
ers in accordance with the permission enclosed in this agreement (Appendix B). 
Article XV 
This agreement is prepared in two identical copies, one copy for each signatory party of this agree-
ment. Signatory parties announce that they are acquainted with this agreement, agree with it and
therefore sign it. 
Bratislava, date 
Representative of political party Representative of Aliancia na podporu fair play
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Questionnaire on Election Campaign Events 
Party/Candidate: Date: 
Elections: 
1. Which person or agency suggested and organized the following campaign activities for you? (please list agency name)
Organizer Cost
Events:
Competitions:
Meetings:
Shows:
Appendix 3: Materials for Monitoring Campaign Events 
2. Please list any space or premises rented for campaign events, including the location and the terms of rental.
Event Space Location Rented 
From
Period 
of rental
Cost
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3. Which of the following were used at your events? (Please check and specify information for all that apply)
Provided by: Cost:
q Fireworks or laser show
q Promotional materials and treats
q Ushers/Hostesses/Wait staff 
q Translation/interpreting services 
q Security
q Photographers/Videographers 
q Other (e.g., antique cars, flowers, decorations) 
q Tables and chairs
q Live entertainment
4. How were campaign events promoted and publicized, and by whom?
Questionnaire on Election Campaign Events (continued)
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q Meeting 
q open space q town square q cultural venue q outdoor stadium
q indoor stadium q meeting room of q hotel  meeting room q restaurant meeting room
local administration
q Reception
q cultural venue q hotel  meeting room q restaurant meeting room q meeting room of
local administration
q Seminar or Lecture: 
q cultural venue q hotel  meeting room q restaurant  meeting room q meeting room of
local administration
q Politicians and important personalities (list of those present and their functions, if known)
Name: Function/Title: 
Name: Function/Title: 
Name: Function/Title: 
Name: Function/Title: 
Name: Function/Title: 
q Entertainment: identity of musical performers/comedians etc and length of performance 
Name: Function/Title/Length:
Name: Function/Title/Length:
Name: Function/Title/Length:
Name: Function/Title/Length:
Template for Monitoring Campaign Events
The following table provides a sample template that monitors may use to record the details of election campaign events.
Monitor: Date:
Party/Candidate: Location:
Type of Event: Number of attendees:
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q Technical equipment (if yes, describe in detail)
q Stage (if yes, describe)
q Electricity (if yes, specify source)
q Transportation provided
q Cars Number: Owned by: 
q Buses Number: Owned by: 
q Vans Number: Owned by: 
q Limousines Number: Owned by: 
q Refreshments (if yes, describe)
q Promotional materials/Treats (if yes, approximate quantity)
q t-shirts: q caps: q lighters: 
q balloons: q pens: q stickers: 
q printed materials: q other: 
q Promotion of event
q posters q public announcements q media announcements 
q other (e.g., hot-air balloon, bus) :
Provide a brief description of the event (length, activities, attendance)
Additional comments:
Template for Monitoring Campaign Events (continued)
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Rules and Guidelines for Regional Monitors 
of Campaign Events
Developed by the Fair Play Alliance, Slovakia
The project worker must:
• be acquainted with the pre-election code of ethics;
• attend all campaign events assigned to him/her for monitoring;
• fill out a report according to the attached sample;1
• include a brief additional report outlining the most important 
aspects of the attended event;
• take two pictures of the event;
• take samples of all promotional materials handed out at the event;
• attend each event from beginning to end;
• obtain information about what happened prior to his/her arrival 
if the event began earlier than announced;
• not accept any rewards, compensation, or help from representatives 
of political parties;
• complete the questionnaire fairly and impartially.
If the worker knows in advance that he/she will not be able to attend a certain event,
he/she must find a substitute and inform the project managers. The substitute monitor
will also have to sign a copy of these rules. Monitors’ work will be checked via telephone,
the pictures provided, and direct check-ups at events.
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Suggested Responses to Typical Questions 
from Event Organizers
1. Who are you? – A regional worker of the Fair Play Alliance.
2. What is the Alliance? – The Alliance is an apolitical, non-governmental 
organization that monitors political parties’ expenditure, behavior, and
ethics during the election campaign. 
3. Why do you monitor? – We monitor the election campaign so that the pub-
lic can know how parties conduct their campaigns and how much the cam-
paigns cost. 
4. What is the point of this? – We want to initiate public debate about the elec-
tion campaign and to provide the public with information about political 
parties, as is their right according to the Freedom of Information Act.
5. If representatives of the political parties object to your presence, refer to the
code of ethics that the political parties signed with the Alliance, and accord-
ing to which they have agreed to cooperate with the Alliance. The Alliance’s
analysts regularly communicate with parties’ headquarters, and they should,
therefore, know that we monitor their activities and events. 
6. If party representatives object to pictures being taken at the event, point out
that the event is being held publicly and attended by the public. The Slovak
Constitution and the Constitutional Court directly guarantee the right to 
photograph public events. Explain that the pictures will primarily be used 
as proof of attendance at the event 
7. In case of any other questions, refer party representatives to the Alliance’s
Executive Director or the regional monitoring coordinator. 
Notes
1. Similar to the template for monitoring events in Appendix 3.
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Glossary
Analysts Project staff who classify and process data to produce
findings
Campaign expenditure Expenditure incurred by or on behalf of a registered polit-
ical party or candidate to promote the party or candidate
at an election or in connection with future elections,
including expenditure that has the aim of damaging the
prospects of another party or candidate
Campaign finance The resources acquired and spent by electoral candidates
and political parties in election campaigns
Campaign income The sources of income used to finance an election cam-
paign, in particular direct donations, loans, third-party 
and in-kind contributions, and the use of administrative
resources
Campaign outputs Campaign-related activities, including advertising and
staged events, organized and paid for by candidates,
political parties, or independent third-parties
Coordinators Project managers who provide overall direction, oversee
monitoring, and supervise project staff
Disclosure Regulations requiring parties or candidates to officially
requirements declare received income and/or expenditure
Donation Any deliberate act to bestow advantage, economic or 
otherwise, on a political party
Electoral bloc A coalition of parties and/or other movements compet-
ing together in an election
Hidden advertising Material that appears in the media as objective reporting
or analysis but in reality promotes one candidate or party
or attempts to discredit another
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In-kind donations Goods and services offered to candidates or campaigns
free of charge or at a discount
Institutional advertising “Public service” advertising, placed and produced at pub-
lic expense by the state or public sector, whose true pur-
pose is to promote incumbent or other favored parties or
candidates
Interconnected donors Multiple individuals, such as family members, used to
conceal a large donation from a single source
Majoritarian An electoral system where citizens vote for and elect
electoral system individual candidates
Market value The price that would be charged for a service or good on
the market
Misuse of  The use of state and public sector powers and resources
administrative (including coercive capacities, personnel, financial, 
resources material, and other resources) by incumbent politicians
or political parties to further their own prospects of elec-
tion, in violation of legal and/or other norms and
responsibilities governing the exercise of public office
Monitoring The systematic and objective observation and documen-
tation of a particular process over time
Monitoring An account of the components of campaign finance
methodology to be monitored, how each component will be moni-
tored, and the sources of information available to carry
out the monitoring
Monitoring strategy The general and specific objectives of a monitoring 
project
Monitors Project staff who collect raw data
Project activities The activities or processes undertaken during the course
of a project (e.g., collecting and analyzing data, collecting
information for reports, organizing a press conference)
Project inputs Materials and resources used to implement a project
(e.g., staff, equipment, facilities, funding)
Project outcomes Changes resulting from a project (e.g., reform of 
campaign finance legislation, improved enforcement,
improved disclosure)
Project outputs “Products” delivered (e.g., data collected through moni-
toring, reports produced, media coverage, draft of a new
campaign finance law)
Proportional An electoral system whereby seats are allocated 
representation proportionally to votes received. In one variant, 
electoral system citizens vote for parties whose candidates are then 
allocated seats according to the percentages of votes 
won by their parties
Quid pro quo donations The provision of financial or other resources by private
interests in return for favorable treatment by elected 
representatives
Real-time monitoring Monitoring that takes place as the campaign is happen-
ing, i.e., daily monitoring of new information and events
Representative sample A portion of the whole that is believed to accurately 
represent the characteristics of the total “population” 
of persons, activities, or locations monitored
Sampling The process of selecting a representative or targeted 
portion of a total “population” for monitoring; samples
typically consist of locations, voters, donors, media 
outlets, etc., depending on the objectives of monitoring 
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Scoping Study A brief, preliminary piece of research performed in 
order to assess the local circumstances, identify the 
areas of campaign finance most suitable for monitoring,
and set general objectives
State capture The corrupt influence of individuals or groups on the
formation of laws, regulations and other government
policies. The World Bank defines state capture as 
“the actions of individuals, groups or firms both in 
the public and private sectors to influence the forma-
tion of laws, regulations, decrees, and other govern-
ment policies to their own advantage as a result of 
illicit and non-transparent provision of private 
benefits to public officials.”
Targeted sample A portion of the whole selected deliberately, not at 
random, and used to illustrate a specific aspect or 
component of a broader phenomenon
Third-party contributions Goods or services paid for on behalf of a political party
or candidate
Transparency The degree to which an institution’s finances, policies, 
methodology, and operations are made available or 
known to the public
Transparency agreement An agreement between a monitoring organization and
parties/candidates, who agree to provide information 
on all or certain aspects of their finances
Unlikely donors Private or corporate donors whose status cannot be 
confirmed or who are not likely to possess the funds
required to make the contributions for which they are
credited on party or candidate declarations of income
Vote buying Providing money or other benefits to voters in order to
persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate
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Open Society Justice Initiative
The Open Society Justice Initiative, an operational program of the Open Society Institute, 
pursues law reform activities grounded in the protection of human rights, and contributes to
the development of legal capacity for open societies. The Justice Initiative combines litigation,
legal advocacy, technical assistance, and the dissemination of knowledge to secure advances 
in five priority areas: national criminal justice, international justice, freedom of information
and expression, equality and citizenship, and anticorruption. Its offices are in Abuja, Budapest,
and New York.
The Justice Initiative is governed by a Board composed of the following members:
Aryeh Neier (Chair), Chaloka Beyani, Maja Daruwala, J. 'Kayode Fayemi, Anthony Lester QC,
Juan E. Méndez, Diane Orentlicher, Wiktor Osiatynski, András Sajó, Herman Schwartz, and
Christopher E. Stone.
The staff includes James A. Goldston, executive director; Zaza Namoradze, Budapest
office director; Kelly Askin, senior legal officer, international justice; Helen Darbishire, senior
program manager, freedom of information and expression; Julia Harrington, senior legal offi-
cer, equality and citizenship; Stephen Humphreys, senior officer, publications and communica-
tions; Katy Mainelli, administrative manager; Chidi Odinkalu, senior legal officer, Africa;
Darian Pavli, legal officer, freedom of information and expression; and Martin Schönteich, 
senior legal officer, national criminal justice.
Contact: Marijana Trivunovic, anticorruption consultant, trivunovic@osieurope.org,
or info@justiceinitiative.org
www.justiceinitiative.org
Open Society Institute
The Open Society Institute, a private operating and grantmaking foundation, aims to
shape public policy to promote democratic governance, human rights, and economic,
legal, and social reform. On a local level, OSI implements a range of initiatives to support
the rule of law, education, public health, and independent media. At the same time, OSI
works to build alliances across borders and continents on issues such as combating 
corruption and rights abuses.
OSI was created in 1993 by investor and philanthropist George Soros to support
his foundations in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Those foun-
dations were established, starting in 1984, to help countries make the transition from 
communism. OSI has expanded the activities of the Soros foundations network to other
areas of the world where the transition to democracy is of particular concern. The Soros
foundations network encompasses more than 60 countries, including the United States.
www.soros.org    
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`
`
Adequate disclosure and regulation of campaign finance are 
necessary prerequisites to controlling political corruption. Yet in
many countries, laws governing campaign finance are riddled with
loopholes and poorly enforced. Monitoring Election Campaign
Finance responds to the growing need among NGOs for a set of
practical tools to help monitor and fight corruption. The handbook
draws on the experience of citizens challenging corrupt practices 
in more than a dozen countries in different regions. It will help
NGOs carry out effective campaign finance monitoring and reform
programs by providing key concepts, practical guidelines, and 
examples of good practices and lessons learned. Government staff,
political party managers, civil society activists, and journalists will
also find the handbook invaluable in helping them understand and
analyze electoral campaign finance issues.
The Open Society Justice Initiative, an operational program of the Open Society Institute, 
pursues law reform programs grounded in the protection of human rights, and 
contributes to the development of legal capacity for open societies.
www.justiceinitiative.org
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